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Abstract
Markets are key elements of people’s livelihood both in normal conditions and in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster, as long as markets function properly. Such
recognition has contributed to the progressive acceptance of cash-based instruments
and, more generally, to the strategic shift from food aid to food assistance with
particular reference to cash transfers. However, such a shift has highlighted new needs,
mainly in the form of analytical skills required to optimize the analysis of response
options and support strategic decision making. Lack of capacity in this respect may be a
critical constraint in the initial stages of emergency response.
This study has proposed and applied a few tools to assess the feasibility of cash
transfers and to support the selection of intervention strategy. This has been done by
assessing the functionality of markets and simulating the response of recipients and
traders to an eventual cash-based intervention. Particular attention has been provided to
the simulation of supply response. This is motivated by the consideration that when
demand is artificially increased through cash transfers, much of the final outcome is
determined by the capacity to scale up local supply. The profiling exercise of traders
conducted through the case studies has provided interesting behavioural information. In
particular, how much price increases trigger traders’ decision to scale up their business
size has been investigated. Price rises generate a range of responses from different types
of traders in different contexts, highlighting the need to define response capacity at local
level. From this contextualized perspective the comparison between increased demand
and supply has been used to estimate the price increase that can be expected from a
certain injection of cash transfer to a set number of beneficiaries.
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Introduction
1.1 Cash and food
Despite some long-term economic growth experienced by low-income countries since
the middle of last century, in general hunger and vulnerability around the globe have
increased. This has reversed the declining trend in the proportion of undernourished in
developing countries and has raised the estimate of hungry people in the world to a peak
(FAO, 2009; IFPRI, 2009).
Figure 1.1 Evolution of undernourishment
Proportion of undernourished
in developing countries Number of undernourishedin the world
Source:   FAO, 2009
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Such a setback in hunger reduction reflects a multi-faceted situation. On one side, the
combined rise in the annual number of natural disasters as well as in the number of
people affected by disasters has contributed to reducing availability and/or access to
food. On the other side, structural changes in the global system have contributed to
making it progressively more distorted (Van der Ploeg, 2010). While this has affected
various aspects of the economy, it has hit the international food system particularly
hard. During the last couple of decades developing countries have become progressively
more integrated, both financially and commercially, into the world economy, and as an
inevitable consequence they have become more exposed to changes in the international
markets (FAO, 2009). This has been dramatically evidenced in the crisis of soaring food
prices experienced in 2007-08, characterized by sharp increases and volatility in food
commodity prices. FAO states that “the increase in food insecurity is not a result of
poor crop harvests, but because high domestic food prices, lower incomes and
increasing unemployment have reduced access to food by the poor” (FAO, 2009).
The increasing relevance of food access causing of food insecurity has reignited
discussion about the effectiveness and efficiency of food aid responses to food
insecurity and stimulated interest in cash transfers and similar instruments1 as an
alternative response option. Despite the consideration that the greater the need for social
protection, the lower the capacity of the state to provide it (Devereux, 2000; Devereux
et al., 2005), cash transfers have become common practice through social protection
programmes, in some cases on a large or even country-wide scale. Following such
developments, recent years have been marked by progressive moves towards the use of
cash-based programming in fragile states and unstable situations and in response to
emergencies. Initial attempts to implement cash and voucher interventions in such
contexts as Somalia and Darfur have shown that cash need not only be considered in
stable contexts (Bailey et al., 2008). After all, it has been remarked how the constraints
1 Although vouchers, conditional and unconditional cash transfers, cash-for-work and other variations of
transfer program strategy, present some differences, not only from an economic perspective, such
peculiarities are ignored here because they are not strictly relevant from the market analysis perspective
which is the focus of the present analysis. Therefore, throughout this analysis the general expression of
cash transfer is used to refer to any form of cash or voucher transfer, with no difference about any
conditionality involved.
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facing cash (security risks, impacts on local markets, entanglement in predatory
economies) in unstable contexts also apply to in-kind assistance (Harvey, 2007).
On the supply side, the position towards the emergence of the new transfer strategy,
though generally supportive, has been rather diverse, with a few convinced supporters
and some others more reluctant to adjust established systems of aid delivery. The
growing support for cash transfers as an alternative mechanism to the delivery of food
assistance is partly motivated by a certain long-term criticism of the lack of
effectiveness and efficiency of traditional food aid management, as well as by
dissatisfaction with its global governance mechanisms and lack of vision about their
future.2 Anyway, interest in cash transfers as a food security instrument has grown
remarkably and the discussion is quickly expanding to involve non-food sectors of
assistance. Such interest is fuelled by the fact that markets in developing countries
function better than they used to, food systems are more integrated, the pace of
urbanization is accelerating and basic financial services are increasingly diffused,
including in rural areas (McCullogh et al., 2008; WFP, 2008). Furthermore, besides
their primary objective of increasing access to food cash transfers may have the
comparative advantage against food transfers of helping to increase – and, eventually,
even kick-start –  market activities, improving this way the local economy and creating
new livelihood opportunities for the poor (Davies et al., 2008; Ahmed et al., 2007).
2 In this regard it may be enough to mention the repeated criticism of the ineffectiveness of such an
institution as the Food Aid Convention (FAC). Maxwell (2007) remarks on the weak enforcing
compliance of legal obligations included in the FAC such as the prescription of minimum tonnage to be
provided by signatories. Although the tonnage minima were intended to make the availability of food aid
somewhat counter-cyclical, there is evidence that food aid is strongly pro-cyclical. In other words, the
availability of food aid increases when food prices are lower, that is when at global level food assistance
is needed less (Maxwell, 2007; Barrett et al., 2005).
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1.2 The present study
Throughout its compilation, the present research, parts of which have been conducted
over a period of five years, has witnessed remarkable changes with regard to the
planning and management of food assistance. It has seen an increasing number of pilot
initiatives meant to explore the feasibility and impact of any possible combination
and/or variation of delivery mechanisms in very different contexts, as well as a
proliferation of initiatives to discuss and promote the use of different aid delivery
mechanisms in order to improve aid effectiveness and efficiency. The present research
is contextual to initiatives meant to progressively recognize and institutionalize the use
of cash transfers, such as most relevant donors’ initiatives to prepare guidelines on the
funding of cash transfer programmes as well as that of the mandated United Nations
(UN) agency on food assistance to set up an apposite policy framework. At the same
time, discussion is currently ongoing about the possibility of proposing minimum
standards for cash and voucher transfers – as well as on strategies for economic
recovery in crisis-affected environment – as already done through the Sphere Project for
the definition of a humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response.3
Despite all such enthusiasm and progress, there are a number of gaps still to be faced
when considering, planning or managing a cash-based intervention.4 Amongst these the
need to increase knowledge and capacity in market analysis is often highlighted as a
priority. The technical knowledge and capacity required to conduct a market study,
which nowadays is becoming a necessary prerequisite to the design of cash-based
interventions, is often seen as a discouraging factor. As remarked on various occasions,
poorly-designed and/or managed aid can do damage, and, like commodity-based
intervention strategies, cash-based ones are not immune to such a risk. Therefore, once
again, improved analysis is required in order to address the inappropriate use of food
assistance (Maxwell et al., 2003).
3 Efforts in this direction are currently coordinated by the Cash Learning Partnership Project (CaLP) and
the Small Enterprise Education and Promotion (SEEP) Network, respectively.
4 Such consideration can be easily extended to the entire field of food assistance, as well as to the other
sectors of aid.
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The aim of this study is to try to fill part of such a gap. The study focuses on some of
the typical analysis required for the selection of humanitarian response options and is
based on real analytical work carried out in relation to market interventions and market
assessment and monitoring. The leading principle throughout the research is that no
intervention is neutral to the system in which it is put in place, be it economic, social,
political, or of any other type, although in our specific case it is mainly economic.
Therefore a proper understanding of the context-specific factors and specific
circumstances in which any intervention is eventually required is key to identifying the
most appropriate food assistance instrument or combination of instruments. In
particular, the aim of this study is to test the assumption that contextual factors are key
determinants of market functionality and therefore both directly and indirectly play an
essential role in affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of different intervention
strategies.
The study tries to maintain a field perspective, with acknowledgement that analytical as
well as any other kind of constraints regularly encountered through this type of studies
in “normal” circumstances are unnecessarily magnified in developing countries. In
particular, wherever possible some rigidities prescribed by the books are circumvented,
trying to maintain a balance between the significance of the analysis and the usual
constraints dictated by shortage of resources or even lack of physical access. The use of
Rapid Appraisal Techniques (RATs) is a case in point.
The initial part of the study provides the basic steps before proceeding to the applicative
part. The literature review provides an overview of the range of tools and analyses that
can be used around markets and market interventions. The conceptual and
methodological chapter is focused on the analytical approach adopted and the
description of the tools considered most appropriate for the scope of this study. The
second part is devoted to the application of the analytical tools. In particular, three case
studies are developed in parallel. These have been the subject of preliminary market
assessments aimed at assessing the feasibility of cash transfers. The three different set-
ups considered through the case studies manage to cover a set of diverse realities. They
range from conditions of a chronically low level of development, to somehow more
dynamic contexts characterized by either a protracted economic recession or, at the
other end, by the start of a process of generalized reprise after a long period of civil
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conflict. Finally, the applicative part continues with a more in-depth analysis of
particular aspects or tools referred to in the case studies. In particular, in chapter 7 the
use of such a diverse set of contextual features considered through the case studies
provides a good background to the comparative analysis of different intervention
strategies. Chapter 8 builds on one of the case studies to deepen the analysis of
efficiency and effectiveness of alternative response options in support of decision
making purposes. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of the study and provides
conclusive remarks.
2
Literature review
2.1 The economics of cash and food transfers
The discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of different types of intervention
strategies is a controversial, though recurrent, subject. In particular, food aid is usually
considered to dominate the emergency response, despite the common perception that
such a form of assistance may be an inefficient – and in many cases even inappropriate
– form of resource transfer. Such a perception has regularly generated discussion about
the feasibility and appropriateness of alternatives to food aid, among which are market
support, cash-for-work, distribution of vouchers and cash transfers. In particular,
various studies have been carried out on the comparative role that such different
instruments as cash and food can play. Normally the analysis has focused on the
comparative advantages and performance of different strategies, providing regularly
mixed results. What follows is a review of the major positions expressed on the subject.
It is evident that, at least from a theoretical point of view, in such situations where an
insufficient purchasing power is at least partly responsible for the problem, a cash
response can make sense. Drèze and Sen (1989) make the case for cash provision,
arguing that lack of purchasing power prevents the normal functioning of markets and
in such conditions a famine may develop even if there is not a food shortage. In such
cases, cash distribution can not only increase household access to food, but also play a
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pivotal role in stimulating a demand-driven process of growth of the local economy. On
the same lines Coate (1989) provides a comprehensive theoretical framework arguing
that if there are food markets in the country to be assisted, a relief agency or a donor
country could just as easily distribute money to the needy and let them purchase food in
these markets. Coate’s model stresses the relevance of trade and highlights that “the
relative effectiveness of cash and direct food relief will depend critically on the
behaviour of traders and on whether food will be exported, imported or neither
exported nor imported” (Coate, 1989).  In particular, cash relief is more likely to be
optimal when food is exported, the larger the degree of price responsiveness of the
excess supply of the non-needy population and the larger the relief agency’s transport
costs, and the smaller the money or asset holdings of the needy population.
In addition, the advantages of cash compared to food in terms of its fungibility are
usually listed in support of a cash-based response. In particular, the use of cash is
considered to be efficient since it is assumed to require smaller logistic costs than
commodity-based alternatives, as well as allowing optimum use of resources transferred
through direct beneficiaries’ decisions.
The perception of food aid as an income transfer, introduced more than two decades ago
(Reutlinger, 1984, and Reutlinger et al., 1984), highlighted the need to pay attention to
the efficiency of such a transfer. It was recognized how “transfer of income is usually
not the sole objective of payments in kind. … In any case, augmentation of poor
people’s incomes should be the dominant objective of project food aid” (Reutlinger,
1984). The use of alpha-value was proposed on such occasion to measure the efficiency
of income transfer achieved through food aid commodities. It is the ratio between the
value of the food aid basket to the recipient and the full cost faced to acquire it and get it
delivered and distributed. However, the alpha-value is recognized to be quite generic
and, furthermore, a constraint to its application is that accurate analysis of the
alternative options requires data-intensive modelling of supply and demand effects,
which in many emergency contexts is seen as neither feasible nor appropriate.
A cross-country study conducted by OECD highlights how “food aid in-kind carries
substantial efficiency costs, conservatively estimated as at least 30% on average … In
contrast, most local purchases or regionally sourced imports are relatively efficient
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ways of providing food aid. Thus, there is scope for considerable efficiency gains by
switching to less restricted sourcing of food. The study therefore argues that, in most
circumstances, financial aid (cash) is the preferable way to fund direct distribution of
food …” (OECD, 2005).
From this perspective Faminow (1995) considers that in theory cash transfers are more
efficient for both beneficiaries and donors, though in-kind transfers are usually preferred
because of strong political support. He suggests that under emergency conditions, when
the aim is to save lives, the choice of intervention strategy is rather uncontroversial,
since in such circumstances both a cash-based and a commodity-based strategy seem to
converge towards consumer equilibrium conditions. He considers, however, that such
an approach becomes increasingly less appropriate as the recovery stage progresses and
a cash-based strategy becomes the most efficient option.
Box 2.1 In-kind and cash-equivalent value trade-offs
Faminow’s analysis is focused on a consumer perspective of the beneficiary’s
equilibrium. What follows is drawn from Faminow (1995).
The figure below represents budget constraints (as indicated by budget lines) and
preferences (as indicated by indifference curves) for households eligible for in-kind
transfers. Prior to the in-kind transfer, households face the budget constraint AB,
consuming ON units of food and OM units of other goods. An amount of food equal to
BD provided to households as an in-kind transfer causes the budget constraint to become
ACD. If the value of the food transfer (BD) were made as a cash payment the budget
constraint would be ECD. However, since the transfer is in-kind, the EC portion of the
budget constraint is not relevant to recipients, unless they can exchange the in-kind
transfer with cash value at market prices. Therefore, in all cases in which beneficiaries
cannot exchange in-kind transfers at market prices their optimum choice is to consume
where ACD meets the indifference curve U2 at point C. In the figure below, recipients
would consume OB units of food and OA units of other goods. If we try to estimate the
cash-equivalent value of the in-kind transfer for the recipient, that is the amount of cash
transfer that would leave the recipient as well-off as a given amount of in-kind food
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transfer, we face a Hicksian equivalent variation, which allows us to remain on the same
indifference curve (U2), but finding an efficient outcome. In particular, a parallel shift
inward of the budget constraint to where the new budget constraint is just tangent to U2
would be a more efficient transfer. Thus, a cash transfer of BF for a total income of OF
would leave the recipient as well off as an in-kind transfer of BD. In other words, BF
measures the cash-equivalent of an in-kind transfer equal to the amount BD.
The case can be generalized and consideration needs to be given to the fact that the gap
between the cash-equivalent value relative to the market value is dependent on
recipients’ preferences for food and other goods. Such preferences are indicated by the
shape and position of the indifferent curves. For example, U3 and U4 show cases where
recipients are ready to give up higher amounts of food in order to consume greater
amounts of other goods. BF’ and BF” are the cash-equivalent values in these two cases.
When recipient preferences are more oriented towards consuming goods other than the
ones received from an in-kind transfer, the cash-equivalent value decreases so that the
overstatement from using market values is higher.
The above has obvious implications in terms of the efficiency of the allocation of
assistance. In effect, only an amount of resources equivalent to BF (or BF’, or BF”) is
required to satisfy the average requirements, compared to an amount equivalent to BD in
the case of in-kind transfer. Therefore, a fixed amount of resources for aid can be
distributed more widely by choosing the most efficient payment method without
reducing the per capita recipient benefits. Following on from the above, during a food
crisis and in general when food is highly valued by recipients relative to other goods, the
effects of in-kind and cash transfers can be equivalent. This would occur if indifference
curves like U1-U4 were located downwards and to the right of those shown in the figure.
In fact, tangencies along the segment CD of the budget constraint result in equivalence
between in-kind and cash transfers. However, during less severe crises or during the
transition from relief to recovery it can be expected that some or most of the potential
recipients might fall into those described by the tangency along the EC portion of the
budget constraint.
The analysis above suggests a range of conditions where the well-being of transfer
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recipients could be improved if transfers were made using cash instead of in-kind
benefits. For the same cost of transfer (BD), recipients could have a higher level of well-
being, as indicated by indifference curve U1. Alternatively, from a donors’ perspective it
would be possible to extend the same recipient value of transfers at a lower cost. That is,
recipients could remain on U2, but at a lower cost than BD: BF (or BF’, or BF”, for other
preference structures).
    Figure 2.1        In-kind and cash-equivalent value trade-offs
Source: Faminow, 1995
The analysis proposed by Faminow has been further developed (Sharma, 2006;
Alderman, 2002; Castaneda, 2000; among others). The relative size of the transfer is
recognized as a key in the comparative analysis of alternative strategies. The transfer is
called “extramarginal” when it is greater than the amount (of the commodity or of
money required to purchase the amount of food) the recipient household would have
consumed without the transfer; otherwise, it is called “inframarginal”. According to
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neoclassical microeconomic theory, while an inframarginal transfer would trigger an
income effect by increasing the recipient’s budget, an extramarginal transfer would also
have a price effect which would be determined by the feasibility of exchange and its
conditions. Gentilini (2007) provides a summary overview of the economic effects of
alternative transfers, as depicted in Figure 2.2. According to Gentilini, the two options
would be equivalent when dealing with an inframarginal transfer, and when dealing
with an extramarginal transfer the price effect would make the difference: the two
options would be in general equivalent and the in-kind transfer would be more effective
in the presence of a price effect.
Figure 2.2        Economics of cash and food transfers
  Is the amount of the in-kind transfer greater  than the amount normally consumed?
* If resale of the ration is prohibited, or if it is resold below the market price, or if the resale entails high
transaction costs. Otherwise it is equal to cash, even if extramarginal.
Income &
price effects
Income effect
only
In-kind better
than cash*
In-kind = cash
Extramarginal
transferYes
No Inframarginaltransfer
 Source:   Gentilini, 2007
From this perspective the income elasticity of demand for the specific food aid
commodity and, more generally, consumers’ preferences seem to play a critical role. In
line with Faminow’s view, this means trying to position food aid beneficiaries along the
line ECD of Figure 2.1. In the case of extramarginal transfer, the further down the CD
segment, the lower would be the preference for cash. Conversely, as suggested by
microeconomic theory and pointed out by Ahmed et al. (1993), the higher up along the
segment EC, the attempt to reach a higher feasible indifference curve will lead towards
a higher preference for a cash transfer. In the case of inframarginal transfer, the two
transfers would be equivalent.
From a different perspective, a common economic argument against the use of cash
transfers makes reference to the risk of an effect on inflation. Such price increases
would end up reducing the effective value of the transfer and would instead negatively
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affect the living conditions of the non-beneficiaries. In this regard, considering that the
non-beneficiaries may be a large and still vulnerable section of the population, a cash-
based intervention could simply result in a shift of the food access problem from one
group to another. Along these lines, Basu (1996) developed a theoretical model to
examine how “a cash-for-work programme would typically enhance the demand for
food, cause food prices to rise, and result in more food in the hands of those who have
received the wage. This means that those who are left out of the programme (for
example the old and the infirm) could be worse off”. Therefore, he argues, “depending
on the parameters of the economy, a generalised cash relief policy (that is cash to all)
could help all the poor, but a generalised food relief policy always helps the poor. In
times of crisis, if a government has the choice, it may be safer to give food relief”
(Basu, 1996).
A further perspective from which in-kind and cash-based strategies have been
contrasted makes reference to their respective effectiveness on nutrition. Because of its
lack of fungibility, a commodity-based option is thought to be more effective. This is
supported by studies which suggest that the marginal propensity to consume food
(MPCf) is higher as a result of food transfers than with equivalent cash transfers
(Ahmed, 2005; Del Ninno et al., 2002; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). More pragmatically,
it is argued that gender factors may work as determinants in this regard. In fact,
according to WFP (2008), one possible reason for the differential nutritional impact of
cash and food-based measures is the greater control that women generally have over
food as opposed to cash resources. From such a perspective, the provision of food
handouts may lead to higher nutritional effects at the household level, while cash may
be used for meeting needs not related to nutrition. However, other studies seem to give
the opposite impression by reporting high shares of cash transfers spent to purchase
food (Devereux, 2008), showing that cash transfers may trigger higher kilocalorie
consumption than food aid (De Matteis, 2007; Sharma, 2006) or at least comparable to a
standard food aid ration (Harvey et al., 2006), or may be associated with lower
malnutrition (Meyer, 2007).5 At the end of the day, as Gentilini (2007) suggests, the
5 Through a review of 27 projects or programs worldwide that made use of cash and/or vouchers, Meyer
(2007) provides a few cases of nutritional impact, showing favourable results, including reduced
incidence of stunting and decreased levels of iron-deficiency anemia.
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multidimensional nature of malnutrition as well as the complexities of the non-linear
link between any transfer, food consumption and nutrition, make it difficult to detect a
single tool, whether food or cash, as the determinant of a nutritional outcome.
Nevertheless, it is easy to consider how the higher fungibility of cash can be of greater
help in supporting a more diversified diet than a standard food aid ration (Sharma, 2006;
Meyer, 2007; Devereux, 2008). However, it is regularly remarked that cash transfers are
not a replacement for supplementary or therapeutic feeding (Jaspars et al., 2007; Bailey
et al., 2008) and is also necessary to consider how in some cases food transfer programs
may provide high-quality and fortified foods which may not be readily available
through markets (WFP, 2008).
2.2 The relevance of the market for the choice of
intervention strategy
Markets facilitate and influence the movement of (food) commodities, contributing to
determining the interaction between supply and demand. Price movements signal
changes in an economy reflecting events or expectations of events of various natures
(climatic, economic, physical security, and policy, among others). As such, market
analysis provides information which is critical for decision making, regarding the
selection of appropriate intervention strategy and the size of the intervention, as well as
the possibility to foresee the type and size of potential positive and negative effects of
the intervention. The relevance of such analysis and support for decision making covers
quite a large spectrum of possible situations: from addressing priority needs in response
to emergencies, to livelihood rehabilitation, for social protection purposes, or to make
markets work for the poor (Albu et al., 2007).
The local availability of food provides a criterion for the choice of intervention strategy,
but it can provide only a limited basis for response option analysis. Access to food is
regularly considered as another major dimension of the analysis; not just in terms of
consumers’ purchasing capacity, but in more general terms, as the capacity to make
demand and supply meet. In other words, it is the strength of market functionality which
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can play a critical role in the analysis of intervention strategy (Barrett et al., 2007; Creti
et al., 2006; De Matteis, 2006). Such functionality affects the type of intervention
strategy: while a cash-based strategy acts through the demand side, leaving the supply
side to the private sector, food transfers bypass the private sector through artificial
support to the supply side. In the former case, market functionality is essential to
convert increased purchasing capacity into effective demand. At the same time, market
functionality may be affected in different ways by different intervention strategies:
while a cash-based strategy may strengthen the market and stimulate a demand-driven
process of local growth, a commodity-based strategy may risk replacing local supply
rather than just filling its gaps. In light of such considerations, the controversial
discussion about the preference for either cash or food finally seems to be shifting
towards a compromise in favour of a combination of both to be adjusted according to
contextual factors (Gentilini, 2007).
The increasing recognition of the role played by market functionality in the selection of
intervention strategy has raised attention to market monitoring and assessment. Various
tools for the purpose of market analysis have been developed recently and/or are being
developed. Among the most relevant are Barrett et al. (2009, 2007), Creti et al. (2006)
and WFP (2009), presented in Figure 2.3a-c. The “decision tree” proposed by Barrett et
al. (2007) and developed in Barrett et al. (2009) as an analytical framework for Market
Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis (MIFIRA) is designed to assess
how markets respond to a crisis as the basis for response option analysis. It is rather
ambitious, intended, according to its authors, to be relevant for chronic, sudden or
complex crises. It addresses two fundamental questions: a) the functioning of local
markets, and b) the local availability of food. It is proposed as a stepwise process: in the
first instance, cash is to be preferred wherever local markets are well functioning; and in
the case of negative feedback the option of procuring food commodities through the
neighbouring markets is considered. Only in case of negative feedback to both steps is
the import of food commodities considered. The decision tree proposed by Creti et al. is
on the same lines. Although slightly more articulated into different scenarios which may
be linked to alternative intervention strategies, it does not differentiate on the source of
eventual food assistance. Finally, the response option tool proposed by WFP adds a
certain stress on the physical access to markets, from both the supply and the demand
sides.
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6 In this case it is reported only the first stage of MIFIRA which addresses the functioning of local
markets. The second stage, addressing the choice of the source of eventual food assistance, is omitted.
Figure 2.3a      The decision tree tool -  MIFIRA6
Source: Barrett et al., 2009
Are food insecure households well
connected to local markets?
How will local demand respond to transfers?
How much additional food can traders
supply at or near current costs?
Do local traders behave competitively?
Do food insecure households have a
preference over the form of aid they receive?
Consider distributing at least some cash
Consider distributing at least some food or
other necessary goods
If some food is necessary, is sufficient food
available nearby to fill the gap?
Food
Mix
Yes
No or
mixed
YesNo
Minimal price
increases
expected
Excessive price
increases
expected
Cash or other
non-food items
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Figure 2.3b     The decision tree tool -  OXFAM
Source: Creti et al., 2006
Cause of food or income
insecurity
Is food available in
neighbouring markets? Result of income loss?
Supply failure Demand failure
Is the market
operating?
Food availability is a problem.
Consider food aid. Demand failure is the result of high prices.Consider food aid but also market support,
such as improving infrastructures, helping
value-chain actors to recover.
Is government restricting
food movement?
Is the market
competitive?Cash intervention may result in price rises.Consider food aid strategy.
Lobby governments to change policy. Prices controlled by traders.
Consider food aid but also measures to
reduce speculation, e.g. setting prices by
means of contracts with traders.Is the market
integrated?
Without market integration, supply will not
meet demand. Improve market integration:
eg. supply transport.Will traders respond to
the demand?
If traders do not respond, food prices
may increase.
Consider food aid strategy.Is there a risk of inflation inthe price of key commodities?
Consider whether continuing adjustment
of sums disbursed is viable.
If not, implement food aid strategy.
Implement cash transfer, targeting women
if possible.
NoYes
Yes Yes
No No
Yes
Yes No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Literature review
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
18
Figure 2.3c      The decision tree tool -  WFP
Source: WFP, 2009
Literature review
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
19
As typical of decision trees, all the tools presented are based on a sequence of questions
which seem to allow only for binary response options (i.e. “yes” or “no” against a preset
benchmark). This is most evident in the decision tree proposed by Creti et al. An
immediate reaction to such a constraint is that a more sensible approach for assessing
the feasibility of cash- and commodity-based strategies would be to identify the degree
of imperfection of the markets. Such an approach would allow for more flexibility in
programming in order to adjust to changing market circumstances (Gentilini, 2007;
Alderman et al., 2006).
Claims about the relative advantages of cash- and commodity-based transfers tend to
refer to programmes that are often implemented in different contexts. As increasingly
stressed, particularly in the latter studies, it seems incorrect to perceive one strategy as
better than another, but in general program features and contextual factors help to
determine the effect of the transfer and therefore potentially play a key role in the
selection of intervention strategy. In particular, from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives the relevance of the market is regularly stressed as a determinant of
programme performance (Davies et al., 2008; Barrett et al., 2007; Ahmed et al., 2007,
Mohiddin et al., 2007, among others). Davies et al. (2008) remark that “although cash
transfers should not be used under all circumstances, where the market is able to
respond to increased demand cash transfers should be considered as an alternative to
in-kind aid” (Davies et al., 2008). Furthermore, in areas where markets are functioning
and accessible cash transfers are reported to be more cost-effective and preferred by
beneficiaries. On the contrary, in areas where markets are less functional or accessible,
food assistance is seen as more cost-effective and preferred by beneficiaries. Therefore,
it seems that “appropriateness of cash programming depends on market access and
functioning (whether they are competitive and integrated), and security. Food aid is
more appropriate in contexts where markets are not working well, where security
conditions impose higher market transaction costs for consumers, and in situations of
high and unpredictable inflation. Opportunities exist for using both interventions in
parallel or in a phased approach depending on seasonal and contextual changes over
time and space. This is especially relevant to emergencies, where market access could
be a limiting factor. In the immediate aftermath of a shock, food intervention may be
more appropriate. Cash based interventions may be gradually introduced as markets
recover and could potentially be used as an exit strategy” (Mohiddin et al., 2007).
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2.3 Market analysis
In order to provide a useful basis for strategy analysis and choice, market analysis will
have to link three aspects: food supply, demand and market functioning. Some
contextual factors affecting one or more of the three aspects just mentioned can be
considered as well to improve the analysis whenever possible: transport and storage
infrastructure, security, credit facilities, policies and public control, etc. The main
objective is to provide a basic understanding of markets, spelling out the extent to which
markets function and ultimately their relevance to food availability and people’s access
to food. Such knowledge and understanding of market structure and functioning would
form the framework for the simulation of alternative intervention strategies, aiming at
reducing an eventual gap between supply and demand generated by either an excess of
demand or a shortage of supply manifesting in problems of either availability or access
to food, or both.
In order to assess market
capacity and functionality,
various models and
analytical tools have been
proposed, each focusing on
some of the most relevant
factors and adopting a
range of methodological
approaches. The number of
such tools is so high that a
few years ago the
resurgence of strong
interest on the subject led
to the need to take stock of
what was available.7 It is
expected that in the
7 See Development Alternatives Inc., 2003, for a list on the subject.
  Table 2.1 List of market indicators proposed for
                         Emergency Food Security Assessments
1.  Availability:
a. Current and pre-shock (at same season)
availability of different items
2.  Prices:
a.
b.
c.
Current and pre-shock prices (terms of trade)
of e.g. food staples, livestock, etc.
Level of casual labour wages
Own- and cross-price elasticities
3.  Response capacity of traders:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Changes in number of market places operating
Changes in market turn-over
Changes in credit facilities for traders
Roads, bridges, railways, transportation means
Security issues related to trade
Prices in neighbouring (supply) areas / IPP
4.  Policies / Governmental programmes
a. Changes in government policies
    Source:  WFP, 2007
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meantime the raised interest in the subject may have generated a number of variants of
such tools. But after considering the abundance of tools and approaches available for
market analysis, there is a need to be more selective, particularly in situations
characterized by scarcity of data and key resources. Table 2.1 reports the list of market
indicators proposed by WFP for the purposes of market analysis in conditions of
emergency food insecurity. In its simplicity, such a list manages to capture most of the
critical factors required for market analysis.
Traditionally, price analysis has occupied a central place in market analysis not so
much, or at least not only, because price data are often the most common – if not unique
– form of market information to be found in developing countries, but also because of
the signalling role they provide on supply and demand (Scott, 1995). From such a
perspective the analysis of demand and supply elasticities as well as of terms of trade
are predominant and the analysis of market integration the most developed output.
A different approach uses participatory methods to develop knowledge of local market
characteristics, trying to estimate the strength and roles of stakeholders as well as of
links among them. While this approach has traditionally focused on the local market
supply chain, links have recently been strengthened with similar methodologies focused
on local micro-demand.
2.3.1 Price analysis
Whenever relevant to the purpose of the study, price analysis is the most common and
developed approach and, therefore, literature on this type of analysis is vast. Table 2.2
provides an overview of basic types of price analysis.
Price elasticities establish the strength of the relationship between price and quantity,
both in terms of supply and demand, as well as both for specific commodities and with
reference to other ones. As such, together with income elasticities, price elasticities
provide synthetic but critical information essential for the purpose of basic modelling
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and the simulation of various events (e.g. shocks) and/or intervention strategies. Hence
their regular use in these types of studies.
Table 2.2      Price analysis
Type of price analysis Data requirements
___________________________________________________________________________________
Trends in real prices Farmgate prices
Wholesale prices
Retail prices
Deflator
Relative price relationships Prices for key substitutes and complements
  International / domestic price comparison Import parity prices, including international
transport costs
Export parity prices, including domestic
transport costs
  Seasonal price variation Average monthly, weekly, or daily prices at
same level of marketing system
  Interspatial price variation Price data for several locations, at same point in
time and preferably at same level of the
marketing system
  Marketing margins Prices at different levels of the food system for
the same commodity
Data on marketing costs
    Source:   Extracted from Holtzman et al., 1995
On the demand side, the analysis of elasticities for different food groups in different
countries has revealed a certain regularity between elasticities and income levels. In
view of their key relevance, datasets have been arranged with estimates of income and
price elasticities for a series of countries for a few food groups.8 Such data can be very
useful for analysts and practitioners, with the major cautions however that: a) the
validity of such estimates is rather broad and not linked to specific categories, and b) it
8 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/InternationalFoodDemand/
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is strongly time-specific, reflecting the conditions in which the analysis, normally a
survey, was conducted.
The analysis of terms of trade (ToT)9 is particularly useful when assessing vulnerability
linked to changes in access to food and other basic needs. Such a tool is revealed to be
particularly useful when dealing with basic economic contexts in which different groups
are characterized by their reliance on very few activities whose output is mainly
exchanged, and by their dependency on the procurement of few key products. From
such a perspective the ToT have been often used as a proxy for vulnerability,
particularly from a dynamic perspective of specific groups’ access to food or other basic
resources expressed as changes in their purchasing power. In fact, the relevance of the
TOT is mainly in its contribution to making comparisons more homogeneous, mainly
from an intertemporal and interspatial perspective.
The use of Import Parity Prices (IPP) and Export Parity Prices (EPP) helps to link the
analysis of domestic prices with the international market.10 In general, parity prices
measure the economic incentives or disincentives for agricultural production and/or for
moving production across borders, given competition from international trade and/or
cross-border flows. If a country is integrated into regional and global food markets and
trade is basically free, food supply shortages, which would normally cause rising
domestic prices, are likely to be met through private imports if there is domestic
purchasing power. As a result, prices will stabilize at import parity (WFP, 2007;
FEWSNET, 2008).
9 This term originates from international trade where it denotes the relative price value of a country’s
exports to its imports. In the context of market analysis for food security, the ToT jargon is used to reflect
a “barter-trade” approach. In this sense it often refers to the relative value of one commodity (for instance
a unit of cereals) to another commodity (for example a unit of livestock). Based on this particular
example, the commodity ToT helps gauge the impact of certain conditions, such as those linked to a
shock) on one group of a society (e.g. herders) in comparison to another one (e.g. crop farmers).
10 The IPP is the price at the border of a good that is imported which includes international transport costs
and tariffs. Reciprocally, the EPP is the price at the border of a good which is exported with the inclusion
of international transport costs and tariffs.
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Price analysis has benefited from and contributed to the development of methodologies
for the analysis of time series, cross-section and panel data. Timmer, Tschirley,
Ravallion, Goletti are among those who have provided the basis for the current stage of
such type of price analysis. The use of the Index of Market Connection (IMC) initially
proposed by Timmer (1987) has led to the more technically sound analysis of market
integration, considered today as among the best tools for assessing market
functionality.11 The most developed version of this type of analysis involves trade
flows, prices, and transfer costs, but in view of the complexities involved it is rarely
used;12 a focus on prices is much more common.
2.3.2 Market chain analysis
The analysis of market prices is insufficient to evaluate how markets function and the
role that they may play (Donovan et al., 2005). On the basis of the consideration that
prices are the outcome of market forces, it makes sense to widen the analysis from price
and price dynamics towards market and market dynamics. This shift of perspective
should help to provide a more in-depth understanding of market functioning as well as
to define relevant scenarios and conduct simulations of possible strategy options.
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) analysis, initially designed with reference
to industrial economies, has over time been adjusted to be applied for market analysis in
developing economies. Initial efforts in this direction can be referred to Holtzman
(1986), Holtzman et al. (1995) and Pomeroy et al. (1995). Recently FEWSNET (2008)
has provided a summary review of the elements of S-C-P, as well as of other basic
economic conditions and public policy, as well as of their relevance for the traders’
decision process. A list of such elements and their systemic links is presented in Figure
2.4, while Table 2.4 provides a more pragmatic illustration of how market structure
determines market conduct and performance.
11 Other milestones are Goletti et al. (1994, 1995), Ravallion (1986) and Tshirley (1995), among others.
12 See Moser et al. (2009) and Barrett (1996) for some excellent examples of such type of analysis.
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Figure 2.4 Elements of S-C-P, basic economic conditions and public policy
 Source:  FEWSNET, 2008
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Table 2.3     Relevance of market characteristics for food security
Structure, conduct and performance characteristics and effect on food security
Structural elements Conduct variables Food Security Performance variables
Number
of sellers
 / buyers
Cost of
starting
business
Economies
of  Scale
(EOS)
Ways of
determining
prices
Buying and
selling
practices
Net
Returns to
traders
Marketing
Margins
to traders
Producer
Share
/ Income
Consumer
Prices
Many Low None Market (open) Spot markets Low Low High Low
Few Medium Medium Collusion
Discrimination
Contract sale
Commission
Medium to
High
Medium
to High
Medium Medium
One High High Collusion
Discrimination
Contract sale
Commission
High High Low High
Source:  FEWSNET, 2008
A specific branch of S-C-P analysis is market chain analysis. A market chain is defined
as the set of economic actors who produce and transact a particular product as it moves
from primary producer to final consumer. The fortune of each economic actor involved
in the chain is bound up with the capability of the whole market chain to respond
systematically in a proactive manner to emerging market signals (Albu et al., 2005).
Therefore greater efficiency throughout the market chain, as well as a more competitive
market structure, are good for all stakeholders and particularly the poor ones from both
the supply and the demand side (FEWSNET, 2008; Albu et al., 2005). Under such
perspective market chain analysis can help to identify constraints and to design – as
well as to select among – a range of possible interventions. Among the analytical
approaches and tools proposed for this purpose are participatory techniques which aim
at developing an overall perception of the system involved through a direct contribution
from the stakeholders in the chain, in order to highlight features of the system which
may otherwise be misinterpreted or not properly rated.
One such technique consists of mapping out the market system. As shown in Figure 2.5
the Market Map is made up of three interlinked components centred around the market
chain itself. This combined view helps to identify the potential of a specific market
channel as well as favourable factors or bottlenecks encountered during the process. In
particular, by understanding how the product value accumulates along the market chain,
this approach helps to identify inefficiencies, inequities and losses which could be
remedied, or added value which could be captured, particularly by poor producers.
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Figure 2.5 Overview and example of market map
 Source: Adapted from Albu et al., (2005)
2.3.3 Market profiling and modelling
While the techniques for market mapping proposed above are essentially recommended
for rough and rapid assessments, particularly as an initial step in response to
emergencies, another approach to market analysis has developed the systemic
perspective presented above further. Essentially, it is proposed to combine information
at different levels (i.e. micro, meta, macro) in a systemic way in order to provide a
profile of the markets under investigation. The aim of such profiling goes beyond the
purpose of analyzing the detailed characteristics of a market, but rather seeks to link it
to some predefined models. The combination of reference models and the most relevant
characteristics of the market in question should allow some simulation exercises ranging
from the possible consequences of shocks to the impact of response strategies. After
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considering the advantages of such an approach, mainly in terms of the precision of the
analysis, it is as well to be considered that this type of analysis may not be appropriate
for rapid response but is useful as a preparatory measure in the case of slow-onset crises
or in countries with recurrent and predictable shocks (Donovan et al., 2006).
While market profiling has recently become quite popular, experience with market
modelling has been more limited, mainly in view of the greater complexity of the
exercise. Market models come in various degrees of detail and complexity, ranging
from single-market to multi-market models and up to computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models. In the first case the analysis is limited to the estimation of consumers’
and producers’ functions, ignoring the interaction among markets (i.e. substitution
effects on consumption and production) and paying limited attention to income effects.
In this case, ignoring the direct and indirect effects on wages, prices and incomes means
that the estimate of welfare changes will be biased in unknown directions
(Arulpragasam et al., 2003; Croppenstedt et al., 2007). At the other extreme are the
CGE models which try to incorporate the direct and indirect effects of both goods and
factors in several markets, allowing for wages, prices and incomes to be determined
endogenously. This helps to provide a systemic perspective which manages to capture
multiplier effects which would otherwise remain unaccounted for.13 The main
drawbacks of these models are their complexity and large data requirements.14 Multi-
market models, also known as ‘limited general equilibrium models’ or ‘multi-market
partial equilibrium models’ focus only on one sector, as opposed to eight to ten, as in
the case of CGEs, but manage to include direct and indirect effects in a small number of
markets (Croppenstedt et al., 2007). Although all types of models are used widely for
policy analysis in developing countries, mainly to simulate ex ante policy options, their
application to the analysis of food aid has been more limited. This is very probably due
13 Such higher precision of CGE models has led in a few occasions to diverge from results achieved
through descriptive or econometric techniques. For instance, assessing the price effect of an eventual
abolishment of food aid in Ethiopia has led to remarkably different results: Levinsohn et al. (2004)
predicted a food price rise of 52.8% by using a single commodity (wheat) supply and demand equations,
while Gelan (2006) estimated a maximum price rise of 2.51% through simulations based on a CGE
model.
14 See Sadoulet et al., 1995 for a more detailed presentation of CGE models.
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mainly to the fact that they have mostly been applied for policy analysis at national
level, missing the various food aid interventions implemented mainly at project level
which quite often have a more localized nature. In particular, their application to the
comparative analysis of commodity-based versus cash-based intervention strategies has
been very limited so far. A few recent studies are of particular relevance in this case.
The general equilibrium analysis conducted by Gelan (2006) with reference to the
Ethiopian case examines the relative effectiveness of cash and in-kind food aid using an
economy-wide modelling framework which allows attention to be drawn to the indirect
benefits resulting from the multiplier effects of cash aid. By accounting for all the direct
and indirect feedback effects in all sectors of the economy, the economy-wide
efficiency gains result much larger than the simple sum of the welfare gains achieved by
direct beneficiaries.
In another study, Davies et al. (2008), using a reduced Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM) manages to estimate the multiplier effect of the cash grant provided through a
project in Malawi. In other words the study tries to capture the indirect effects of the
grant, such as market expansion for local goods and income growth for non-recipients,
which follow increased expenditure by the recipients of the grant. This systemic
perspective allows to estimate that each dollar transferred through the grant had
economic effects more than double its original value. In both cases a limitation of this
approach is recognized as how the highly aggregated nature of the model allows only
generic policy recommendations in favour of a cash-based strategy.
Dorosh et al. (2009) make use of data from Zambia to apply a simple two-commodity
economic model to assess the impact of maize production shocks on the domestic maize
price and staple food consumption under alternative policy regimes. The study suggests
that, given a favourable policy environment, two key price responses will contribute to
protect consumers from the impact of the shock: a) consumers’ substitution effect
among staples, and b) traders’ response in scaling up food imports to the affected
region. It is estimated that these key price responses together could make up for
approximately two thirds of the initial maize consumption shortfall. Neglecting such
key components in emergency needs assessments would lead to overstating food aid
needs and eventually to excessive food aid flows which would discourage domestic
production. The analysis stresses how careful assessments of market conditions, in
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terms of market competitiveness, potential sources of supply and, as well, of potential
traders’ response are needed as part of emergency needs assessments (Dorosh et al.,
2006).
Box 2.2 A two-commodities economic model
What follows is drawn mainly from Dorosh et al. (2006, 2009) who present a simple
two-commodity economic model developed to quantify the impact of production shocks
on domestic food prices. In turn, the model assesses the impact of these changing prices
on consumers, farmer and trader behaviour as well as on the food consumption of
vulnerable groups. Likewise, the model evaluates prospects for using trade policy, food
aid or cash transfers, or various government policy interventions to protect consumers
from production-induced shocks in staple food consumption.
The model differs from standard methods of food aid needs assessments through its
explicit modelling of market prices for key staple foods (maize and cassava) as well as
the resulting impact of price changes on farm household income, food consumption by
various groups, staple food imports and exports, and production the following season.
In order to anticipate all such outcomes, the framework incorporates price responses by
three groups:
 poor consumers, who reduce maize consumption and substitute maize with
other staples as the price of maize rises;
 traders and millers, who decide their trade movements in response to
differentials between domestic and border prices;
 farmers who take planting decisions in response to changing prices.
The model includes as exogenous variables a range of potential instruments wielded by
government and donors: trade quotas and tariffs, public import and exports, local
procurement, government stockholding and sales, and targeted income transfers.
The model tries to estimate how much the domestic maize price will change following
an exogenous shock. Figure 2.6 shows the impact of a major supply shock which causes
Literature review
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
31
production to decrease from S0 to S1. This leads maize supply to fall from Q0 to Q1 and
maize price to increase from P0 to P1, affecting both the income of maize producers and
consumption decisions of all household groups. When the domestic maize price (P0) lies
between import parity (Pm) and export parity (Px), no trade takes place. But when a
supply shock causes the domestic price to rise, Pm sets an upper limit on the price
increase. In the absence of trade, the domestic maize price would spike to P1. But if
imports are allowed, traders will import an amount M1 = Q2 – Q1 at Pm, capping the
domestic price increase at import parity. Conversely, in case of a bumper maize harvest
Px sets a floor price below which the domestic price will not fall. The domestic price
will move outside these parity bands only when government policy limits imports or
exports.
Figure 2.6   Effects of private imports in moderating a production shortfall
Source: Dorosh et al., 2009
Various simulations are run under two possible scenarios, drought and bumper harvest,
and various combinations of possible policy and intervention measures (autarky, free
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trade, public imports – with and without food aid – export controls, targeted cash
transfers, local procurement).
To capture key consumption responses to a price shock the model includes two food
staples: maize and cassava. In case the price of maize rises, consumers reduce their
consumption of maize and substitute with cassava. Cassava has a perfectly elastic supply
in the short run and its price remains unchanged in this model.
Model equations
Production
Xi = Xi0 * (Pi / Pi0)ESii * (Pj / Pj0)ESij
Consumption
Cih  = ih0 * Cih0 * (Pi / Pio)EDhii * (Pj / Pj0)EDhij * (Yh / Yh0)EDYhi
Income
Yh = vi * Pi * Xih + vj * Pj * Xjh + Ykh0 + YTFRh
Trade
Private imports: under free trade MPRIVM = CM - XM - MPUBM
under quotas MPRIVM = MPRIVM
Public imports: MPUBM = MGOVM + MFOODAIDM
Commodity supply
Maize: SM = XM - LOSSM + MPRIVM + MPUBM
Cassava: SC = XC
Demand
Maize: DM = CM + STOCKSM + GOVPURCHM - GOVSALEM
Cassava: DC = CC
Equilibrium
Maize: SM = DM
Cassava: SC = DC
Market price
Maize: PM = PIMPM if PDM > PIMPM
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PM = PDM if PEXPM < PDM < PIMPM
PM = PEXPM if PDM < PEXPM
Cassava: PC = PCo because the supply of cassava is considered perfectly
elastic in the short run.
Variable names
Cih = consumption of commodity i by household group h, following a shock
Cih0 = base level of consumption of commodity i by household group h
Ci = total household consumption of commodity i, M = maize, C = cassava
Di = total demand for commodity i, M = maize, C = cassava
GOVPURCHM = government purchases of maize
GOVSALEM = government sales of maize
LOSSM = national maize losses
MPRIVM = net private maize imports (negative imports = exports),  or
level of net private imports fixed by government quota
MPUBM = net public imports of maize
MGOVM = net national government imports of maize
MFOODAIDM = net food aid imports of maize
Pi = price of commodity after new equilibrium is reached after a shock
Pi0 = base price of commodity i
Source: Dorosh et al., 2009
2.4 Conclusions
Scarcity of information and particularly of skills to generate useful information or to
make proper use of available information can be a critical constraint at the initial stages
of emergency response, when hard choices among alternative response options are to be
made.
The most relevant approaches to market analysis that can effectively provide support for
such an effort have been considered. They differ in the tools and techniques used, some
being more rigorous and data-hungry than others. This is reflected in a necessary trade-
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off between analytical rigour and the availability of resources required for the analysis,
mainly in terms of time and skills.
While the various decision-tree tools propose key questions as sequential steps along
the decisional process, they do not clarify the way in which such questions are to be
addressed. The use of different analytical approaches to measure the various indicators
proposed can provide a series of both advantages and drawbacks.
Under certain conditions, such as when decisions refer to life-saving interventions, the
urgency of the response may justify a less rigorous approach. For such a purpose Rapid
Assessment Techniques (RATs) have been developed. Being designed in support of
rapid response, they trade off part of the rigour and significance of the analysis in
exchange for rapidity of findings and recommendations.
However, while RATs offer rapidity and flexibility of implementation, their limitations
in the analysis must also be taken into account. Their built-in approximate approach
does not allow them to pay due attention to all the effects, direct and indirect, induced
by – or linked to – each option. Thus, contrary to more lengthy techniques of in-depth
analysis the RATs may lead to strongly biased estimations and therefore to
inappropriate decisions.
From such a perspective it is possible to think about a series of approaches and
techniques which can be ordered according to their degree of analytical rigour and
resource – mainly time – use. The decision maker will select the technique to be used on
the basis of such criteria as: a) urgency of receiving findings and recommendations, b)
minimum acceptable degree of analytical rigour, c) feasibility of techniques dictated by
contextual conditions (i.e. mainly security) and, finally, d) costs involved.
The present study considers the possibility of combining different approaches. As it will
be made clear in the following chapter, while reflecting the need to maintain a certain
degree of rigour throughout the analysis, it is made use of data collected through various
techniques and approaches.
3
Conceptual framework
and methodology
3.1 Conceptual framework
As mentioned in the introduction and the literature review, the positions both in favour
and against a cash-based response are somehow centred on the economic question of
how markets will be able to react to the use of cash. Often in developing countries
market functioning is already weak in normal conditions, but it becomes of particular
concern in situations affected by conflict or natural disaster. Figure 3.1 helps to
summarize under what basic conditions a food-based or cash-based strategy may be
more appropriate with reference to market functioning. In particular, while the degree of
market functioning is less relevant in situations of food surplus (III and IV quadrant), its
role is critical in situations of food deficit (I and II quadrant). In fact, while in situations
of surplus the preference for a cash-based intervention responds essentially to a problem
of access (the increased demand generated through the injection of cash is not expected
to generate inflation in view of the condition of surplus), in situations of deficit the
choice is wider. In such situations, if the market works (II quadrant), an injection of
cash can generate demand-led growth and traders are expected to be able to respond to
the increased demand; on this basis, cash is the appropriate tool. If the market does not
work (I quadrant) at all, or works inappropriately, a commodity-based intervention is
generally appropriate. However in this latest case extreme situations may require a
Conceptual framework and methodology
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
36
different response: situations characterized by strong deficit and absence or absolute
disruption of the market should be addressed solely through commodity-based
interventions, while situations characterized by minor deficit and limited functioning of
the market can be addressed through a combination of both cash- and commodity-based
interventions.
Figure 3.1   Preference for a food-based versus a cash-based approach
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Source: De Matteis, 2006
Having said the above, the question moves onto how to draw the line between the
different cases considered. Essentially, this involves verifying the existence of a
functioning market and local availability of the commodity in question. However, it has
already been pointed out that availability is not enough to ensure access, which then
needs to be included in the analysis. The following parts address these points through
the demand-supply framework and analysis of market integration.
3.1.1 The demand-supply framework
To cover the points just mentioned it is necessary to analyze: supply (availability),
demand (access), and the interaction between the two. The price of food commodities
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exchanged becomes the link between supply and demand and constitutes the key to the
analysis by combining information about both consumers’ willingness to pay for a good
and traders’ costs in supplying it.15
Figure 3.2 presents a simplified supply-demand framework to consider the short-run
impact of cash and food aid on the market.
Figure 3.2 Short-run impact of food aid and cash on market prices
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Any transfer, be it in cash, kind, or any other form, can be expected to affect household
demand for basic needs such as food. The relative size of the transfer and its form are
particularly relevant. The larger the transfer, the larger the shift in the demand curve.
A cash transfer determines an increase in beneficiaries’ income. How much this is going
to translate into increased demand for food depends on the income demand elasticity
and price demand elasticity (see below). Assuming that the entire amount of the transfer
is spent on food, the demand curve will shift from D0 to D1. If, instead, no share of the
transfer is spent on food, there is no shift in the demand curve D0. In the first case, the
15 Throughout this document we make the assumption that authorities do not interfere in the market
determination of prices.
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equilibrium shifts along the supply curve S0 from A to C, corresponding in an increase
of the market price from P0 to P2. Under ideal market conditions, the price rise – or even
the expectation of price rise – would induce traders to respond to increased demand by
scaling up the quantities supplied from Q0 to Q1. Such a response would help to shift the
supply curve from S0 to S1 re-establishing this way the initial equilibrium price P0 but in
correspondence of a higher equilibrium quantity Q2. If only a share of the transfer is
spent on food the same process above would still apply, but with reduced shifts in the
demand and supply curves. This would correspond to a new price P2’ with P0 > P2’ > P2
which, in ideal conditions, will lead to a shift in the supply curve leading to a new
equilibrium corresponding to equilibrium price P0 and equilibrium quantity Q1’ with Q0
> Q1’ > Q1. It comes clear that any constraint on the supply side to scale up quantities
marketed in accordance to the rise in quantities demanded deriving from the cash
transfer will inevitably result in new equilibriums to be reached at higher prices. In
other words, the capacity of the system, mainly, but not only, through trade, to respond
to the increased demand will determine the price rise. The higher such capacity, the
lower the gap between increase in demand and increase in supply, the lower the price
rise, that is the rate of inflation.
Let us consider now the provision of a certain quantity Q0Q1 of food aid purchased
outside the system considered in Figure 3.2. If the food aid is provided to hungry poor
people who have no purchasing capacity to buy from the market, the transfer should not
affect the equilibrium price P0. In fact, the shift in the supply curve from S0 to S1, which
reflects the physical increase of supply in the system, is only fictitious, as fictitious is as
well the corresponding shift of the demand curve from D0 to D1 which reflects the
increased income. In other words, provided that food aid responds to needs not
expressed on the market (i.e. lack of purchasing capacity cannot generate any effective
demand), the income transfer generated to the recipients through the provision of food
aid will not affect the market. In such conditions, the market equilibrium is still at point
A (Q0, P0), despite the presence of food aid in the system. If, instead, the recipients were
to sell all the food aid received on the market, the supply curve would shift from S0 to
S1 and the equilibrium would shift to point D corresponding to an increase in market
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supply (Q1) and to a reduction in equilibrium price (P1).16 If recipients were to sell only
a share of the quantity received, there would be a partial shift of the supply curve from
S0 towards S1 and this would lead to new equilibrium conditions with P0 > P0’ > P1 and
Q0 > Q0’ > Q1.
The points above show how important it is to know how recipients will make use of the
transfer, being it in cash or commodities. In particular, it is essential to estimate how
much the demand, particularly for staple food, will change after an income rise,
generated either through a cash transfer or food aid. This is called the income elasticity
of demand: According to whether an income rise leads to an increased or decreased
consumption of a certain good, reflected in a shift of the demand curve, such good is
said to have positive or negative income elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of
demand expresses the sensitivity of quantities demanded to changes in market prices
and, on the reverse, the sensitivity of prices to changes in the quantities demanded. The
cross-price elasticity of demand is relevant when considering two products (either
substitutes or complements). It is a measure of the responsiveness of quantity (price)
demanded for one product to changes in the price (quantity) of the other product. The
price elasticity of supply is similar to the price elasticity of demand but in this case
expresses the responsiveness of the supply to price changes: in other words, the
sensitivity of quantities to changes in market prices and, on the reverse, the sensitivity
of prices to changes in the quantities supplied. While both income and price elasticity of
demand refer to households and try to explain consumers’ behaviour and their
interaction with the market, price elasticity of supply refers to suppliers, in this case
mainly traders, trying to explain how they take their decisions and therefore how they
interact with the market.
The effects of food aid on the beneficiary’s consumption of food and non-food will
depend on the size of the ration as well as on the way it is used. The food ration is said
to be inframarginal if its size is lower than the amount the household would have
consumed in its absence; otherwise it is called extramarginal.
16 In this case it is assumed that recipients sell food aid at market price. It is much more likely that food
aid will be sold below market price, in which case the recipient will not be able to monetize the entire
value of the income transfer received in the form of food aid, the difference being transferred to traders.
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If the ration is inframarginal, it will affect consumption through an income effect only.
On the other hand, if the ration is extramarginal, the situation is further diversified
according to the conditions of eventual resale. If resale is feasible and occurs at market
prices, the only effect is the income effect. If, instead, resale is not feasible or, anyway,
entails high transaction costs, then the income transfer through such a food ration may
have two effects: an income effect and a substitution effect.
The case of an extramarginal ration is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The quantity of food
commodity X is shown on the horizontal axis and the aggregate quantity of all other
goods (Y) is shown on the vertical axis. The budget line AB shows the maximum
quantities of X and Y that the household could purchase with its budget before
receiving assistance. Let OX0’ be the quantity of food commodity received through the
food ration. If we assume that the household consumes the full amount of the ration, the
reception of food aid would let AB rotate around A and become horizontal, as in AR.
Therefore, the new budget line is ARD, where RD is an outward shift of AB.17
The situation would be different if the beneficiary were to sell the food aid received. In
such case, the amount of resale and the conditions of resale would matter. If the
recipient household could sell the entire ration at market price, the budget line would
shift outwards in a parallel way passing through R. In such case the effect of income
transfer would be equivalent to the income effect only, and any change in the amount of
the commodity received as assistance would depend merely on the type of good: it
would increase in the case of normal goods and it would reduce in the case of inferior
goods.18 Finally, if the resale price of the food aid commodity is lower than the market
price, or if the resale entails anyway high transaction costs, then the upward portion of
the budget line, RC, would become flatter as in RE and the new budget line would be
represented by ERD. The lower the effective selling price, the flatter is going to be RE.
On the other hand, RD is unaffected since the market price of the commodity remains
17 The size of the shift is equivalent to AR and OX0’, which is the amount of the food commodity
received.
18 Those goods for which demand increases as a result of an income rise are called “normal” goods; the
opposite is the case of the so-called “inferior goods”.
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unchanged. In such case the effect of income transfer would be the result of a
combination of income and substitution effects.
Figure 3.3 Consumption effects of an extramarginal ration
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Each indifference curve I1, I2, … I5, identifies the various combinations of X and Y that
would give to the recipient equal satisfaction. In the original conditions, i.e. before
receiving food aid, point m, the point of tangency between the budget line AB and the
indifference curve I1, identifies the optimum choice which corresponds to OX0 amount
of the commodity received as food aid and OY0 amount of all other consumption goods.
After receiving food aid, if the beneficiary is free to sell the food aid received at market
prices points n and s, points of tangency between CD and I2 and I3, represent the
optimum quantities of both X and Y in the case of inferior and normal goods
respectively. Finally, if the resale prices are quite below market prices, points t and u,
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points of tangency between ER and I4 and I5, represent the optimum quantities of X and
Y for inferior and normal goods respectively.
As mentioned above, in the case of an extramarginal ration, when resale is feasible and
occurs at market prices the only effect is the income effect, as reflected by the parallel
shift of the initial budget line AB to the new budget line CD. When, instead, resale is
not feasible or occurs at below market prices the income transfer through such a food
ration may have two effects: an income effect and a substitution effect. The substitution
effect (of a price change of the food aid commodity) is always negative. On the other
hand the income effect will vary according to the nature of the food commodity: in the
case of an inferior good the income effect would offset part of the substitution effect,
while in the case of a normal good it will reinforce it.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the case of an inframarginal food ration. The rationed quantity
OX0’ is less than the quantity of such food commodity consumed by the beneficiary
before receiving assistance OX0. As a result of the income effect of the transfer, the
budget line AB shifts outward horizontally and becomes the new budget line ARD with
a kink at point R. If the food commodity in this case is a normal good, the optimum
choice for the beneficiary household will be given by, say, w, the point of tangency
between the budget line ARD and the indifference curve I2, which corresponds to OX1
amount of the commodity received as food aid and OY1 amount of all other
consumption goods. If instead the food commodity is an inferior good, the optimum
choice for the beneficiary household will be given by, say, z, the point of tangency
between the budget line ARD and the indifference curve I3, which corresponds to OX2
amount of the commodity received as food aid and OY2 amount of all other
consumption goods.
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Figure 3.4 Consumption effects of an inframarginal ration
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The effects of a cash transfer on the beneficiary’s food consumption depend on the way
such a transfer is used. According to Engel’s law, we can expect that the poorer the
conditions of the recipient, the higher the share of the transfer spent on food or the
satisfaction of other primary needs.
To compare cash-based and commodity-based transfers it is worth considering that the
consumption effect generated through a cash transfer has equivalent value to the
beneficiary as when a commodity transfer is fully sold at market prices. In general
terms, with the cash received through the transfer or generated through the market
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resale, the recipient of a transfer is expected to increase his/her purchase of normal
goods and to reduce the purchase of inferior goods.19
Regarding the supply side, much has been said on the impact of cash and particularly
food transfers on the supply of food. Although not really settled as an issue, various
studies seem to have found no evidence of displacement effect against food production
or, more generally, food availability generated by the provision of food aid. In view of
the market focus of the present study as well as of the temporal complications related to
the production process, the present analysis neglects the implications for production and
assumes that all changes in availability are due to trade factors. From this perspective
changes in supply are linked to characteristics of the market environment as well as of
market operators. Market signals, as well as the functionality and capacity of both
market institutions and stakeholders are expected to affect elasticity of supply.
Therefore besides issues of availability, the major determinants of supply elasticity are
expected to be: the prices and functionality of price transmission mechanisms, transport
and storage capacity, security, and access to credit. Business size is expected to be the
most relevant characteristic of traders.
3.1.2 Market functioning and market integration
The market is essentially the encounter of demand and supply. Therefore, a measure of
market functioning could be considered the extent to which supply manages to make
demanded goods and services available at affordable prices. If markets work well,
customers should be able to find what they need at prices that exceed traders’ costs by
reasonable margins. Conversely, insufficient quantities of demanded goods or their
excessively high prices reflect the incapacity of the market to make supply and demand
properly meet.
As Barrett (2001) puts it, market integration concerns the free flow of goods and
information – and thus prices – over form, space and time. Vertical market integration
19 However, it is worth considering that the same good can be normal or inferior for different strata of the
population. In particular, a basic food commodity which has the characteristics of an inferior good for
middle and higher strata of population may be a normal good for the poorest ones.
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involves stages in marketing and processing channels, spatial integration relates
spatially distinct markets, and intertemporal integration refers to arbitrage across
periods. For the purposes of the present analysis we focus here on spatial market
integration. From this perspective market integration is a measure of the extent to which
markets in different areas are linked. When two or more markets are integrated, the flow
of commodities among them reflects effective demand, price evolution reported for the
same good is similar and price differentials are closely related to the transaction costs.
Otherwise, they are not integrated but segmented or isolated.
As just mentioned, three characteristics can be identified to describe spatial market
integration: similar patterns of price movements, equilibrium between quantities
demanded and supplied, and size of profit margins. The last point highlights how
integration is closely related to the concept of efficiency (Barrett, 2001; Moser, 2009).
In particular, the following relationship should be observed:
  jitjtit pp  (3.1)
where:
tp is the price of the same commodity at time t in location specified by i or j;
jit is the total cost of moving the commodity from location j to location i at time t;
 is the expectation operator
In case (3.1) holds with equality, that is   jitjtit pp  , there is a condition of
competitive equilibrium under tradability. This condition is defined as Regime 1 in
Baulch (1997).
A second possibility, defined by Moser (2009) as segmented competitive equilibrium
and by Baulch (1997) as Regime 2, exists if   ijtjtit pp  , indicating unprofitable
arbitrage.
Finally, there is a condition of imperfectly competitive equilibrium, defined as Regime 3
in Baulch (1997), when   ijtjtit pp  , indicating positive expected returns from
intermarket trade due to imperfect market behaviour.
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Moser (2009) highlights a limitation of empirical price analysis when prices are known
but that is not the case for either total transfer costs (i.e. ijt ) or the nature of market
(dis)equilibrium (i.e. the operator relating  jtit pp  and ijt ), or both. In fact,
common practice in testing market integration through time series analysis of price data
relies on strong assumptions about total transfer costs, market equilibrium and
quantities traded. However it is also commonly recognized that the paucity of data in
developing countries makes empirical analysis of price time series still quite a valuable
tool.
3.2 Analytical techniques
The following part presents methodologies for the estimation of elasticities of demand
and supply and for the analysis of market integration.
The analysis of seasonal dimension is relevant with relation to the focus of the study.
However, the data currently available to tackle such component are limited to price time
series data which can contribute to assess how seasonality affects market integration,
while data collection for the estimation of supply and demand has not been designed to
take account of the seasonal dimension.
3.2.1 Elasticity of demand
For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on income elasticity of demand and price
elasticity of demand. Whenever possible, the estimation of the cross-price elasticity of
demand will contribute to the analysis.
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Box 3.1 Main measures of elasticity of demand
Income20 elasticity of demand (YED) measures the percentage change in demand caused
by a one percent change in income. This can be visualized in Figure 3.2 as how a change
in income causes the demand curve to shift reflecting the change in demand. YED is a
measurement of how far the curve shifts horizontally along the X-axis.  Mathematically
YED =   QYYQ //  . The use of the partial derivative indicates that all other
determinants of demand, including the price of the good, are being held constant. When
YED is less than one (YED < 1) demand is income inelastic. When YED is greater than
one (YED > 1) demand is income elastic.
Price elasticity of demand (PED) measures the percentage change in quantity demanded
caused by a one percent change in price. Again, Figure 3.2 shows how a change in price
induces a movement along the demand curve that reflects the change in quantity
demanded. PED is a measurement of how far along the curve the movement is, or in
other words, how much is the change of quantity demanded. Mathematically PED =
  QPPQ //  . The partial derivative PQ  /  indicates that all other determinants of
demand are being held constant. PEDs are almost always negative. If the PED is less
than minus one (PED < -1) demand is said to be elastic. If the PED is between minus
one and zero (-1 < PED < 0) demand is inelastic and if PED equals minus one (PED = -
1) demand is unit-elastic. A perfectly inelastic demand curve, perpendicular to Q axis,
has zero elasticity. A perfectly elastic demand curve, horizontal to Q axis, is infinitely
elastic.
Cross price elasticity of demand (XED) measures the percentage change in demand for
the good in question caused by a one percent change in the price of a related good. A
change in the price of a related good causes the demand curve to shift reflecting the
change in demand; XED is a measurement of how far the curve shifts horizontally along
the X-axis. Mathematically XED =   QggQ /PrPr/   where gPr  is the price of the
related good.
20 Sometime elasticity of demand is considered with reference to expenditure rather than income. Unless
otherwise specified, the two terms are used interchangeably here.
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A few models are available for demand analysis. The simplest is a one-commodity
model such as:
iii XLnpLnqLn 21   (3.2)
where:
iq is the quantity of the examined commodity demanded by the ith
household;
ip is the average price paid by the ith household to purchase the commodity;
iX is the expenditure or income of the ith household.
Such a simple model can be improved with: a) the introduction of an interaction term
ii XLnpLn to allow the price and income elasticity to vary, and b) some form of price
index to capture eventual changes in the value of the monetary unit over the time frame
considered.
The evolution of (3.2) is represented by the Linear Expenditure System (LES) model
which a) moves from the use of generic income/expenditure variable X towards a more
focused approach with the inclusion of total expenditure on a restricted set of goods
being analyzed, and b) includes of a dedicated price index:
   


n
k
kikiii PpLnePxLneqLn
1
* (3.3)
where:
iq is the quantity demanded of the ith good;
kp is the nominal price of the kth good;
x is the total expenditure on the group of goods being analyzed;
ie is the total expenditure elasticity;
*
ike is the cross-price elasticity of the demand of the ith good on the price of
the kth good;
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P is an index of prices of the goods considered.21
Both (3.2) and (3.3) are logarithmic models and therefore the coefficients estimated are
directly interpreted as elasticities. However, the preferred model is the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS). Its simplified version, called Linear Approximate of AIDS
(LA/AIDS) is the following:
  

 


n
j
itit
n
i
tiijtijiit upLnwxLnpLnw
1
1, (3.4)
where:
itw is the expenditure share of the ith good;
itp  and jtp are the nominal prices of the ith and jth goods respectively;
x is the total expenditure on the group of goods being analyzed.
A series of properties make (3.4) the preferred model.22 However, the selection of
models is affected by the purposes of the analysis as well as by the data available. If the
purpose of the analysis is to consider the possible use of an eventual cash transfer, (3.3)
and (3.4) may not be the most appropriate tools since they somehow impose the
restriction that the increased expenditure ( x ) is limited among the categories of goods
and expenses covered by x. This is not necessarily correct in the case of unconditional
cash transfers and therefore (3.2) may be more appropriate.
In terms of data constraints, while (3.3) and (3.4) require information on prices and
quantities of all the goods included in the basket under examination, (3.2) requires not
only the price and quantity of the good (or goods) considered but also the total
expenditure incurred. Sometimes some of these data may not be available or may not be
collected through a survey due to shortage of time or other resources. In that case it is
necessary to make the best use of secondary data and/or, if possible, proceed to some
limited data collection through rapid appraisal techniques.
21 In particular, 
k
kk pLnwPLn where: wk is the expenditure share of the kth good.
22 See Deaton et al. (1980a, 1980b) for a more in-depth discussion of the AIDS model.
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3.2.1.1 Estimation of elasticities from rapid appraisal techniques data
Rapid appraisal techniques (RAT) do not aim to collect new data per se, or at least, the
collection of new data is carried out in a succinct way which can provide a higher or
lower degree of acceptability but cannot ensure any statistical significance that the value
or range of values derived is representative of the true value of the unknown variable.
However, in some circumstances rapid appraisal techniques are the preferred or even
the only option available. The quality of data obtained through RATs varies with the
standards of the technique adopted. In general, much care need to be taken when
making use of data collected through RATs, although continuous improvements
achieved in some of such techniques have managed to gain them remarkable
recognition.
The Household Economy Approach (HEA) is probably the one that has managed to
gain the highest recognition due to its capacity to reach a good degree of approximation
in its estimations through the use of a systemic approach. HEA is a livelihoods-based
framework for analyzing the way people obtain food, non-food goods and services, and
how they might respond to changes in their external environment – for example a
negative shock such as a drought or crop failure, or a positive policy change such as a
cash transfer scheme.23 It is a very useful source of information when trying to estimate
income and price elasticities.
The main form of information gathering for HEA baselines is through semi-structured
interviews with focus groups. In this way average key variables such as household food
production, food consumption, sources of food consumed, ways to cope with shocks,
and similar are estimated in a systemic fashion rounded on food. In order to maintain a
certain homogeneity, wherever possible monetary values are converted into energetic
values (expressed in kilocalories). This allows the researcher to come up with a
reasonably good basic profile of average units within different, though reasonably
homogeneous, groups which vary mainly in terms of wealth and livelihood
characteristics.
23 See Boudreau, 2008.
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Due to the structure of the data set used (limited sample of average data with no
measurable statistical significance) the application of models presented above for the
estimation of income and price elasticity cannot provide valid results. Therefore it is
necessary to resort to alternative methods to estimate some proxies.
As a proxy for income elasticity we can use what can be called effective demand for
food estimated for each wealth group as the ratio between the market value of food
consumed by the household and the sum of total household expenditure plus the market
value of food produced for self-consumption by the household and that received as food
aid:
effective demand
for food =   



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1 (3.5)
where:
ip       is the market price of the ith good;
c
iq       is the quantity of the ith good consumed by the household;
fx       is the total household expenditure on food;
nfx      is the total household expenditure on non-food;
s
iq       is the quantity of the ith good produced by the household for self-consumption;
a
iq       is the quantity of the ith good received by the household as food aid or as gift.
Through (3.5) it is possible to estimate proxies for the income elasticity of different
wealth groups. This could help to estimate how an eventual cash transfer will contribute
to increasing the demand for food from a typical household of a specific group defined
by a series of characteristics such as livelihood zone and wealth group.24 The more
specific the characterization of the groups for which (3.5) is calculated, the lower the
discrepancy between the estimate and its true value can be expected to be.
24 In this case the use of typical characteristics of livelihood zones and wealth groups provides a similar
role as the one played by the inclusion of fixed effect in the usual conduction of demand analysis through
conventional techniques.
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Estimating price elasticity of demand on the basis of average data can be a little more
complicated. An option is provided by the simulation of fictitious distributions based on
the average values of each relevant variable assumed for each wealth group for each
wider group identified by a set of characteristics such as livelihood zone. In other
words, it is a process of imputation of missing variable values through some relationship
among the assumed average values of such variable for the various wealth groups. The
easiest such imputation is through linear interpolation. Such estimates may be refined
through the adoption of the functional form which better fits the interpolated data.
The estimation process becomes a bit less fictitious, though still based on average data
which are not statistically significant, when the initial RAT data collection design has
included the simulation of possible price changes in the staple food commodity with the
aim of analyzing the household’s capacity to cope with possible price rises. If such data
are available and sufficiently developed, they can provide a good basis for the
estimation of price elasticity of demand.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.5 help to clarify the procedure. Table 3.1 summarizes the results
of simulations in the changes in share of food consumption covered by food staples
purchased following changes in their price. The price changes simulated in this case
range between -80% and 200%. The simulation has been repeated for the various wealth
groups considered (i.e. very poor, poor, middle, better off). Knowing the average market
price of staple food as well as average quantities purchased by a typical household, it is
possible to estimate changes in Q  related to changes in P . Then, values of QLn  are
regressed against PLn  to estimate the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. In the
case of the Very Poor wealth group reported in Figure 3.5 the price elasticity of demand
is given by the inverse of the coefficient of QLn  = 1 / -0.9853 = -1.0149. In this case
the use of a loglinear model serves various purposes:
 it helps to reduce the relevance of outliers and improve the fitness of the model;
 it facilitates the estimation of elasticities;
 it reflects common practice in the literature.
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Table 3.1 Share of food consumption
                covered by food staple purchase
(%)
Figure 3.5   Relationship between LnP and
                    LnQ for Very Poor wealth group
-80 34 26 163 238
-60 17 13 81 119
-40 11 9 54 79
-20 8 7 41 59
0 7 5 33 48
10 6 5 30 43
20 6 4 27 40
30 5 4 25 37
40 5 4 23 34
50 5 4 22 32
60 4 3 20 30
70 4 3 19 28
80 4 3 18 26
90 4 3 17 25
100 3 3 16 24
150 3 2 13 19
200 2 2 11 16
Middle Better off% Very poor Poor
wealth groupprice change
y = -0.9853x + 5.3792
R2 = 0.9908
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 2 4 6 8
Ln Q
Ln
 P
Source: Author’s elaboration of HEA data from Swaziland VAC and FEG, 2007
At this stage it is worth considering some possible reservations about the approach
adopted for the estimation of demand elasticities. On general grounds the methods
proposed are sufficient to identify demand. First, data used for the estimation of
effective demand do not directly capture market transactions. Furthermore, it is not
limited to market transactions but includes non-market sources of food such as
assistance, gifts and exchange. Having said the above, it must be recognized that
reservations are justified the closer the focus of the analysis is to minimum nutrition
requirements. From this perspective, in conditions of famine the typical demand-supply
framework can provide biased estimations. Such bias is partially taken into account by
HEA by focusing on changes in quantities demanded between times of famine and
reference normal conditions. Therefore while in general the proposed RAT technique
manages to achieve proper identification of demand, a certain risk of bias is
acknowledged when food consumption in the case under investigation is close to
minimum food requirements.
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3.2.2 Elasticity of supply
For the purposes of the present study the analysis of supply is centred on the assessment
of its expandability. A key step in such a direction is the estimation of price elasticity of
supply (i.e. how the supply of a specific food commodity will change following a
change in the commodity price) as well as of its determinants. Considering the market
focus of our perspective, the aim of this part of the analysis is to try to establish the
relevance of the trading sector in responding to the demand for food, and its flexibility
to expand in response to an eventual increase in demand. It is proposed to do this
through a traders’ survey. The aim of the survey is to establish traders’ profiles as well
as assessing their capacity and willingness to scale up their business size. In particular,
this study proposes a rather simple method of contingent valuation to estimate traders’
capacity and willingness to expand the supply of food.
3.2.2.1 Traders’ survey
A traders’ survey should be able to provide a description of the traders operating in a
certain geographical area and a specific sector. In principle, in order to be representative
the sample drawn for the survey should be based on a complete knowledge of number
and generic characteristics (mainly, typology25 and size) of traders operating in the area
of investigation and in its surroundings. However, this is normally not feasible in
developing countries and therefore the sample is normally selected purposively, mainly
on the basis of key informants’ good knowledge. When the geographical area covered
by the survey is not very large, such a limitation of the survey design can be reduced by
increasing the sample size in order to cover a higher number of traders per location.26
25 In this case, in terms of typology traders could be described as collectors, wholesalers, retailers,
according to their role along the market chain.
26 Donovan (2006) suggests that in each location the sample should include at least 10 traders, or 10% of
traders operating in a large retail market, or at least five traders in the case of a wholesale market. WFP
(2009) recommends interviewing a total of six traders, including two retailers, two wholesalers and two
collectors, per location and per market chain.
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The sample size needs to be increased when there is a suspicion of high heterogeneity
among traders.
Besides the role played within the market chain, one of the descriptive bits of
information detected through a traders’ survey that is of particular relevance for the
purposes of this analysis is the business size of each operator. Different sizes of
business are expected to raise different type of constraints and may therefore play a
certain role in contributing to traders’ decision making. However, estimating business
size is not so easy and even a group categorization such as small, medium and large is
very context-specific. The method proposed in this case is quite rough, but acceptable
for the purpose of the analysis conducted here, which is not aimed at an exact definition
of the business size but rather its approximate classification. From this perspective,
traders’ business size can be estimated by considering the value of the few major
commodities traded.27 Such a value can be arbitrarily assumed to represent
approximately half of the entire turnover eventually achieved by each individual. It is to
be considered that the estimate derived this way is not necessarily the total business size
of each trader but is rather the individual size of the trader’s food trade business.
Information on the composition of commodities traded in terms of food versus non-food
may be collected through the survey; however, estimating the total business size of each
trader is not considered relevant for the purpose of this analysis.
The estimation of traders’ business size can also help to assess market structure and
functioning. The analysis of market share estimates covered by individual traders or
groups can help to estimate concentration ratios and therefore to consider the degree of
competitiveness of the food marketing channels as well as the risk of collusion.28
27 It is reasonable to assume that the number of most relevant commodities dealt with by a trader varies
according to the degree of development of the market or geographical area under investigation. This
consideration goes beyond the degree of specialization of a single trader and is focused on the degree of
diversification of both the commodities traded in the market and the commodities consumed within the
local community. Such a degree of diversification is expected to be higher the higher the development of
the local economic system.
28 Timmer (1983) suggests that the greater the number and the diversity of traders operating in a market,
the lower the risk of collusion.
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Box 3.2 Measures of market competitiveness estimated through a traders’
survey
The higher the aggregate market share of a few large firms, the higher the concentration
of trade activities and the risk of collusive behaviour. Therefore, the Concentration
Ratio ( XCR ) of the largest X  traders in a market of N traders is given by:


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N
i
i
X
i
iX BSBSCR
11
(3.6)
where BSi is a measure of the business size of the ith trader.
The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) assesses the degree of competition in a market
by comparing the squared business size of each unit against that of the entire market.
Assuming a market composed by N units, each unit i with a market share si, HHI is
given by:

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i
isHHI
1
2  (3.7)
The Normalized Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI’) is given by:
   NNHHIHHI /11/1'  (3.8)
HHI ranges from 1/N to 1 and HHI’ ranges from 0 to 1.
3.2.2.2 Willingness to trade and constraints to scaling up supply
The use of contingent valuation has mainly focused on the estimation of consumers’
willingness to pay for a specific service or good. Although the validity of contingent
valuation studies for supply estimates has been the subject of much academic debate
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(e.g. Hausman, 1993; Weinshenk, 1994), it is commonly agreed that such a
methodology provides at least an approximation of true behaviour. A condition for its
application is that, similar to consumer surveys about public goods, the contingent
scenario places the respondents in a hypothetical market situation, meaning that the
marketed supply is not fixed but can be decided by the decision maker. The approach
proposed here is not limited to the estimation of traders’ willingness to trade (WTT),
but will refer such choice to specific increases in price levels. Therefore the hypothetical
bias inherent in contingent valuation studies (Green and Tunstall, 1999) is minimized
because the options considered reflect real scenarios.
A preliminary step in the analysis has tried to determine availability and access to
critical inputs. In fact, it goes without saying that traders’ confidence in accessing a
sufficient amount of critical inputs such as food commodities in particular would
constitute a necessary precondition for the feasibility of a cash-based initiative.
Through the traders’ survey it is possible to find out traders’ willingness to scale up
their supply as well as to investigate the eventual constraints to doing so that they may
face. The number of possible reasons for the acceptance or rejection of traders’ interest
in scaling up their business can vary from case to case, but the most relevant for our
analysis can be reduced to the following five:
 prices
 security
 roads and accessibility
 credit
 storage facilities.
In particular, the variability of prices is instrumental to the analysis of possible
consequences of increasing demand, in this case limited to food items. The analysis of
traders’ willingness to accept to scaling up their activities should help to consider the
feasibility of expanding and adapting supply to the estimated increased demand and
concurrently estimating the possible risk of inflation.
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The analysis can be carried out through multivariate regression. Since the decision to
start or scale up own business size can be considered a dichotomous choice problem, it
is possible to carry out econometric estimation through the application of limited
dependent variable models. This type of non-linear statistical model relates choice
probability to explanatory factors. In the present case the objective is to estimate the
probability that traders are willing to start new activities or scale up their existing
activities conditional upon specific trade and trader’s characteristics. The present
analysis focuses on business size for what concerns the trader’s characteristics and on
the factors highlighted above as major determinants of business size. In order to do this
a model is required that is able to reflect the adoption of a certain set of behavioural
responses which are empirically observed. This ‘adoption behavioural model’ with
binary dependent variables can provide a conceptual framework to examine variables
that are associated with the adoption of certain behaviour and eventually provide a
stimulating role in such respect. Although ordinary least squares estimates can be
computed for binary models, the error terms are likely to be heteroskedastic leading to
inefficient parameter estimates and thus making inappropriate classical hypothesis tests.
Probability models can be of help in overcoming such a constraint. In particular the
logit model has been applied in this study. The use of the logit model, which gives
maximum likelihood estimators, helps to overcome most of the problems associated
with linear probability models and provides parameter estimators which are
asymptotically consistent, efficient and Gaussian so that the analogue of the regression
t-test can be applied (Pindyck et al., 1981).29
The adoption behavioural model used to examine factors influencing traders’ WTT can
be presented as follows:
 iIfY  (3.9)
 jiji XbbI 0 (3.10)
29 The logit model, based on the cumulative logistic probability function, is computationally easier to use
than other similar models, such as the probit and tobit.
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where:
iY is the observed response for the ith trader ( iY =1 for a positive response, iY =0
otherwise);
iI is an underlying and unobserved stimulus index for the ith observation;
f is the functional relationship between the field observation ( iY ) and the stimulus
index ( iI ) which determines the probability of strategy adoption;
i identifies observations on variables for the adoption model  ( i  = 1, 2, …, n, n
being the sample size);
jiX is the jth explanatory variable for the ith observation ( j = 1, 2, …, n);
jb is an unknown parameter ( j  = 0, 1, …, n);
j identifies the explanatory variables ( j  = 0, 1, …, m, where m is the total
number of explanatory variables).
The logit model assumes that the underlying stimulus index (Ii) is a random variable
which predicts the probability of adopting a certain strategy. Such probability can be
expressed as:
i
i
I
I
i e
eP 1 (3.11)
Therefore, for the ith observation (ith trader), equation (3.10) expressed through a logit
model becomes:
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PLnI  01 (3.12)
On the basis of such a model, the relative effect of each explanatory variable ( jiX ) on
the probability of strategy adoption can be measured by differentiating with respect to
jiX :
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 (3.13)
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Finally, the interpolation and linearization of the WTT rates estimated in
correspondence of different rates of price increase allow the estimation of the WTT
multipliers.
3.2.2.3 Price elasticity of supply
Since the survey is able to provide only a snapshot of the reality, the existing variations
in price at the time of the survey are insufficient to generate the amount of information
required to simulate an increase of quantity demanded. The best way to fill such a gap is
to run a simulation exercise by proposing a set of price changes and ask the interviewee
for his/her most likely response on the basis of his/her current/expected capacity.
To do so the following model can be used for the estimation of the elasticity of supply:
ijnijn pLnbbqLn 10  (3.14)
where:
ijnq is the quantity of the nth commodity supplied by the ith trader in the current
( j =0) or simulated ( j =1, 2) situations corresponding to the jth price change;
ijnp is the current ( j =0) or desirable ( j =1, 2) price of the nth commodity as
expressed by the ith trader.
In case of high variation in traders’ business size and capacity in general, the analysis
can be diversified to capture different attitude to price changes from different typologies
of traders. The simplest way to do this is through the use of dummy variables in (3.14).
An alternative way to carry out such analysis would be through the use of a multiple
logit model.
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3.2.3 Simulation of intervention strategies through a
demand-supply framework
Once the elasticities of demand and supply have been estimated, they can be combined
to simulate intervention strategies and particularly to try to estimate the eventual
inflationary consequences that can be expected from such strategies. Figure 3.6 presents
the supply and demand curves estimated on the basis of the inverse elasticities as
measured above. Since the
focus of the intervention is
the poorest strata of the
population, it is wise to
estimate the demand curves
on the basis of the average
inverse elasticity for very
poor groups of households,
the target of eventual
interventions.
At the equilibrium point
demand equals supply, therefore both demand and supply specifications have to be
analyzed simultaneously. In simultaneous equations systems some of the independent
variables in a regression may be correlated with errors.30 In such a system there is a
contemporaneous feedback between endogenous variables and therefore the Ordinary
Least Squares technique does not provide unbiased and consistent estimates. Various
possible estimation techniques can be applied in this case.31 It is recognized how the
proposed approach for the simultaneous estimation of Demand and Supply does not
control for the interdependence between the two functions. In addition it is recognized
that some unobservable variables may affect both functions.
30 Thus violating the fourth Gauss-Markov assumption.
31 In the Three Stages Least Squares technique the Instrumental Variable approach is used first and this is
followed by a Generalized Least Squares approach.
    Figure 3.6 Demand and supply curves
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If demand elasticities have been estimated through RATs on the basis of average data,
once again it is necessary to follow a more pragmatic approach. This can be
summarized in a few steps, which are described below.
The first step is the estimation of the increased demand eventually induced by a
potential cash transfer. The best way to do this is by establishing scenarios derived from
the estimates provided in previous phases of the analysis, mainly the share of increased
income/expenditure following the cash injection which is spent on food by the poorest
strata of the population. Unless cross-price elasticities have been estimated, the
simplifying assumption is made that all additional demand for food is covered by staple
food. This monetary amount is converted into physical quantities on the basis of the
average market price of the staple commodity (or commodities) considered. Obviously,
in the case of a cash transfer programme the additional quantities would rise with the
amount of the transfer and the number of beneficiaries, as well as with the number of
distributions in the case of interventions protracted over time. Therefore the daily
amount of per capita physical demand increase estimated so far is adjusted by the size
of the prospective caseload and foreseen duration. Such estimates are based on the
assumption of constant prices, and more realistically can be considered as the maximum
increase in possible additional quantity demanded.
At this stage, for the analysis of expandability of supply it is possible to make use of the
multipliers estimated earlier for the various categories of traders. In this case we need an
estimate of the normal market supply. Unless there are reliable estimates of market
supplies provided by traders32 or other market operators, the assumption can be made
that the quantity purchased by the households in normal conditions in a certain market
is the average quantity which corresponds to the equilibrium price. Being the
equilibrium quantity, this amount also corresponds to the average tonnage handled by
the various suppliers and traders in normal conditions. In other words, on the
assumption of the supply-demand equilibrium, we use demand-related data as the basis
for the estimation of normal market supply. It goes without saying that such estimate is
an approximation in defect, since it is reasonable to assume that quantities supplied by
traders supply the market with greater quantities than are actually sold. Converting the
32 Traders’ avoidance of direct questions about the size of their business is well known. See Harris, 1992
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quantities of all food commodities into the cereal equivalent and multiplying the
average daily individual purchase of the different wealth groups by the estimated
number of household within each group, it is possible to estimate the aggregated
supply-demand equilibrium quantity over a certain period. These amounts can be
arbitrarily split among the various traders’ business sizes and form the basis for the
analysis of expandability of supply.
The final stage of the simulation exercise associates possible market price increase rates
with likely increases in marketed supply. Arranging such data in a matrix form allows
quick estimation of the range of inflation rates that can be reasonably expected from the
eventual injection of cash in the local economy. This tool can assist in selecting
intervention measures (e.g. commodity-based, cash-based, mixed, etc) or fine-tuning
details such as caseload of recipients, duration of the programme and amount of the
transfer.
3.2.4 Market integration
In this study the analysis of market integration makes use of time series data. In order to
study the interdependence of price time series between any pair of markets i and I, we
can refer to a linear relationship of the type:
tItit upp  21  (3.15)
where:
itp represents the retail price prevalent on market i at time t;
Itp represents the retail price prevalent on market I at time t;
tu represents the error term;
1 and 2 represent the coefficients to be estimated.
As is typical of time-series analysis, in order to be co-integrated itp  and Itp  need to
satisfy the following two conditions:
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 both variables need to be difference stationary: I(1);
 the residuals from the regression of the two variables need to be stationary: I(0).
When this occurs the two price series and consequently the two markets are said to be
co-integrated.
In order to test the condition of stationarity, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit
root test is applied. In a second step, the ADF test is applied to the series of residuals ut
of the two initial time series.
Once the condition of stationarity of the series and their co-integration are verified, the
analysis can move on to consider the following model known as the Error-Correction
Model or Error-Correction Mechanism (ECM):
  ttIiItit upppp  121321  (3.16)
where  indicates the change in price in market i or I between one period and the
previous one (t and t-1).
The model above can be interpreted by considering how traders adjust the price of their
merchandise from one period to the next in response to changes in concurrent prices on
other relevant markets (in this case indicated by: Itp ) as well as to the previous
disequilibrium between the price prevalent on their market i and the prevalent price on
market I. From this perspective the coefficient 2 measures the short-run effect in the
process of price change and the coefficient 3 measures the speed of adjustment of price
on market i to a discrepancy between pi and the price prevalent on what we could call
the reference market ( Ip ) in the previous period.
At this stage the half-life index h can be used to achieve a summary measure of the
process of price transmission, which is particularly useful for comparative purposes.
The h index measures the number of time units required for the process of price change
in one market to take effect in the other market, per each pair of markets, before
restoring half of the long-run equilibrium between their prices. This is measured as:
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)ˆ(ln
)2/1(ln
h (3.17)
where ˆ is the estimate of  , the coefficient of the lagged price difference in:
  tItitItit upppp   11 (3.18)
The h index results are particularly useful in order to derive a combined picture of the
characteristics of the adjustment process and facilitate comparisons. Such a combined
view is provided by the ratio 2 / h.33
In addition to the above, the Granger causality test is used to verify the presence and
direction of causality. Per each couple of markets it can test: 1) whether price changes
experienced in one market have induced or influenced price changes in another market;
2) whether any influence is unidirectional or bilateral. With reference to the two
equations:
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 (3.20)
there are four possible cases:
(1) Unidirectional causality from X to Y (X is said to “Granger-cause” Y):
33 Goletti (1994) provides a very simple and clear example in support of the use of the ratio between size
of adjustment and time to complete the adjustment: “Given two markets A and B with the same value of
the magnitude of price adjustment with respect to a third market C, then the lower is the time to complete
this adjustment, the better integrated the market”.
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In this case past values of X have an effect on current values of Y (i.e.
zeroallnotsi ' ), but past values of Y have no effect on X (i.e.
zeroallsi ' ).
(2) Unidirectional causality from Y to X (Y is said to “Granger-cause” X):
zeroallsi ' ; zeroallnotsi ' .
(3) Bilateral causality:
zeroallnotsi ' ; zeroallnotsi ' .
(4) Independence:
zeroallsi ' ; zeroallsi ' .
3.3 Field activities
The following section is a description of field activities related to the case studies.
3.3.1 Selection of case studies
Since the aim of this study is to test the relevance of the context and, in particular,
market functionality in supporting the preference for one or another intervention
strategy, it is appropriate to refer to specific case studies reflecting real conditions in
order to test theoretical positions. In the early stages of this study it was considered
appropriate to use three case studies to achieve this purpose. In order to reduce the
author’s personal preference, the selection of the three case studies was determined by
the demand for such studies from the practitioners’ community. In fact, all three case
studies were carried out by the author in response to specific requests raised by either
NGOs or donors. Table 3.2 summarizes the fieldwork by commissioner, time and
location.
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Table 3.2 Fieldwork
Area Commissioner
of study
Period of fieldwork
Turkana,  Kenya OXFAM December 2005
Lubombo and Shiselweni,
Swaziland
SC July 2007
Northern Bahr el Ghazal
and Lakes,  Southern Sudan
EC – DG ECHO February – March 2009
The three contexts analyzed through the three case studies provide a good combination
of different contexts in which a choice between response options is normally faced. On
one hand there is Turkana, a district of Kenya characterized by a chronically low level
of development and very limited resources, while on the other are two districts in
Swaziland with much higher living and economic standards but affected – as is the
entire country – by a certain long-term recession. Finally, the case of Southern Sudan is
somewhere between the two extremes, in some ways closer to Turkana but also
currently undergoing the initial stage of a process of generalized reprise after a long
civil conflict.
It is hoped that setting the analysis in such a diversified set of contexts can highlight the
relevance of contextual factors for the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative
intervention strategies.
3.3.2 Summary of data and data sources
As the research focuses on the relevance of market functioning in different contexts, the
analysis is articulated at different levels, some relevant at country level and others at a
comparative multi-country level.
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Overall, the approach proposed as the most appropriate to assess the feasibility of cash
transfers and to compare alternative response options through market analysis is
composed of three components:
a) estimation of income and price elasticity of demand;
b) estimation of price elasticity of supply and its determinants;
c) estimation of market integration.
To cover these tasks, a combination of secondary and primary data have been used.
Demand elasticity has been estimated through:
a) secondary data from recent HEA,
b) primary data collected through a household survey.
The aim of the household survey was to test the validity of HEA data and mainly to
integrate existing data with aspects not yet covered (i.e. simulation of recipients’ use of
an eventual cash transfer).
Supply elasticity has been estimated through:
a) primary data collected through a trader survey.
The estimation of market integration has made use of secondary data: a time series
analysis of market price data.
A list of data sources is provided in the overview table below.
Table 3.3 Data and data sources
Area Type of data Source
Kenya Supply analysis
Trader survey in Turkana and
neighbouring areas Primary Author
Price analysis
Time series for Turkana Secondary ALRMP
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Time series for RoK Secondary CBS
Time series for Uganda Secondary RATIN,
RATES,
TRADENET
Market prices prevalent at time of fieldwork Primary Author
Demographics
Time series of population data in Turkana Secondary CBS
Malnutrition
Series of nutritional data in Turkana Secondary ALRMP
Dietary energy supply
Estimate for Kenya Secondary FAO
Food aid deliveries
Time series of food aid in Turkana Secondary WFP
Perceived impact of CFW and GFD
Survey Secondary OXFAM
Cost of food aid
Project budget Secondary WFP,
OXFAM
Swaziland Demand analysis
Household economy (HEA) Secondary VAC, FEG
Household survey in Lubombo and Shiselweni Primary Author
Supply analysis
Trader survey in Lubombo, Shiselweni and
neighbouring areas Primary Author
Price analysis
Time series for Swaziland Secondary CSO
Time series for South Africa (SAFEX)
and neighbouring countries
Secondary SAFEX,
FEWSNET,
Dradri
Market prices prevalent at time of fieldwork Primary Author
Food production, dietary energy supply, malnutrition
Time series of cereal production Secondary FAO / WFP
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Time series of dietary energy supply Secondary FAO
Time series of other nutritional data Secondary FAO
Distribution of food insecurity by
socio-economic group Secondary VAC
Cost of food aid
Project budget Secondary WFP
Southern Demand analysis
Sudan Household economy (HEA) Secondary LAF
Household survey in NBeG and Lakes Primary Author
Supply analysis
Trader survey in NBeG and Lakes Primary Author
Price analysis
Time series for Southern Sudan Secondary WFP
Time series for USA Secondary FAO
Market prices prevalent at time of fieldwork Primary Author
Food production, food consumption, malnutrition
Time series of cereal production Secondary FAO / WFP
Estimate of food consumption Secondary FAO / WFP
Time series of nutritional data Secondary FAO / WFP
Cost of food aid
Project budget Secondary WFP
3.3.3 Approaches used for sampling
Table 3.4 shows the sample size used for primary data collection in the various case
studies.
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Table 3.4 Sample sizes
Trader survey
Household survey
on site
surrounding
areas total
Lubombo 0
252
235
373
Shiselweni
NBeG
Lakes
360
130
248
309 0
0
490
557
0
Swaziland
Southern Sudan
0
490
557
Kenya
Lakes
NBeG
47
49
0Southern Sudan 150373 223
94
92
Lubombo
ShiselweniSwaziland 186
Kenya 205
Since in all cases the total population of food traders was unknown, any sophisticated
sampling technique was bound to add nothing more than false rigour. Instead, the
sampling for the traders’ survey was purposive, relying heavily on the enumerators’
knowledge of the local area. The enumerators were instructed to cover a certain number
of local markets identified along both major and minor trade paths, as well as bus stops
and other meeting points and localities where food transactions occurred. They were
also instructed to interview traders spread across all functional levels of trade, ranging
from very small-scale retailers through mobile intermediaries to large-scale wholesalers.
As such it is felt that although the surveys cannot be considered representative of the
traders’ communities in the various case studies, such a limitation is somehow balanced
by the consideration that in each case the sample size is large enough compared to the
assumed population.
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Sampling for the household survey was slightly different. The main aim of the
household survey was to cover a wide spectrum of income levels while minimizing
financial and time costs. Additional household characteristics considered determinant in
the choice of the location were different in the various case studies (e.g. beneficiaries of
food assistance, status of returnees/displaced/sedentary or nomadic, etc). Therefore, in
the absence of any recent census data and/or data related to the distribution of the
various categories of households, the selection of geographical units within the focus
areas mainly relied upon expert knowledge from key stakeholders (i.e. key informants
from central and local administrative offices, members of bodies mandated to
livelihoods and vulnerability analysis, NGOs, CBOs, etc). In each location chosen
through such a first stage, households were selected through systematic sampling. It is
acknowledged that since beneficiary and non beneficiary households are different a
comparison between the two is not unbiased.34
3.3.4 The author’s role
The role of the author has been essential in all parts of the research, from the early
design of the structure of the first case study to the comparative analysis of the three
case studies.
In particular, the author:
a) has developed the research strategy followed in parallel through each case study.
In particular he has developed the approach used to estimate the supply elasticity
and proposed and field-tested the use of the traders’ willingness to trade as a
tool to estimate the likely rate of inflation to be expected from a certain injection
of cash in the local economy;
b) has adjusted available household data (essentially provided in average form
through HEA datasets) for the estimation of demand elasticity;35
34 It is expected that beneficiaries were initially selected to participate in the programme because more in
need than those who were not selected.
35 This refers only to the Swaziland and Southern Sudan case studies. As indicated above, the bulk of
each case study is reflected in the estimation of demand, supply and market integration. The first case
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c) has designed the questionnaires for all the various activities of primary data
collection, be they market prices, household data, traders’ data;
d) has trained enumerators and piloted the data collection in each case study;
e) has trained the data-entry staff;
f) has supervised data collection and data entry;
g) has conducted all data analysis, both related to each case study and to the
aggregate dataset;
h) has carried out all reporting activities.36
study (Turkana, Kenya), where the estimation of elasticity of demand is omitted, is an exception. This
omission is justified by the total reliance of local demand for cereals on external inputs, through either
food aid or commercial channels.
36 In the case of Southern Sudan, the market analysis conducted by the author, was part of a wider
assessment conducted by a team led by the author.
4
Kenya: Turkana
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Introduction
The regular recurrence of major droughts in Kenya during the past few decades has
raised concerns over the provision of food aid as the standard response. The chronic
nature of good size of food insecure people has raised concerns over the appropriateness
of emergency response to what have become “predictable needs”. And the consideration
that predictable needs can be met more effectively with predictable resource flows has
led to direct efforts towards the introduction of the Hunger Safety Net Programme
(HSNP).
The present case study was conducted as part of wider efforts in preparation of the
HSNP. It is focused on the analysis of market functioning in one of the districts selected
to pilot the implementation of the HSNP and where some pilot cash-based activities had
already been attempted.
This case study is organized as follows. The initial part provides a review of the context
and the justification for assistance. After an analysis of market functioning through a
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review of market behaviour, the focus shifts the estimation of the demand for and
supply of food. This will allow the simulation of a cash transfer strategy.
4.1.2 Demographics and food requirements
On the basis of official statistics, in 1999 the population of Turkana district in Kenya
was estimated at 447,000 individuals. According to more recent reports, the Turkana
population in 2005 was estimated to be around 510,000 people, apparently reducing the
high demographic growth recorded in the 1990s.37
In the absence of a specific estimation of daily food consumption in Turkana, we can
make reference to the average estimate of daily food consumption in Kenya, with the
understanding that such estimation is clearly in excess of the case in Turkana. On such a
basis, it is useful to make reference to FAO estimate of Dietary Energy Supply (DES),
estimated at 2,110 kilocalories per person per day in the case of Kenya.38 We can use
DES as proxy for estimation of food requirements.
Once established estimates for both population and DES as proxy for food
requirements, we can infer food demand by converting kilocalories into cereal
equivalent. Table 4.1 provides all such estimates. Given that in Turkana standards of
37 It is worth noting the remarkable demographic increase that has occurred in Turkana during the recent
three decades, as depicted by the snapshots provided by the three Population Censuses carried out in
1979, 1989 and 1999 and by the subsequent projections:
1979 1989 1999 2005’Population in
Turkana district 143,000 184,000 447,000 509,286
‘  projection
Source: Government of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 2004, pag.24; projection
from http://www.knbs.or.ke/
From the above it can be assumed that the annual growth rate increased between the 1980s and the 1990s
from 2.8% to 9.2%. However, a more realistic explanation would lead us to assume an under-enumeration
in the 1979 and 1989 censuses.
38 See FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2004, pag.38
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food consumption are expected to be below the national average, the estimate was
carried out as well on the assumption of a lower DES level, arbitrarily fixed at 1,900
kilocalories per person per day, equivalent to 90% of national average.39
Table 4.1 Estimated food requirements in Turkana in 2005
kgs / person / day MTs / year
0.630 117,275
0.567 105,5471,900
Cereal equivalent requirements
kcal / person / day
DES
2,110
Source: Author’s estimates
From Table 4.1 it seems reasonable to consider the annual food requirements in
Turkana to be within the range of 106,000 to 117,000 MTs of cereal equivalent.
4.1.3 Trade, food security and nutrition
The economy of Turkana is extremely limited and predominantly based on trade, as is
typical for a pastoral society. Therefore, trade is the backbone of food security and, as
such, major determinant of food supply and, consequently, of nutritional status.
39 On the basis of population age composition, a breakdown of nutritional requirements could be:
Age group (years) Kcal / person / day
  0 – 14 1,620
15 –  2,040
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Figure 4.1 Changes in nutritional status in Turkana
Source: Adapted from McKinney, ALRMP / OXFAM, (2005)
Figure 4.1 provides a summary overview of magnitude and trends in malnutrition in
Turkana.40 In particular, it shows how high malnutrition rates are recurrent in Turkana
and how a long-term view does not seem to show a favourable trend. It is interesting to
mention the analysis carried out by McKinney (ALRMP / OXFAM) who has managed
to highlight the changes in nutritional status occurred in Turkana in the latest 15 years.
In particular, comparing the magnitude and trend of malnutrition measures as the
middle upper arm circumference (MUAC) between the early nineties and the initial five
years of the current decade, he notes “the general shift upwards in the percentage of
children falling below the MUAC 135mm cut-off. This seems to be in spite of the large
EMOPs41 during 2000-2002.”
In order to better appreciate the link between trade, food security and nutrition,
following up on McKinney’s analysis, a simple review of trends of cereal prices,
40 The smoothed evolution of GAM estimates is based on the average of a set of 35 anthropometric
surveys all conducted to the standard methodology of 30x30 two-stage random cluster sampling.
41 The acronym EMOP stands for Emergency Operation, which is the major channel of food aid in
Turkana.
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livestock prices and malnutrition rates was carried out.42 In particular, time series
(years: 2000-2005) of indexes were generated and correlated. As in Table 4.2, the
correlation between the three indexes (CI: cereal prices; LSI: livestock prices; NI:
malnutrition rates) gives a good picture of the strong link between cereal market and
livestock market (with almost 70% of variability of each index explained by the other)
as well as of the remarkable link between livestock market and nutrition (around 60% of
variability explained). The link between cereal market and nutritional status seems to be
left behind, though still on reasonable values: 40%. However, given that malnutrition is
often considered a late indicator, the correlation among the three indexes was repeated
with the inclusion of increasing monthly lags (from t0 reflecting the case of no time lag
to t11 in the case of 11 month lag).43 Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 help to clarify the point
and highlight that the gap which helps to maximize the correlation is of five months in
the case of the livestock price and six months in the case of the cereal price. This is
surprising, since the time lag estimated is longer than expected; but at the same time a
few consideration are of high interest:
 Both the cereal and livestock market evolution seem to be quite good
predictors of malnutrition, being able to explain in both cases more than two
thirds of variation in nutritional status.
 In comparative terms, the predictive value exercised by livestock price is
stronger (higher and quicker to reach its maximum value), but the
improvement of the predictive value is stronger in the case of the cereal price
index (approximately 50% increase in six months).
42 Data source is the database of the Government of Kenya (GoK) Arid Land Resource Management
Project (ALRMP).
43 In this case, the objective is to determine the lag which corresponds to the maximum level of
correlation, or, in other words, the delay in the two correlated time series which helps to maximize the
predictive value of cereal and livestock market in terms of malnutrition.
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Table 4.2 Correlation among cereal price index, livestock price index,
nutrition index
lag (months)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CI - NI 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.50
LSI - NI -0.60 -0.60 -0.61 -0.63 -0.67 -0.70 -0.69 -0.65 -0.55 -0.50 -0.41 -0.31
LSI - CI -0.68 -0.69 -0.64 -0.57 -0.47 -0.47 -0.36 -0.32 -0.31 -0.21 -0.09 -0.08
CI: cereal price index;  LSI: livestock price index;  NI: nutrition index
Max values in bold
Source: Author’s estimates
Figure 4.2 Evolution of correlation between nutrition index and the
market price indexes*
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11
CI
LSI
* Correlation between LSI and nutrition is in absolute value
Source: Author’s estimates
The points above underline the strong link between trade and nutrition, and therefore,
the need to adapt development policies as well as short-term strategies in a way to
provide due attention to trade. This is not only in the sense of increasing attention on
market analysis as a component of the decision making process with the aim of getting
the highest benefit from trade, but rather in the sense of considering the indispensable
role of trade as a major determinant of food security and nutrition, to be properly
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developed and at the same time protected from the likely negative side effect of short-
term interventions.
4.1.4 Food aid
Proper tracking of food aid deliveries in Turkana was initiated only in 2000. Data on
food aid deliveries were converted in cereal equivalent in order to facilitate the analysis.
On such a basis Figure 4.3 was produced, taking the initiative of reducing the curve
fluctuations through a 3-month moving average smoothing.
Figure 4.3 Evolution of food aid deliveries in Turkana
(in MTs of cereal equivalent)
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As shown in Figure 4.3, the quantities delivered include a component for the refugee
intervention. Such tonnage was been rather constant over the period considered, around
1,600 MTs of cereal equivalent per month. Additional tonnage refers almost completely
to the Emergency Intervention (EMOP10374.0) put in place by the World Food
Programme (WFP).
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In order to properly assess the role played by the food aid delivered, a proper analysis
on nutritional status, on livelihood status, and on the cereal market should be considered
in order to establish positive and negative, direct and side-effects of the intervention.
But unfortunately information available is so scanty and patchy as to make such
analysis virtually impossible. However, while a proper analysis of the final impact is
difficult at this stage, it is possible to consider the role played by food aid in increasing
food availability. For such a purpose, food aid deliveries presented above were
considered against nutritional requirements.44 As shown in Figure 4.4, the share of food
requirements covered through food aid is rather low, with an overall average of 25%,
although in a few occasions has reached remarkable peaks.
 Figure 4.4 Share of nutritional requirements covered by food aid
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44 In this case, nutritional requirements were estimated in terms of cereal equivalent on the assumption of
a constant annual demographic increase between 2000 and 2005, as well as on the assumption of constant
1,900 Kcal average intake throughout the period considered. The refugee population was estimated on the
basis of official registration statistics. Nutritional requirements were estimated as for the local population.
In fact, Post Distribution Monitoring shows that between 65% and 85% of refugee population consume
less than 2,100 kcal per day.
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4.1.5 Cash interventions
Since mid 2007 Turkana has benefited of the National Hunger and Safety Net
Programme (HSNP); however HSNP is not covered through this study since the latter
refers to a period prior to the launch of the programme. In fact, by the time the
fieldwork for the present study was conducted the experience of cash interventions in
Turkana was quite limited. Essentially, it can be reduced to the cash-for-work (CFW)
component of the Drought Recovery Programme implemented by OXFAM that started
by the end of 2001, and since then implemented irregularly through various phases till
end 2005. An additional phase of CFW was under preparation by the time of this study.
The coverage of the initiative was quite limited, with a targeted caseload varying
between 25,000 and 70,000 people and geographically rather concentrated in a few
project areas.
An evaluation of the DRP has highlighted the appropriateness of the CFW programme
in its first phase. In particular, it is interesting to consider that the evaluation report
summarizes how “in view of the limited infrastructure available … and the low number
of beneficiaries, CFW appears to have been the most appropriate intervention … for
maximum focused impact”. Moreover, the report stresses how “with an operating
market and with fairly stable prices for cereals, milk and livestock over the December
2001 and June 2002 period when cash payments were mostly made, cash was
considered … as the most appropriate form of resource transfer”.
This statement just mentioned is of particular relevance for the purposes of this analysis.
Unfortunately, the supporting evidence provided by the document is limited to the
evolution of average livestock prices in the district, while in the CFW project areas, as
well as in most areas in Turkana, it is essentially impossible to find price records for
major commodities. In regard to this, in Figure 4.5 an attempt is done to visualize the
periods of implementation of CFW interventions as well as of food aid distributions
together with the evolution of the average price of maize between 2000 and 2006.
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Figure 4.5 Link between CFW implementation, food aid distribution and price
of maize‘
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It is very interesting to consider how in Figure 4.5 neither of the two interventions
seems to have an effect on the price evolution of the major staple food in Turkana. In
particular, in the case of CFW, while in its first phase (Jan – June 2002) it is possible to
identify a minimum association between the cash intervention and a certain price
increase, in the other two phases (Aug – Dec 2003 and Aug – Dec 2005, respectively)
the distribution of cash seems surprisingly associated to a certain price reduction.
Furthermore, it is very interesting to consider how during the latest period mentioned
the tendency towards a price decrease is associated with both the implementation of
cash distribution as well as to the progressive scaling down of food aid – two events that
would be normally considered as inflationary factors. However, this can be considered a
major approximation, since the scale of the two interventions (food aid and CFW) is
quite different and since the evolution of the average price in the district may not be
able to capture the effect of the quite localized CFW intervention. However, it is
interesting to consider the price margin between the district average and the average in
the CFW project area. While such a margin may be explained by transport costs, it tends
to gain certain stability only after the second phase of CFW intervention and it reduces
only when there is a rise in the amount of food aid. The available data is not enough to
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support such an interpretation. However, there is the impression that the increased
purchasing capacity and consequent demand may have contributed to raise local market
prices. Having said that, it is necessary to take into account that the beneficiaries of
CFW programme have benefited at the same time of the ongoing food aid intervention
and therefore it is doubtful that the increased purchasing capacity has raised the demand
for maize, but most likely has affected the price of other commodities.
In order to further explore the concern expressed above about the relevance of the link
between the CFW implementation and the average cereal price, we can refer to another
set of data. In fact, in order to monitor the possible impact of the intervention as well as
the possible risk of inflation generated by the CFW intervention, OXFAM has
conducted a baseline and a monitoring survey among the beneficiaries of the CFW as
well as among traders operating in the areas covered by the intervention.
Table 4.3 Changes in perceived impact of CFW and GFD
Baseline
Stock levels 86 7 7 15 75 10
Diversity 92 3 5 23 70 7
Price 12 10 78 8 30 62
Competition 60 3 37 22 35 43
Monitoring
Stock levels 100 0 0 0 95 5
Diversity 97 0 3 3 92 5
Price 45 0 55 0 55 45
Competition 87 0 13 8 77 15
anticipated impact of CFW actual impact of GFD
Higher Lower No change Higher Lower No change
Source: Author’s estimates
Table 4.3 reports the traders’ perception about the impact of the two types of
interventions: CFW and general food distribution (GFD). Two types of comparison can
be drawn:
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 between the impact of CFW and of the GFD at the time of the baseline and
monitoring surveys, to compare expectations and impressions on the impact
of the two interventions.
 between the initial expectations of the CFW and GFD impact and the follow-
up monitoring survey, to consider how such perceptions have changed
through the implementation period.
With reference to the first comparison (CFW versus GFD), it is possible to consider
how expectations seem to indicate that a stronger and more favourable impact was
expected from CFW. This is in terms of allowing higher stock levels, increasing
diversity of products, increasing competition. Both interventions seem to have had no
significant influence over price levels.45 In particular, the higher stock levels and higher
diversity of products can be explained in view of the higher value transferred to the
beneficiary through cash as well through the lower fungibility, and consequent loss of
value in the following exchanges, of GFD commodities. It is interesting to consider the
expectation/consideration of higher competition in combination with the one about price
stability. The results of the monitoring exercise strengthen the divergence between
CFW and GFD under all aspects. In fact, contrary to GFD, CFW is seen to support
higher stock levels, increasing diversity of commodities and increasing competition. To
a lesser extent the divergence is clear as well in terms of impact on prices: while CFW
is perceived as stimulating a no change-higher price effect, GFD is associated to a
lower-no change price effect.
The results of such analysis seem to highlight a preference for CFW, particularly, as
expected, in the sense of its capacity to favour the market system. Having said the
above, it is to be recognized that such analysis reflects the opinion of traders and not
necessarily that of consumers, particularly the most vulnerable who should be the
primary target of food aid. In support of this consideration it is worth taking into
45 After considering the majority shares of responses, it is interesting to note the clear tendency identified
in the case of GFD in terms of reducing prices. On the contrary, in the case of CFW, no clear tendency
can be identified in terms of either increasing or decreasing prices.
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account how group interviews conducted ex-post have shown more mixed results in
terms of preference for either form of intervention. 46
4.2 Prices and profit margins
4.2.1 Trade flow
In view of the high market prices prevalent in Turkana and of their determinant role on
the cost-efficiency of different interventions, as described in the previous section, it is
important to examine this issue more closely.
Figure 4.6 Cereal trade flows
      satellite markets
      satellite markets
      satellite markets
Uganda
Lodwar
Kakuma
Loki
Kitale Eldoret Kapenguria
Source: De Matteis, 2006
As a first step in the analysis, Figure 4.6 summarizes the major trade flows for cereals
and other commodities with the major exception of livestock. 47 Figure 4.6 stresses the
46 Reference is made to community group discussions carried out in December 2005 between the author
and the communities targeted by the CFW intervention.
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district dependency on trade inflows. In fact, apart from livestock trade flows, Turkana
is almost completely dependent on imports of food and other commodities. In general,
major supplying markets are Kitale and Eldoret, which are essentially transit markets,
particularly for what concerns food commodities. Part of such flows finds its origin in
Ugandan markets, though of less relevance is the trade flow which proceeds directly
from Ugandan markets to markets in Turkana.
Within Turkana the major markets are Lodwar, Kakuma and Lokichokio. In view of
their location along the transport routes, a major role is played by Lodwar, where a large
part of the quantities which enter the district happens to be exchanged before finding its
way towards the various satellite markets or proceeding along the major transport routes
towards Kakuma and Lokichokio. The case of Kakuma is strongly affected by the
presence of a major parallel market in food aid commodities brought in through the
refugee programme. This constitutes a major additional supply for the district and has
an obvious economic impact. In fact, while on the one hand it releases to some extent
the burden on the local commercial capacity in terms of availability of transport and
access to other resources, on the other it increases artificially the supply to the local
markets contributing this way to containing market price increases. Therefore, Kakuma
functions as a source market for the two other major markets in the district as well as for
its satellite markets. Lokichokio is essentially a major final destination market, as well
as a transit for its satellite markets.
4.2.2 Prices and profit margins
The trade flows described above are reflected in the level of market prices. As expected,
prices tend to increase along the trade flow as the distance from sources of supply
increases. The average rate of price increase between source markets out of the district
and Lokichokio (as the furthest major market in Turkana) is in the range of 40-50%,
with peaks of up to 80% in the case of some commodities such as beans. Such average
rates can get slightly higher when considering some final markets such as Lokitaung,
where the highest prices are recorded. Having said that, some minor remote markets,
47 For an analysis of the livestock market in Turkana, see Mathuva, 2005
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such as Kataboi and Kalokol (respectively, in and around the area covered by the
OXFAM CFW intervention) and others, tend to show a different tendency with lower
differentials. This can be interpreted in view of lower purchasing capacity.
 Figure 4.7 Price of maize on various markets
0
5
10
15
20
25
kita
le
lodw
ar
kak
uma
loki
cho
kio
loki
taun
g
low
are
nga
k
kalo
kol
kata
boi
loki
cha
r
loic
han
gam
atak
KS
hs
 / K
g
maize w/s
maize retail
Source: Author’s estimates
In order to get a better understanding of the market system, we have tried to estimate
costs and consequently traders’ profits and profit margins. For this purpose, information
was collected on costs incurred by a sample of 250 traders as well as on their
purchasing and selling prices.48 Costs eventually incurred were identified as follows:
 purchase of commodities,
 store rent,
 transport costs,
 labour costs,
 taxes and other administrative costs.
In addition, in order to differentiate the analysis, the cases of wholesale and retail, as
well as a combination of the two, were identified according to traders’ typology. In this
regard it is necessary to consider that while in general 97% of traders can be considered
48 This information has been collected within a survey aiming at assessing traders’ capacity and is better
described in 4.4.
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retailers, the factor that characterizes most the trader typology is the use of transport. In
fact, while it is estimated that around 15% of the traders makes use of transport, such
share is spread between the two groups of wholesalers and retailers. In particular, while
it is reasonably expected that all wholesalers make use of transport, only a small portion
of retailers is expected to have access to it. Such a share constitutes what can be defined
as the wholesaler-retailer: they are essentially retailers who have access to transport
(almost always on a rent basis) and optimize the transport cost-efficiency by supplying
smaller retailers who cannot afford to advance money to cover the transport cost.
Table 4.4 summarizes profit margins and rates estimated for different commodities and
different categories of traders. It is interesting to consider how the rates of return are on
average slightly higher for wholesalers (18.5% versus 15.5%) and are rather doubled in
the case of mixed wholesale-retail. In terms of commodities, the highest margins are
linked to sugar; however when considered in relative terms such margins get reduced by
the high cost of procurement of the commodity, and the most profitable commodity to
trade turns out to be maize meal (20% and 22% for retail and wholesale respectively
and a remarkable 47% for the mixed case).
Table 4.4 Profit margins for various commodities and trader categories
wholesale retail w & r wholesale retail w & r
maize 2.23 3.03 4.37 17.69 18.45 30.60
maize meal 2.73 3.88 7.00 22.20 20.40 47.25
beans 3.80 3.34 7.35 24.89 12.72 40.23
sugar 2.71 4.55 8.10 8.04 7.41 17.25
average 2.80 3.66 6.48 18.50 15.52 35.16
KShs / Kg %
Source: Author’s estimates
4.2.3 The role of transport
As highlighted above, profits are not necessarily linked to the cost of the commodities.
It is also reasonable to assume that in a situation which is totally dependent on imports
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from external markets, transport must play an important role in determining profit. On
this basis, costs incurred by traders were rearranged in order to isolate the role of
transport and procurement costs on profits achieved. For such a purpose the following
production function of the Cobb-Douglas type was used:
iubij
b
ij
b
ijij eXXXY 321 321 (4.1)
where:
ijY is the rate of return achieved by trader i dealing with commodity j;
ijX 1 is the procurement cost faced by trader i in relation to commodity j;
ijX 2 is the transport cost faced by trader i in relation to commodity j;
ijX 3 is any other cost faced by trader i in relation to commodity j;
u is the error term;
e is the base of natural logarithm;
21 ,bb and 3b are the parameters to be estimated.
The results of regression analysis report that transport is the most productive factor and
its contribution in determining the rate of return is double that of commodity costs, and
almost tenfold that of all remaining costs. In particular, holding other factors constant, it
shows that:
 an additional investment of 1% in transport leads on average to about 1.2%
increase in the rate of return;
 an additional investment of 1% in commodity purchase leads on average to
about 0.7% increase in the rate of return;
 an additional investment of 1% in other factors leads on average to about 0.1%
increase in the rate of return.
This estimation has clear implications in terms of resource allocation and highlights the
key role played by transport.
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4.2.4 Entrepreneurial approach and the role of cash
The analysis above has shown how trade activities in Turkana can be quite profitable.
This is particularly relevant for Turkana traders who, due to the quite isolated nature of
a large part of the district, and the low number of business opportunities, should be
ready to accept moderate expectations of profit margins.
Having said that, various constraints currently inhibit any economic initiative in
Turkana. Of particular relevance in this regard is the access to critical inputs such as
finance49 and transport capacity. Such constraints impose a critical limitation to traders’
choice among available options. Such conditions immediately highlight the possibility
that an eventual intervention in support of local purchasing capacity would be helpful
only in the short-term, it can be expected to have an inflationary effect on the local
market, and would not be of much help in facing the major constraints encountered by
local traders. At the same time, a food aid-led strategy would help to artificially contain
prices, but would have a discouraging economic impact by depressing local trade.50
In such conditions, initiatives that can help to maintain the economic viability of trade
should be promoted. In this regard, all initiatives which can contribute to reducing costs
should be preferred as well as initiatives aimed at stimulating a stronger entrepreneurial
49 The cost of credit was reported to be around 25% per month.
50 The case of Kaikor, which has in the past benefited of both types of intervention (CFW and food aid)
provides a good example. The population of Kaikor, estimated around 10,000 people, essentially relies on
the quantities of food and other merchandize brought in by a very limited group of traders. It was reported
that six traders (based in Kaikor) purchase in Lodwar and sell in Kaikor. In addition, three (two based in
Lodwar and one in Kakuma) sell in Kaikor. In both cases the frequency of traders’ movement is linked to
food aid and cash interventions. In the absence of food aid distributions, each trader makes on average
two journeys per month; in case of ongoing food aid interventions in and around Kaikor, the frequency is
reduced to once every three months. During the second half of 2005, in the absence of food aid and
during the implementation of CFW programme, such frequency increased to once per week mainly in
view of price increases. According to local views, during the first half of 2005 the average price of white
maize was around 600 KShs per 45 Kg bag; during the second half of 2005 (characterized by the
combination of no food aid and implementation of CFW project) the average price of white maize
prevailing in Kaikor market was around 1,000 - 1,200 KShs per 45 Kg bag.
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approach. Among such measures is the facilitation of links, and creating confidence
between Turkana traders and operators in the major and/or potential supplying markets.
Such initiatives should not be limited to major traditional supplying markets such as
Kitale and Eldoret, but should be extended to explore more competitive alternatives.
The analysis of market prices and of trader capacity out of Turkana, better described in
the following parts of this chapter, has revealed some interesting trade links between
Turkana and a few markets along the Ugandan border (mainly Suam and Mbale). In
view of their competitive prices, such markets have traditionally provided a stable
source of supply to such markets as Kitale and Eldoret, while their direct trade link with
markets in Turkana has so far been quite limited. In particular, it was estimated that
around 30 traders from the Kenya-Uganda border markets deal directly with Turkana
traders; such trade flow is rather continuous and quite profitable. Moreover, in view of
their competitiveness compared to the traditional suppliers of Turkana markets, their
risk of dependence on high price is low, which contributes to the reliability of their
supply flows.
4.3 Market integration
4.3.1 Analysis and findings
The purposes and methodology of this part of the analysis are described in section 3.2.4.
4.3.1.1 The data
The analysis of market integration utilizes time series data. It is clear that the longer the
time series the more precise can be the analysis. In Kenya the collection of market data
is rather limited; the two major datasets being the one collected by the Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS) and the one collected by the Arid Lands Resource Management
Project (ALRMP). Both systems present some limitations, with the major ones as
follows:
 the CBS data does not include any market in Turkana;
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 while both datasets focus on prices, the CBS dataset does not include
quantities exchanged and the ALRMP dataset also remains vague in this
regard;
 both datasets are limited in terms of food commodities covered: the CBS
focuses on maize and beans, while the ALRMP covers maize, maize flour,
millet and sorghum.51
 CBS data refers to average city markets, while the ALRMP data is arranged
on divisions and sample areas and therefore ALRMP data provide a sort of
limited geographical average.
 while the price data in the CBS set refers to retail price, the price in the
ALRMP set refers to household expenditures.
Needless to say, with Turkana’s markets being the object of the present analysis, the
ALRMP dataset was taken as the principal data source. This has involved a series of
limitations, the major ones being as follows:
 The analysis focuses on prices and does not take into account quantities
exchanged. This is not a major limitation, but rather common practice for the
analysis of market integration.
 The analysis focuses on one commodity: maize. Again, this is not a major
limitation, since maize is by far the most important staple food in Turkana,
and, though to less extent, in the country as a whole.
 The first point and the last couple of points mentioned above raise the major
concerns. However, in principle, the different nature of the prices collected
in the two cases (average monthly retail market price of maize versus
average monthly household expenditure for the market purchase of maize)
should not be such as to prevent a comparative analysis of the time series.
After all, attention is rather directed towards price changes than towards their
absolute levels.
The markets in the analysis include seven sample areas (from now on called “markets”)
as well as another set of nine major markets which should work as terms of comparison.
Such non-Turkana markets are either major markets with country relevance or major
51 The number of food commodities covered by the ALRMP dataset was increased since mid 2005.
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supply markets neighbouring Turkana. Attention to cross-border trade is provided
through the inclusion of border markets both from Kenya and from Uganda. Price data
for Ugandan markets were obtained from regional sources such as RATIN, RATES and
TRADENET. Wherever feasible, retail market price data were reproduced. When only
wholesale prices were available, retail prices were estimated through the use of a
conversion rate estimated on the basis of Ugandan and Kenyan wholesale and retail
maize prices.52 Ugandan price data were converted into Kenyan Shilling using a time
series of exchange rates. All were deflated by using the series of USD exchange rates.
The period covered by the present analysis is between April 2000 and November 2005.
For such a period very few short gaps (i.e.: 1-month or 2-month) in the monthly price
dataset were present, which, where feasible, were filled through linear interpolation.53
Longer gaps have remained unfilled; this is the case particularly of Busia-Uganda
whose time series is very limited and in which case results should be interpreted with
caution. The time series of Kitale, critical market for Turkana, is also shorter than the
other markets in the dataset; however it is considered to be continuously long enough to
provide significant results.
4.3.1.2 Analysis of correlation
In order to put the analysis in context, Figure 4.8 provides an interesting summary
visualization of the evolution of maize prices by comparing the average evolution in
Turkana with that in the rest of the country.54
52 The conversion rate from wholesale to retail prices was estimated on the basis of current prices at
13.5%, corresponding on average to a margin of 1.8 KShs / Kg.
53 This seems the most sensible way to fill such short gaps, on the assumption that the lack of data is due
to recording problems irrelevant to the evolution of prices on the market. The possibility should be
recognized, though, that such gaps exist because no quantities may have been sold at that time. There is
no significant difference between results conducted by using interpolated data and living missing data.
54 It is worth remembering that the analysis of market integration was carried out exclusively on the price
of maize, staple food both in Turkana and in the rest of Kenya.
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Figure 4.8 Evolution of average price of maize in Turkana and in the rest of
Kenya
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A brief consideration of the graph suggests that it is appropriate to distinguish between
three phases: an initial period (roughly one year since the beginning of the timeframe
considered) in which there is no clear link between the path of the two lines; a second
period (between mid-2001 and mid-2002) in which the two series evolve in opposite
directions resulting in an increasing gap; and finally a 3-year period (from end 2002 to
end 2005) in which the gap between the two values seems to maintain within a
reasonably stable range, which could eventually be considered the normal gap between
the two average prices in conditions of equilibrium. This seems to be confirmed by
considering the evolution of the coefficient of correlation between the two series. In
order to capture the change highlighted above, the correlation was estimated for all pairs
of markets on a 13-month moving interval.55 The results can be visualized in Figure 4.9
as summary representation of minimum, maximum and average values recorded during
the period considered for a selected number of market combinations.
55 The use of a 13-month moving average allows a centred moving average system while minimizing the
modification of seasonal patterns of data.
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Figure 4.9 Average values of moving 13-month coefficient of correlation
estimated for a selected number of market pairs
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As shown in Figure 4.9, the range of the coefficient is generally very large. And, while
averages seem in general to be positive but modest, the minimum and maximum values
may easily fall in the extreme positive and negative quarters at the same time. In
contrast, in a few cases the range is short and the average quite high. The full set of
averages and extreme values of the coefficient of correlations estimated on a 13-month
period for all pairs of markets covered in this study is reported in Table A1 in Annex 2.
4.3.1.3 Analysis of cointegration
In line with the methodology presented under section 3.2.4, the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root test is applied to test the condition of stationarity of each price
series. In a second step, the ADF test is to be applied to the series of residuals ut of the
two initial time series. Finally, the analysis of the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM)
manages to estimates the various relevant aspects of price transmission. Results are
reported in Table A2 and Table A3 in Annex 2.
Table A2 shows that all price series are integrated of order 1: I(1). Table A3 reports on
different aspects of price transmission among the markets considered, such as in
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particular: the magnitude of adjustment in the long-run and short-run, the speed of
adjustment, and the so-called half-life, which is the time required to correct half of the
price disequilibrium among the price of the same commodities in two markets.
A summary of such data is provided in Table 4.5. First of all, the strength of market
connection as expressed by the long-run evolution of price series is reflected through
coefficient . Its average value decreases substantially when shifting from non-Turkana
markets identified as Rest of Kenya (RoK) to those in Turkana. The adjusted measure
/h, appropriate for comparisons, reduces the gap only mildly. This was somehow
expected, though a proper analysis and a measure of it was not yet available. While the
market interconnection within Turkana is not very bad, neither does it seem especially
good, particularly when compared with the average value for Kenya. In this case there
seems to be a disconnect between markets in Turkana and those in the rest of the
country: the weak market link is further reduced when shifting from the internal
connections to the external, particularly between markets in Turkana and RoK. Within
Turkana, such a disconnect is significantly higher in the northern part of the district.
This, as well, was expected, confirming the compounded effect of increasing distance
both in physical and economic terms. The gap seems to be lower in the short-run
dynamics expressed through 2.56
Table 4.5 Price transmission: magnitude and speed of adjustment
2 2 3 h 2 /h 2 2 3 h 2 /h
North Turkana 0.348 0.262 0.403 1.042 0.334 0.217 … 0.618 1.027 0.212
South Turkana 0.482 0.356 0.443 0.976 0.494 0.340 … 0.420 1.007 0.336
Rest of Kenya 0.910 0.580 0.404 1.066 0.854 0.873 0.492 0.309 1.047 0.834
internal external
Source: Author’s estimates
56 A possible interpretation of such a shorter gap in the short run may be found in the chronic nature of
backwardness in Turkana compared with the rest of the country and reflected in the drastically different
patters of economic growth experienced through the past few decades.
Kenya: Turkana
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
98
The first point above is of major interest, as well as concern, in the analysis of market
integration in Turkana, and of the possible strategies to deal with it. The crucial
question to be asked is: Why there is such a disconnect between markets in Turkana and
the ones outside the district? It is assumed that such reduced link in terms of market
prices is reflected in a similar drop in the amount of quantities exchanged; however,
such assumption cannot be tested through a price analysis. Further, if there is a drastic
reduction in trade flow, which side of the flow is mainly affected? This last question
does not refer to the direction of trade (in fact, it is quite immediate to think that the
cereal trade flows move almost entirely from non-Turkana towards Turkana markets,
contrary to livestock trade ones), but rather on the origin and motivation of the traders
involved.
Having said that, an in-depth look at disaggregated results in Table A2 suggests that
market integration is far from homogeneous in each of the groups considered. In
particular, in all sub-groups there are a few market links which seem to be stronger than
the others. A good understanding of successful market links can be very instrumental in
identifying where a market-oriented intervention can be more successful. In order to
identify the most integrated markets in Turkana, the various Turkana markets
considered in the analysis were ordered according to the frequency and intensity of co-
integration with other markets. In particular, in each of the two cases involving Turkana
markets – i.e.: a) within Turkana, and b) between Turkana and rest of the country – a
restricted list was established of the 20 pairs of markets recording the highest values in
terms of both magnitude and speed of price adjustment. Such a list helps to identify
within each pair the market which tends to play a role of price maker rather than price
taker. On such a basis four lists were generated and for each of them the two markets
with the highest score were selected, as reported in Table 4.6 below. Following such an
approach, the markets most integrated and with a certain price-making attitude in
Turkana seem to be Napusimoru and Lokwi. In the case of the co-integration between
Turkana market and the others, Lokwi, Kalimapus and Napeililim are the most
integrated. In this case, the Turkana markets play essentially a role of price-takers.
At this point it is interesting to consider the location of those markets identified as most
integrated. Napusimoru and Lokwi are located in the southern part of the district, rather
well connected to markets such as Lokichar on the main route which links Turkana with
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neighbouring districts. Napeililim and Kalimapus are in the central-northern part of the
district with a major difference in terms of accessibility, the former being on the major
transport route between two major markets (Lodwar and Kakuma), and the latter being
rather isolated along the lakeshore. It is interesting to consider that Kalimapus is close
to the CFW project area, though it is difficult at this stage to determine the role that
such small and localized project may have played in strengthening the commercial link
between the rest of the country and such remote area in Turkana. This finding, which is
quite interesting, deserves more attention.
Table 4.6 Most integrated markets
magnitude of adjustment speed of adjustment
Napusimoru Napusimoru
Lokwi Lokwi
magnitude of adjustment speed of adjustment
Lokwi Kalimapus
Kalimapus Napeililim
Within Turkana
Between Turkana and rest of the country
Source: Author’s estimates
4.4 Traders’ capacity
4.4.1 Scope of the analysis
As mentioned in the analysis of market integration, the analysis of prices needs to be
put in perspective. For such a purpose it is particularly relevant to pay closer attention to
one major category of actors involved in the sector: traders.
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There is no recent census or survey of the trade sector in Turkana. For this purpose an
estimation of trading capacity was attempted. This was done in two ways. First, through
a series of interviews and particularly benefiting from the great knowledge of CFW
field monitors, an initial estimate of trader population was carried out. Second, the
major trading centres in the region were visited and a more in-dept analysis of traders
and their capacity was conducted.
The major aim of this effort is to try to establish the role so far played by the trading
sector in responding to the demand for food coming from the various parts of the
region, as well as the flexibility of such capacity to expand in response to eventual
increase in demand.
4.4.2 An attempt to estimate food supply and demand
4.4.2.1 Estimate of traders’ population and capacity
On the basis of information provided by key informants and through a survey detailed
below, an estimate of traders’ population was attempted. At this point it is necessary to
specify here that this analysis is focused on trade in food and, to a limited extent, in
livestock. Therefore, in this case a trader is not accounted as such unless even partially
involved in these activities.
A first rough indicator is provided by the ratio between traders and total population (a
sort of measure of traders’ density within the population). Such a measure seems to vary
in Turkana between 80 and 120 with an average around 100; in other words it seems
possible to simplify without serious risk of mistake by saying that there is one trader
more or less per every 100 people. On such a basis we can estimate the total population
of traders involved with food trade in Turkana at around 5,100 individuals.
However, such a measure does not tell us much, unless more characteristics of the
traders are provided. For such a purpose, a summary classification of traders is provided
in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7 Traders’ key characteristics (%)
Use of
transport
Medium
20
Type
Small
77Size
Large
3
Wholesaler Retailer
3 97
Transporter Non Transporter
15 85
Source: Author’s estimates
The first two characteristics reported (size and typology of business) seem to provide a
clear overlap to the extent that we can immediately consider as very likely that the big
traders are also the wholesalers. Access to – and use of – transport is another major
characteristic to be considered, in view of both the cost involved as well the associated
rate of return, as considered under section 4.2.3. As expected, transport proves to be a
prerogative of large traders and of half of medium-sized traders.
The following step was to try to get a more in-depth insight on traders’ business size
using the data collected through the survey. The assumption is that the basket of
commodities traded is very limited, thus reflecting the food demand and consumption
patterns in the district and in most of the rest of the country. On such a basis, the size
was estimated by considering the value of the two major commodities traded and
assumed to represent between half and two thirds of the entire turnover eventually
achieved by each individual. It is to be considered that the estimate derived this way is
not necessarily the total business size of each trader, but rather the individual size of
food trade business.57 Such monetary value was finally converted into a cereal
equivalent, as reported in Table 4.8, to estimate the quantity of food sold on a monthly
average.
57 Information on the composition of trade in terms of food versus non-food was collected through the
survey. However an estimation of the total business size of each trader is not considered relevant for the
purpose of this analysis.
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Table 4.8 Monthly turnover of food traders
small medium large small medium large
food budget
min 1800 15733 49000 413840 1800000 4860000
max 15140 48800 6793333 1275000 4240000 32000000
avg 7376 31008 413543 900982 2961911 13189045
cereal equivalent
min 150 1311 4083 34487 150000 405000
max 1262 4067 566111 106250 353333 2666667
avg 615 2584 34462 75082 246826 1099087
KShs
Kgs
Turkana non Turkana
Source: Author’s estimates
Figure 4.10 Monthly turnover of food traders
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The comparison between the business size of Turkana and non-Turkana food traders is
striking: the turnover as well as amount of food sold on a monthly average by a large
Turkana trader is lower than in the case of a small non-Turkana trader. In addition to
that, both Table 4.8 and Figure 4.10 give an impression of the higher concentration of
the business in the Turkana context. In other words, the more skewed distribution in
terms of business size in Turkana highlights the determinant role played by the large
traders who happen to run and control the bulk of the food trade in the district.
4.4.2.2 Food supply versus food demand
On the basis of estimates for the number and composition of the trader population as
well as for their monthly turnover, it is possible to try to provide an estimate for the
amount of food traded on a monthly basis in Turkana. In particular, earlier on in the
analysis the population of traders involved in food trade in Turkana was estimated at
around 5,100. Finally, information on their typology and business size was combined as
summarized in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9 Annual food trade (cereal equivalent) according to trader
typology
% n avg kg tot kg % MTs / yr
Small 77 3927 615 2415105 23 28981
Medium 20 1020 2584 2635680 26 31628
Large 3 153 34462 5272686 51 63272
Tot 100 5100 10323471 100 123882
Retailer 97 4947 5050785 49 60609
Wholsaler 3 153 5272686 51 63272
Tot 100 5100 10323471 100 123882
Transporters 15 765 6854094 66 82249
Non transporters 85 4335 3469377 34 41633
Tot 100 5100 10323471 100 123882
Source: Author’s estimates
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However, considering that trade is carried out at different stages along the trade chain,
there is a high risk of double counting the quantities of food that need to go through
various stages. In such case various criteria can be utilized. First of all, we can start
considering the quantity provided by retailers, since this is passed directly to consumers.
In such case, the annual tonnage would be in the range of 60,600 MTs. However we can
certainly argue that even wholesalers may get involved on a small scale in retailer trade;
but in such case which share of total wholesale trade estimated (63,272 MTs) could be
considered to reach the customers directly? We could assume that the balance between
the tonnage provided by wholesalers and that channelled through the following phase of
retailer trade could be the quantity directly sold by wholesalers to final customers
(around 2,600 MTs per year). However, we think that probably this is much higher
considering the remarkable marginal profit increase deriving from the capacity to
combine wholesale and retail activity, as shown in section 4.2.3. Following this line of
argument, it is quite interesting to differentiate the trading capacity according to the
availability and access to transport. In fact, this perspective is linked to the total
dependency of Turkana on the import of food from neighbouring districts and countries.
Under such a perspective the amount of food exchanged in Turkana would be around
82,000 MTs of cereal equivalent per year, and in this case, the difference between such
an amount and the estimate of tonnage provided through the retail link (60,600 MTs)
would be the estimate for the tonnage sold directly from wholesale traders to the final
customers.
At this point it is possible to make a comparison between food supply provided through
trade, just estimated at around 82,000 MTs per year, against the food requirements
which were estimated earlier on in the range between 106,000 and 117,000 MTs of
cereal equivalent per year. The gap between the estimates of food supply and food
requirements can be therefore estimated in the range of 24,000 – 35,000 MTs of cereal
equivalent per year, which corresponds approximately to a gap in food requirements
between 29% and 30%. On such a basis, the question to be raised at this stage is about
the expandability of the current trading capacity in a way to be able to absorb such a
gap.
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4.4.3 Traders’ survey
4.4.3.1 Data and methodology
A survey of 252 traders was carried out; 205 being based in the district and the rest
being in the surrounding areas. The selection process was essentially dictated by
geographical considerations, where preference was given to major urban and trading
centres. As such it is felt that such a survey is not necessarily representative of the
traders in Turkana; however, it is felt as well that such limitation is somehow balanced
by the consideration that the sample size covered by this analysis is sufficiently large
(approximately 5%) compared to the assumed population of traders in Turkana.
The analysis of traders based in Turkana has focused on the identification of major
determinants of business size in order to consider its possible expandability. In addition,
a certain number of traders based outside the region were asked whether they were or
had been operational in Turkana and in both cases were presented with the hypothetical
proposal to start or increase business activities in Turkana. In particular, traders were
given the opportunity to indicate the reasons for their eventual lack of interest to start or
increase their involvement in Turkana.
The methodology applied for the analysis follows the one presented under section 3.2.2.
4.4.3.2 Findings
Firstly, it is worth noting that, out of the 252 traders in the sample, only seven, all based
out of the district, have not manifested an interest in starting business in Turkana, and
only one based and operational in Turkana has expressed an unwillingness to consider
the possibility of scaling up the size of his/her business. In other words, the survey has
disclosed a general interest in starting new business or scaling up existing activities in
Turkana. However, as expected, major constraints are envisaged and traders have
contributed to identify these.
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4.4.3.3 Availability and access to key inputs: money versus
commodities
As a first step in the analysis, consideration was given to the question of availability of
– as well as access to – additional key inputs that are a precondition for considering the
feasibility of scaling up the business size: financial resources and commodities. Another
key input in the case under consideration, the availability and access to transport
capacity, was not considered at this stage, because it can be considered as an
intermediate input which, in a wider perspective, can be reduced under the category of
resources and ultimately, through a major approximation, of financial resources.
As shown in Figure 4.11, availability of and access to (additional) financial resources
seems on average more difficult than in the case of availability of and access to
(additional) commodities. In particular, Figure 4.11 can be interpreted as on average a
trader has a little less than 60% probability of accessing additional money required and,
at the same time, has around 85% probability of accessing additional commodities
required to scale up his/her business. In this case the focus is on the perceived higher
constraint given by the need to find the required financial resources rather than the need
to find the commodities. This consideration seems to be common to all business sizes.
Figure 4.11 Traders’ confidence in getting access to critical inputs
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4.4.3.4 Determinants of willingness to trade
Once the question of the comparative access to critical inputs was clarified, attention
was shifted to the analysis of other contextual factors which play a determinant role in
the decision of the business size. Four of these factors were included in this analysis:
prices, security, roads, markets – the last one to be interpreted in terms of credit services
and other facilities which are normally associated with markets.
In general terms, the current limited accessibility throughout the district, as summarily
identified by the status of the roads, was apportioned most significance in the survey,
while the price factor was the second priority in the traders’ decision to invest. The third
and fourth factors were identified respectively as the poor security conditions and the
poor access to credit. Having said this, the picture changes somewhat when considering
the different trade categories separately. In fact, while transport and accessibility
concerns seem to be particularly relevant for small traders (highly dependent on
suppliers), for medium-size traders the level of prices seems to be more influential than
other factors in decision making. In between is the case of large traders, for whom such
factors as price levels and the quality of roads have the same influence on their
willingness to (scale-up) trade in Turkana. Overall, roads and security are major
determinants for the extra-large out-of-Turkana traders. Access to cash and other credit
facilities play an important role for small traders. Table 4.10 and Figure 4.12 help to
classify the main priorities and determinants of willingness to trade of the different
categories of traders.
Table 4.10 Main determinants of willingness to trade
First Second
All Accessibility Prices
Small Accessibility Market services
Medium Prices Accessibility
Large Prices Accessibility
Extra large Accessibility Security
Source: Author’s estimates
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Figure 4.12 Determinants of willingness to trade
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As summarized in Table 4.10, it is clear that:
 availability of – and access to – credit and similar market services are a
necessary prerogative of small traders;
 improvement in security is a type of “luxury” prerogative of extra-large –
essentially out-of-Turkana – traders;
 improvement in accessibility and increase in prices are the two predominant
factors which seem to be common more or less across the spectrum of categories
of traders covered in this analysis.
With reference to the last point, it is necessary to consider how improvements in the
quality of roads and increases in commodity prices are two sides of the same coin, since
both aim at increasing the trader profit, either through a reduction of costs
(improvement of accessibility) or through an increase of income (price increase).
Indeed, the aim of increasing profit is understandable as the leading criterion for
interpreting a trader’s willingness to trade and in general of an entrepreneur to scale up
the size of his/her business. In this light, both options (increase accessibility and
consider the feasibility of price increase) are worth considering. However, having said
that, it is easy to consider how the two strategies are of a totally different nature: the
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first one requires major budgetary and major political support, more in line with a
proper developmental perspective, while the second is instead much lighter and directly
linked with initiatives carried out in emergency and rehabilitation contexts.
Consequently, under a more pragmatic and short-term perspective, we leave aside the
option of increasing accessibility and focus on considering the feasibility of making use
of price increases as a determinant of traders’ willingness to trade (WTT) and therefore
as a factor to increase local food supply. In other words, the question now becomes:
“How much does price need to rise to be able the gap in food supply – identified in
4.4.2.2 – to be covered?”
4.4.3.5 Trade-off between price and food supply
In order to answer the question just raised above, traders’ willingness to react to price
changes has been estimated on the basis of traders’ business size and their perception of
availability and access to key inputs – i.e. cash and food. The following ordered logit
model has been adopted:
iiii foodmoneysizeWTT   (4.2)
where:
iWTT is the willingness to trade manifested by the ith trader,
isize is the business size of the ith trader,
imoney is the ith trader’s expectation to access cash,
ifood is the ith trader’s expectation to access food commodities.
Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Figure 4.13 present the estimates of WTT of the various
categories of traders considered in this case study in response to changes in the
prevailing market prices. In particular, the possible price increases envisaged range
between 0% (no increase) and 20% or more. In this case the price changes do not refer
to a specific commodity, but rather to the major commodities dealt with by each trader
interviewed.
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Table 4.11    Willingness to trade in response to price changes
traders' confidence in accessing cash  (%) *** ***
traders' confidence in accessing commodities  (%) *** ***
Ln business size *** ***
cut 1
cut 2
cut 3
cut 4
N. obs
LR chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
756
60.90
0.0000
0.0178
648
73.69
0.0000
0.0436 0.0305
0.502
648
30.05
0.0000
-0.494
-5.234
-2.951
-0.575
-0.199 -0.111
-0.549
-4.178
-1.986
0.277
1.421
-4.955
-2.734
C
-0.876 -0.847
A B
-0.683 -0.843
Source: Author’s elaboration
Table 4.12    Probability of WTT
0 5 10 15-20  >20
small 3.042 19.413 50.543 15.415 11.588
medium 5.373 29.249 48.926 9.995 6.457
large 6.691 32.826 46.167 8.721 5.594
extra large 9.760 40.253 40.512 5.925 3.550
all sizes 5.710 29.012 47.383 10.614 7.281
rate of price increase  (%)
Source: Table 4.11specification B
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Figure 4.13 Willingness to trade in response to price changes
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For all categories of traders considered the evolution of the WTT has the expected
inverted-U shape.58 Small traders are the slowest to react, at least for rates of price
increase lower than 10%, which also corresponds to the maximum WTT value. On the
other end, extra-large traders report the fastest capacity to react to price changes. The
reason why this does not happen in reality is due to the lower relevance of the price
factor in their decision to invest or scale-up their investment in Turkana, as observed
above. The other categories are in between the two extremes, showing very limited
difference in terms of traders’ attitude and capacity to react to price changes.
On the basis of these points, it seems possible to assume in a rather arbitrary manner
that:
58 The inverted-U shape reflects the relevance of a specific variable or set of variables in the traders’
decision making process. In this case the inverted-U shows that traders’ WTT initially tends to increase in
response to price increases in the commodity or group of commodities exchanged. In a second phase,
after reaching its maximum value, the WTT starts decreasing, showing that the variable under
consideration (in this case the price of the commodities exchanged) has exhausted its role as a
determinant of the trader’s decision making process.
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 Extra-large traders’ reaction to price increases would be rather limited (unless
other concomitant measures were taken, as in particular improvement of road
quality and in general increased accessibility).
 Small traders’ reaction would be slower than the other groups.
 Medium and large traders would be very close to overall average.
The above considerations help to envisage the possible direct implications of a price
increase. At this stage it is necessary to separate two possible objectives that may be
eventually pursued through a cash injection strategy:
 increase in marketed supply;
 promotion of small-scale traders.
In particular, with regard to the latter point, it seems possible to argue that any strategy
aiming at small-scale trade promotion eventually pursued through a purely market-
driven strategy (demand support through cash distribution) would find it hard to achieve
success. In fact, it can be expected that the faster response from medium and large
traders would drastically reduce the possibility of small traders’ involvement in any
additional market share created through cash injection. Moreover, under such
perspective, any cash injection purely aiming at promoting small-scale trade can be
expected to have inflationary consequences. Both problems (ineffective support to
small-scale traders and high risk of contributing to inflationary pressure) can be
contained by channelling the demand-driven support through alternative mechanisms
properly coordinated with suppliers (i.e. provision of vouchers).
With regard to the feasibility of achieving an increased marketed supply through a cash
injection strategy, a simulation was carried out on the basis of the assumptions
mentioned above. Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 help to follow the analysis of the
expandability of supply from the different categories of traders. In particular, Table 4.13
estimates the multipliers to be used in Table 4.14 for the estimation of expandability of
food supply marketed by different trader categories. In Table 4.14 the assumption
considered earlier on of limited influence of price changes on quantities marketed by
extra-large traders is applied. In this case, it is a pessimistic assumption, since any
response, though limited, will contribute to an increase in the food supply traded in the
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district and, as such, will contribute to a reduction in the possible price increase required
to achieve the target.
Table 4.13   WTT multipliers
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Trader category
Small 0.030 0.063 0.096 0.129 0.161 0.194 0.256 0.319 0.381 0.443 0.505
Medium 0.054 0.101 0.149 0.197 0.245 0.292 0.332 0.371 0.411 0.450 0.489
Large 0.067 0.119 0.171 0.224 0.276 0.328 0.355 0.382 0.408 0.435 0.462
Extra large 0.098 0.159 0.220 0.281 0.342 0.403 0.403 0.404 0.404 0.405 0.405
Rate of price increase
Source: Author’s estimates
Table 4.14 provides the results of the simulation exercise. At a first glance, a price
increase of approximately 3-5% should be able to generate through the market system
the increase in marketed supply estimated in section 4.4.2.2 (approximately within the
range 24,000 – 35,000 MT per year) to be able to cover the normal gap of annual food
requirements in Turkana. However, the consideration that Turkana relies almost
completely on the import of cereals from neighbouring areas makes it is reasonable to
restrict the “additional” contribution to those provided by the groups of medium and
large-size traders. In such perspective, the price increase required can be reasonably
expected to range between 4% and 7%.
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Table 4.14    Expandability of food supply
Estimated Food Supply
Expandability
Rate of price increase additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative
0% 882 29863 1699 33328 4234 67506 6815 130696
1% 1830 30812 3210 34838 7541 70813 12581 136463
2% 2779 31761 4720 36348 10848 74120 18348 142229
3% 3728 32710 6230 37858 14155 77428 24114 147996
4% 4677 33658 7741 39369 17463 80735 29880 153762
5% 5626 34607 9251 40879 20770 84042 35647 159528
6% 7430 36412 10496 42124 22458 85730 40384 164266
7% 9235 38216 11740 43369 24146 87418 45121 169003
8% 11039 40020 12985 44613 25835 89107 49859 173740
9% 12844 41825 14230 45858 27523 90795 54596 178478
10% 14648 43629 15475 47103 29211 92483 59334 183215
Traders category
28981 31628 63272 123882
Small Medium Large TOT
Source: Author’s estimates
With this in mind, it is worth considering that:
 such an estimate deliberately does not take into account the contribution that a
price increase in combination with other eventual concomitant initiatives
(particularly in terms of increased accessibility) may stimulate through the
category of out-of-Turkana extra-large traders.
 such an estimate does not take into account the possibility of increasing traders’
capacity (particularly of medium size). It is expected that such eventual
increased capacity would help to raise further expandability of supply in
correspondence of lower price increases than the ones determined in Table 4.14.
The latter point is of great relevance in the analysis and formulation of strategies aiming
at increasing food supply in Turkana.
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the relevance of market capacity and functioning for food
security and related issues in a district in Kenya, Turkana, which is prone to chronic
food insecurity and totally dependent on food trade.
First of all, it has been considered how the food trade flow is insufficient to cover local
requirements, even when taking into account the role played by the refugee intervention
in Kakuma, which artificially contributes to increase the supply of food within the
district. Such concern becomes more and more relevant when considered under a
dynamic perspective, which is characterized by a steady population growth, with
consequent increase in food requirements. Within a stagnant and rudimentary economic
background, such dynamics only contribute to widen the gap between requirements and
availability of food.
In addition, it has been considered how the gap between food requirements and supply
in the district is reflected in high prices, almost double the average level for the country.
This inevitably affects the problem from both sides of the coin: while, on one side, high
prices are a prerequisite to attract traders’ interest and involvement, on the other, they
drastically limit access to a large part of the population.
In general, trading activities in Turkana are found to be profitable. This is due in
particular to the high market prices prevalent in the district. Despite the profitability of
the trade business, potentialities are far from being optimized and a large share of both
actual and potential demand remains uncovered. The major constraint identified is the
access to critical inputs such as cash and transport capacity. In fact, both inputs are very
expensive, essentially because in short supply in the district.
In terms of market functioning, the degree of market integration for the Turkana
markets is below the average for the rest of the country. This was to some extent
expected, though a proper analysis and a measure of market integration was not yet
available. The two most interesting points raised by this analysis are the following:
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 The market interconnection within Turkana is low, though on average
acceptable, particularly in light of the gap between the local economic structure
and the average one in the rest of the country. This is worsened by a certain
disconnect between markets in Turkana and the ones in the rest of the country.
 At all levels, that is in Turkana, in the rest of the country, and between Turkana
and the rest of the country, the degree of market integration is far from
homogeneous: some markets are well connected to others, while others are not.
With reference to the points just highlighted, the proposed strategy for any market-
related intervention in Turkana is to utilize the markets which are currently most
connected, since they are best placed to work as a link between the rest of the country
and the remote areas in Turkana. In particular, the markets most integrated and with a
certain price-making attitude within the district seem to be Napusimoru and Lokwi. In
the case of the co-integration between Turkana markets and the others, Lokwi,
Kalimapus and Napeililim are the most integrated; in this case, the Turkana markets
play essentially a role of price-takers. In this regard, it was found out that, while three of
the four most integrated markets are rather well located along the main transport routes,
Kalimapus is instead located in a remote area along the lake shore close to the area of
implementation of the CFW project. Though it is difficult at this stage to consider the
role that such small and localized project may have played in strengthening the
commercial link between the rest of the country and such remote area in Turkana, this
finding deserves more attention.
The risk of implementing market-based interventions in areas where markets are
disconnected from the district’s major trade network is that a certain level of local
inflation may be among the by-products of the initiative. In particular, the more
disconnected the market where a cash-based intervention is implemented, the higher the
expected risk of inflationary consequences. In this regard, a review of market prices in
the area of implementation of CFW has not been able to recognize a direct association
between cash intervention and price increase. Having said that, the link is expected and
wherever market-related initiatives are implemented efforts should be done to put in
place a system to provide regular monitoring of market prices of major commodities.
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A profiling of the traders involved in food commerce in Turkana and in the
neighbouring areas in Kenya was carried out in order to analyze the feasibility of
increasing trade inflows in the district. Such profiling highlighted the drastic gap in
terms of capacity between traders based in Turkana and in the neighbouring areas in
Kenya. Following on from this exercise, the analysis tried to identify the major
determinants of traders’ involvement in Turkana and explored their willingness to scale
up (or to initiate at all) such involvement. In general terms, the very poor status of
infrastructure throughout the district was lamented as the major disincentive, while the
price factor was recorded as the second priority in the traders’ decision to invest. The
third and fourth factors were identified respectively as the poor security conditions and
the poor access to credit. 59
Having said this, it is necessary to consider how improvements in the quality of
infrastructure and increases in commodity prices are two sides of the same coin, since
both contribute to increase the trader’s profit, either through a reduction of costs
(improvement of accessibility) or through an increase of income (price increase). From
this perspective, both options – i.e.: a) increase accessibility, and b) consider the
feasibility of price increase – are worth considering. However, the two strategies are of
a totally different nature, the first one requiring heavy budgetary and political support,
more in line with a proper developmental perspective, the second being, instead, much
lighter and directly linked with initiatives carried out in emergency and rehabilitation
contexts. Thus, while highlighting the need for more attention from the central
authorities on improving transport infrastructure, this study has focused on considering
the feasibility of making use of price increase as a factor to strengthen food supply. This
highlighted the need to separate two possible objectives that may eventually be pursued
through a cash injection strategy:
 increase in marketed supply;
59 Accessibility concerns seem to be particularly relevant for small traders (highly dependent on
suppliers), while for medium-size traders the level of prices seems to be more influential than other
factors in decision making. In between is the case of large traders, for whom such factors as price levels
and the quality of roads have the same influence on their willingness to (scale-up) trade in Turkana.
Overall, quality of roads and security are major determinants for the extra-large out-of-Turkana traders.
Access to cash and other credit facilities play an important role for small traders.
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 promotion of small-scale traders.
In particular, with regard to the latter point, it seems possible to argue that any strategy
aiming at small-scale trade promotion eventually pursued through a purely market-
driven strategy (i.e. demand support through cash distribution) would find it hard to
succeed. In fact, it can be expected that the faster response from medium and large
traders would drastically reduce the possibility of small traders involvement in any
additional market share created through cash injection. Moreover, from this perspective,
any cash injection purely aiming at promoting small-scale trade would be expected to
have inflationary consequences. Both problems (i.e. ineffective support for small-scale
traders and high risk of contributing to inflation) can be contained by channelling the
demand-driven support through alternative mechanisms properly coordinated with
suppliers (i.e. provision of vouchers).60
With regard to the feasibility of achieving an increased marketed supply through a cash
injection strategy, the results of a simulation exercise show that a price increase of
approximately 3-5% should be able to generate through the market system the increase
in marketed supply required to be able to cover the gap recorded in annual food
requirements in Turkana.
Having said this, it is worth considering that:
 such estimate deliberately does not take into account the contribution that a price
increase in combination with other eventual concomitant initiatives (particularly
60 In broad terms, cash injected in the system will determine a disequilibrium through an increase of
overall financial wealth which is not due/linked to a parallel increase in material wealth (increased supply
of whichever good). The risk of inflation will depend on the capacity of the increased demand generated
by the increased financial wealth to stimulate an increased supply (variable according to market strength).
The case of vouchers is slightly different. Indeed vouchers are quasi-money and, as such, the risk of
inflation remains high. However, the use of vouchers gives the chance to regulate in advance the
conditions of the increased supply through negotiations with the traders. Such negotiations moderate –
rather than eliminate – the level of price increase likely to be generated by the introduction of quasi-
money. In addition, contrary to the case of cash, in the case of vouchers, the increase in financial
wealth raises the general confidence that the process (increased supply of commodities) will be
completed, and such confidence helps to contain the risk of price increase.
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in terms of increased accessibility) may stimulate through the category of out-of-
Turkana extra-large traders.
 neither does not take into account the possibility to increase traders’ capacity
(particularly of medium size). It is expected that an eventual increased capacity
would help to raise further expandability of supply in correspondence to lower
price increases.
The first point just raised identifies a rather contained level of inflation to be expected
from an increased demand. However, such favourable perspective needs to be
considered within the current context of already quite high prices.
Following on from such concerns, it is advisable to combine demand-driven and supply-
driven strategies. From this perspective, the latter point mentioned above is extremely
relevant to the analysis and formulation of strategies aimed at increasing food supply in
Turkana. In order to minimize the risk of inflation, a demand-driven approach should be
accompanied by local investment promotion. Such initiatives in support of traders’
capacity should anticipate any cash injection. Further, in view of Turkana traders’
motivation and willingness to scale up activities, an endogenous growth process is
preferable to one led from neighbouring, more advanced districts. In particular,
initiatives targeting large traders based in Turkana would be more reliable and efficient.
In terms of actual measures, two sets are particularly recommendable:
 support to strengthen local transport capacity, by increasing availability of and
access to local transport;
 support to improve local business knowledge and attitude:
 by improving collection and analysis of market information and
their dissemination both within the district and in neighbouring
areas;
 by facilitating links between medium and large Turkana traders
and traders operating in most competitive markets (such as the
markets along the Kenya-Uganda border).
5
Swaziland:
Lubombo and Shiselweni
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background and structure of case study
Swaziland was one of the countries worst affected by the drought which struck Southern
Africa in 2006, with an estimated maize production for 2006/2007 nearly 60% below
that of the previous year. The drought compounded the country’s high levels of chronic
poverty.61 In a context of rising unemployment and increasing poverty, the harvest
failure resulted in significant income losses for both producers and the poorest workers,
who had few labour opportunities. As a result, an increased number of households were
reported to be below the food security line, with an additional 10-15% of the population
unable to access sufficient food. Even self-reliant households which usually managed to
access sufficient food were predicted to face food shortages and to require assistance
until the following harvest.
The aim of this case study is to consider the feasibility and appropriateness of cash-
based interventions in a chronically food deficit country: Swaziland. In particular, the
61 According to the Human Development Report 2005, produced by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), about 43% of the population live in poverty.
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analysis is restricted to two geographical areas, characterized by different agro-
ecological and livelihood systems. The analysis is conducted from an economic
perspective focused on the functioning of the market. In particular, the attention of the
study is focused on the market of food in general and of cereals in particular.
The study is organized as follows. The initial part provides a review of the context and
the justification for assistance. After an analysis of market functioning through a review
of market behaviour, the focus shifts the estimation of the demand for and supply of
food. This will allow a cash transfer strategy to be simulated.
As part of the study, fieldwork was conducted in July 2007. In particular, a household
survey and a traders’ survey were conducted throughout the focus areas and surrounding
areas as well as in the main commercial centres. The aim of such activities was to
capture some characteristics of demand and supply of food and arrive to estimate their
elasticities.
The household survey covered a sample of 490 units: 360 in Lubombo (LCM) and 130
in Shiselweni (TH).62 The sampling framework was stratified, with households and
enumeration areas selected randomly. In Lubombo 56% of the households in the sample
happened to be among the beneficiaries of food aid intervention and the remaining 44%
non-beneficiaries. In Shiselweni all households in the sample were non-beneficiaries.
The traders’ survey covered a sample of 235 units, 94 based in Lubombo, 92 in
Shiselweni, and 49 in the major commercial centres in the country, mainly Matsapha
and Manzini.
62 Throughout this study the names of administrative areas (“Lubombo” and “Shiselweni”) and of
livelihood zones (“Lowveld Cattle and Maize” and “Timber Highlands”) are used interchangeably, either
in combination or on their own. The reference is in all cases to the specific part of the administrative area
identified by the relevant livelihood zone: LMC for Lubombo and TH for Shiselweni.
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5.1.2 General context63
Swaziland is classified as a Lower Middle Income country in view of its per capita GDP
which is well above the sub-Saharan African average. At the same time it is classified
under the Low Human Development category of countries.
Its economy is closely linked to South Africa, with the national currency (Lilangeni)
pegged at par to the South African Rand. This is reflected in the solid trading patterns
between the two countries, with 90% of Swaziland exports being directed to South
Africa, which is also the source of more than half of its imports.
The Swaziland economy is still largely based on agriculture. While agriculture
contributes only a small share (12%) of total GDP, it provides the major source of
income for more than 60% of the population. Such discrepancy is reflected in the low
productivity of the agricultural sector and the relevance of subsistence farming.
5.1.3 Food production and marketing
The local staple food is maize, which comprises approximately 95% of the country’s
cereal production. Other cereals produced and consumed on a much smaller scale are
sorghum and rice. As shown in Figure 5.1, the trend in maize production during the last
decade was characterized by a continuous decline. Several factors contributed to such
downward trend, including erratic weather, inadequate policy implementation, the
impact of HIV/AIDS and low productivity. The decline is reported across all agro-
ecological zones and manifested particularly in the drier Lowveld and Lubombo
63 This section provides the essential background to introduce and contextualize the bulk of the analysis
conducted in the following parts of this chapter. Additional background on the country can be found in
Swazi VAC (2006), while Swazi VAC (2007) and FAO/WFP CFSAM (2007) provide wider insight into
the case of food shortage experienced in the country. Finally, Dradri (2007) provides a regional
perspective of the food market analysis in Southern Africa.
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plateau, where farming is essentially on a subsistence basis characterized by very low
productivity.64
    Figure 5.1 Trend in maize production during the past decade
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     Source: CFSAM Report 2007, FAO/WFP
As shown in Table 5.1, the downward trend in food production has contributed to
reversing the major achievements in terms of increased food availability recorded in
Swaziland from the 1960s to the mid 1980s. This is reflected in the reported increase of
the rates of undernourishment.
Table 5.1 Food availability and malnutrition
1961 - 63 1971 - 73 1981- 83 1990 - 92 2001 - 03 1990 - 92 2001 - 03
2178 2316 2431 2450 2360 14 19
Proportion of undernourished in total populationDietary Energy Supply
%kcal / person / day
According to FAO definition, it is here considered as “undernourished” the proportion of population whose daily
food consumption falls below the minimum daily requirements.
Source: FAO, State of Food Insecurity 2006, and FAO Statistical Database
The low productivity of agriculture forces a certain dependency on imports of food,
which has been fluctuating at between 50% and 60% of national food consumption. As
64 In Lowveld and Lubombo plateau average yields are less than two MT per hectare. Average yields
reported by commercial producers in the more productive Highveld areas are around six MT per hectare.
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    Figure 5.2 Structure of maize market
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     Source: Mukeere and Dradri, WFP, 2006
remarked by the FAO/WFP CFSAM 2007 report, “commercial food imports appear to
have been quite responsive to the fluctuations and general downward trend in national
production”, also facilitated by the direct convertibility of the local currency into South
African Rand.
The bulk of imports is accounted for by maize. Importation rights for maize are owned
by a state monopoly. Maize is imported through the National Maize Corporation
(NMC), a parastatal entity established in 1985 with the aim of guaranteeing a market to
local producers by protecting them against competition from cheaper maize from South
Africa while at the same time ensuring the provision of good quality maize to Swazi
consumers at affordable prices. In other words, the NMC is mandated with the double
aim of market protection and stabilization. In normal production years about 10% of
domestic maize production is formally marketed, mostly through the NMC. The
FAO/WFP CFSAM report highlights how “the dual role of NMC as the an importer as
well as a competitor in the domestic market gives it an unfair advantage over its
competitors, thus creating market imperfections that distort producer and consumer
incentives. It sells the imported maize to millers (two main ones control about 90% of
the domestic maize flour market) at a price it determines, while the millers in turn
determine the prices to charge consumers for maize meal. Maize meal prices tend to be
on the high side for poor
households which, therefore,
have difficulties accessing
adequate supplies”.
The structure of maize
marketing in the country is
summarized in Figure 5.2.
While maize grain and milling
are dominated by a few
companies,65 the retail market
is more competitive.
65 Maize milling is dominated by two large-scale millers (Ngwane Mills Ltd and Universal Milling
Company), which account for approximately 60% and 25% of total market respectively.
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5.1.4 Food aid
In response to the decreasing household production of food coupled with the increasing
difficulty of poor households in accessing food there has been an increased role for
external assistance. Food aid has been the standard response mechanism for meeting
food insecurity for several years. The National Disaster Task Force (NDTF) and the
World Food Programme (WFP) are the two agencies running the major food assistance
programmes in the country in parallel, with NGOs typically running the food delivery
programmes in communities. According to the Swazi VAC report 2006, approximately
a quarter of the rural population are recipients of food aid. If we consider that almost
80% of the Swazi population is rural-based with livelihoods predominantly dependent
on small-holder agriculture, we can appreciate the relevance of food aid in covering
nutritional requirements.
Figure 5.3 Distribution of food insecurity among different socio-economic
groups
Source:  Swaziland Vulnerability Assessment Report, Swazi VAC 2006
Having said the above, it is widely acknowledged that food assistance in Swaziland is
characterized by poor targeting. In fact, as documented in Figure 5.3, taken from the
Swazi VAC report 2006, food aid seems to be distributed to all socio-economic strata of
the population independently of their different purchasing capacity and access to food.
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Improving targeting is a general concern since misdirected resources not only
unnecessarily reduce the efficiency of food aid, but also severely reduce its
effectiveness, leading to market displacement and disincentives to food production.
The bulk of WFP intervention in Swaziland is part of the regional Protracted Relief and
Recovery Operation (PRRO). In terms of resources, as of 1st May 2007 approximately
two thirds of WFP Swaziland’s budget requirements were covered.66 This appears lower
than the one reported for the regional operation as a whole, which by end of July 2007
had managed to secure 83% of requirements for the period January 2005 – April 2008.
Despite that, operations seem to be performing better in Swaziland than in most of other
countries in the region. In fact, as reported by FEWSNET in Table 5.2, during the
period April – June 2007 Swaziland managed to achieve among the highest results in
terms of the ratio between distributed and planned tonnages: approximately 70% of
quantities planned were distributed against a mere 42% achieved as an average for the
region. However, prospects for the period July 2007 – April 2008 were below the
regional average.
Table 5.2 WFP Southern Africa PRRO: cereal distributions for April-
June 2007 and pipeline requirements for July 2007 – April 2008
(in MTs)
 Source: FEWSNET, 2007
66 The rate of coverage was 62% in financial terms and 68% in terms of commodities.
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 Figure 5.4 USA and Argentina maize prices compared
to SAFEX
Source: FEWSNET, 2007
5.2 Market price analysis
5.2.1 Market prices
The low production experienced in South Africa was expected to affect the food
security of the entire region and, in particular, of countries like Swaziland which
regularly source most of their food imports from South Africa. As a consequence a
certain rise of food prices was expected. Such expectation was supported by rising
trends of world prices
for cereals mainly
reflecting the increasing
demand for the
production of
biofuels.67 Figure 5.4
compares the evolution
of maize prices in USA
and Argentina against
the one recorded by the
South Africa Futures
Exchange (SAFEX).68
On the basis of historical trends, Dradri (2007) attempted some projections of maize
prices throughout the region. In particular, as shown in Figure 5.5, SAFEX prices were
expected to remain “steady around the USD 250/MT mark between July and November
and then fall below this mark from December”.
67 FAO (2007) suggests that, despite record global cereal production during 2007 (4.8% above 2006
levels), total supply would barely meet increased demand.
68 South Africa usually imports maize to meet its requirements from Argentina and the USA.
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  Figure 5.5 Maize price projections for selected countries (USD/Kg)
Source: Dradri, 2007
The projections reported in Figure 5.5 were used to estimate the Import Parity Price
(IPP)69 for Swaziland for the period June – December 2007, reported in Table 5.3.
Dradri (2007) considered the two best options for Swaziland as source of imports: South
Africa, – its traditional source – and Malawi, which had reported a surplus.
Table 5.3 Import Parity Prices for Swaziland: June – December 2007
(USD/MT)
June September December
South Africa 361 339 316
Malawi 211 219 250
Source: Dradri, 2007
69 Import Parity Price is the sum of all costs incurred: procurement price in the country of origin plus the
costs of transport, handling and insurance.
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Figure 5.6 helps to visualize the price evolution for food commodities in Swaziland
during the first half of the year. In particular, it highlights the peak recorded in April and
how this was mostly reabsorbed after the harvest. The figure also shows how the
problem has been general, but particularly affected cereals. This is in line with the
evolution registered in South Africa and in a few other countries of Southern Africa.
Figure 5.6 Evolution of food price indexes
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In view of constraints in data availability, prices of maize and of maize meal are
considered together. Figure 5.7 presents the evolution of prices of maize for Mbabane
and for maize meal for the following markets: Manzini, Hlathikhulu, Siteki, Bigbend,
Simunye, Piggs Peak, Nhlangano, Mankayane. They are expressed in USD/kg to be
comparable with the SAFEX price for white maize.
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Figure 5.7 Prices of maize and maize meal
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It is interesting to notice how prices for maize meal in Swaziland remained within a
limited range for some time and they seem to develop into two main groups after mid
2002. Such groups, called here A and B, are formed by Mbabane, Manzini, Hlathikhulu,
Piggs Peak, Mankayane (Group A) and Bigbend, Siteky, Simunye, Nhlangano (Group
B). The prices for the two groups of markets maintain a certain similarity of movement
and the gap between the two groups has remained fairly constant since 2005, with
Group A being 1.5 to two times the value of Group B.
It is difficult to understand the cause of such a gap, particularly in view of the small size
of the country. Vicinity between markets does not seem to be the only reason: in fact,
while for Group B this could be understandable in the case of Simunye, Siteki and
Bigbend, grouped along the eastern border, it seems difficult to be valid in the case of
Nhlangano, which lies along the south-western border. A possible theory along the lines
of centre-periphery could be considered, with markets in Group B being less influenced
by the centre than the others.
Finally, it is interesting to notice how the SAFEX price oscillated within a rather stable
range and the price increase experienced since during the first months of 2007 seemed
to break such virtual ceiling. This seemed to show a certain structural change upwards
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in the mid-term equilibrium of this price trend. Along such interpretation, part of the
price rise experienced in Swaziland in the first part of 2007 could be expected to be
structural as well.
5.2.2 Market integration
The purposes and methodology of this part of the analysis are described in section 3.2.4.
5.2.2.1 Findings
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is applied to test the condition of
stationarity of each price series. In a second step, the ADF test is to be applied to the
series of residuals ut of the two initial time series. Finally, the analysis of the Error
Correction Mechanism (ECM) manages to estimates the various relevant aspects of
price transmission. Results are reported in Table A4 and Table A5 in Annex 2.
Table A4 shows that all price series are integrated of order 1: I(1). Table A5 reports
different aspects of price transmission such as the magnitude of long-run and short-run
adjustment to price changes and the speed of adjustment. An overview of such data is
provided below in Table 5.4. First of all, the long-term market connection reflected in 
seems to be quite good throughout the areas considered and beyond. In other words,
most of the price changes eventually experienced in a market get transmitted to other
markets. This good level of interconnection was expected, some of the major reasons
being summarized by the very good road connections within a small country
neighbouring wealthy South Africa. However, the good level of market connection in
the long-run is not mirrored in the short-run. In fact, weaker rates of price transmission
are recorded in the short term, expressed by 2, and this reflected in a low speed of
transmission, 3. In other words, the degree of market integration is good, but not at full
speed. An adjusted summary measure is provided by the ratio between  and half of the
time required to restore half of the long-run equilibrium between prices in market pairs:
/h. In this case the gap widens between Lubombo and Shiselweni on one side and the
rest of the country on the other. Interestingly, this consideration seems to apply only
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within each of the areas considered while it does not hold on the external side, that is
between each area and the others as well as between each area and the reference market
at regional level. In such case, the degree of integration seems to be less diversified,
though at a lower average level.
With reference to groups of markets identified above, Group A records the highest
levels of combined measures of integration. Such markets seem to play the role of price
markers within the country, or at least are in a good position as predictors of price
changes. However, the slightly different patterns of price evolution between the two
groups, as highlighted in Figure 5.7, makes price monitoring in the proposed areas for
cash based intervention even more interesting and useful. In fact, it can be quite helpful
not only to try to capture early signs of price changes but also to try to distinguish the
share of an eventual price rise determined by what can be called “imported inflation”
from the direct and indirect impact of an eventual price injection.
Table 5.4 Market price transmission: magnitude and speed of adjustment
2 2 3 h 2 /h 2 2 3 h 2 /h
Shiselweni 0.876 0.314 0.146 1.530 0.573 0.915 0.467 0.261 1.317 0.695
Lubombo 0.921 0.652 0.225 1.396 0.660 0.892 0.442 0.191 1.511 0.590
Rest of Swaziland 0.926 0.272 0.197 1.135 0.815 0.745 0.305 0.239 1.282 0.569
internal external
Source: Author’s estimates
5.3 The demand for food: a household perspective
5.3.1 Scope of the analysis
The aim of this part of the analysis is to improve knowledge of consumer behaviour,
with a particular focus on the demand for food. Two datasets have been used:
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a) one collected by the Swazi VAC and Food Economy Group (FEG) in
occasion of the establishment of the Household Economy Assessment (HEA)
baseline conducted in June 2006;
b) one collected through a household survey conducted ad hoc for the present
study with the major aim of assessing household preferences and any
comparative advantage between cash-based and commodity-based
assistance.
5.3.2 Household economy and the demand for food
While a full presentation of the household economy background and characteristics in
the different livelihood zones in Swaziland can be found in the HEA baseline report,
Table 5.5 provides the key information required to start the analysis. It is limited to the
two livelihood zones which are the focus of the present study: “Lowveld Cattle and
Maize” (LCM) and “Timber Highlands” (TH).
Table 5.5 Income, expenditure and relevance of food consumption
Very Poor Poor Middle Better Off Very Poor Poor Middle Better Off
Income SZL 2179 6063 3515 6320
Expenditures SZL 2042 5210 3310 6298
Food share of total expenditures % 18.2 18.5 21.9 17.0 37.0 26.9 12.4 6.5
Kcal consumed kcal 2163 2226 2478 2688 2121 2184 2331 2646
Kcal purchased as % Kcal consumed % 8.7 7.5 37.3 58.6 20.8 24.0 39.6 30.2
Kcal purchased as % of 2100 Kcal % 9.0 8.0 44.0 75.0 21.0 25.0 44.0 38.0
Food aid kcal 1492 1536 719 0 0 0 0 0
School feeding kcal 260 200 273 242 255 240 256 238
Tot food aid as % of food consumed % 81.0 78.0 40.0 9.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 9.0
15665 40602 35233 55575
LCM TH
22958 53075 36560 62370
Source: Author’s estimates based on VAC and FEG, Household Economy Assessment Baseline, 2007
Income and expenditure of the various wealth groups show very concentrated patterns
in both areas, though the lower average levels for LCM in Lubombo are remarkable
compared to TH in Shiselweni. This is not reflected in the estimates of average food
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consumption. The provision of food aid in LCM and not in TH helps to explain: up to
81% of food consumed by the poorest group in Lubombo is obtained through food aid,
while in Shiselweni food aid, provided only in the form of school feeding, accounts for
only 12%. This disparity also affects the estimation of the share of expenditure covered
by food: while in the case of TH this tends to decrease normally as income and
expenditures rise, in LCM it remain more or less stable. This is a clear reflection of a
biased situation in LCM. The bias can easily be perceived when considering the major
contribution of food aid in covering food requirements: in the absence of food aid the
poorest group in LCM would be confronted by a major food gap even in normal
circumstances. This bias is inevitably reflected in the estimation of the income elasticity
of demand for food, as well as for other commodities.
Because of the structure of the data set used (cross-section of a limited sample) the
application of traditional techniques for the estimation of income elasticity cannot
provide significant results. Therefore, we resorted to estimating a linear interpolation of
the average values of what can be called “effective demand for food” for each wealth
group as the ratio between the market value of food consumed by the household and the
sum of total expenditure plus the market value of food produced by the household
and/or received as food aid. The results achieved through this approximation are shown
in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Elasticity of demand for food from different wealth groups
Wealth groups Very poor Poor Middle Better Off All Very poor Poor Middle Better Off All
Expenditures 0.70 0.68 0.51 0.31 0.56 0.52 0.26 0.24
Income 0.68 0.64 0.39 0.25 0.54 0.52 0.26 0.22
Price (staple only) -1.02 -1.04 -0.97 -0.77 -1.02 -0.76 -0.63 -0.39 -0.29 -0.54
Lubombo LCM Shiselweni TH
Source: Author’s estimates
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In the case of price elasticity, also reported in Table 5.6,70 the demand for food in
Lubombo is much more elastic than in the case of Shiselweni: a percentage increase in
price is expected to determine a (just more-than) proportional decrease in the quantity
demanded; which is somehow typical of conditions of a certain oversupply. It is very
likely that a big part of the price elasticity estimated in Lubombo is linked to food aid.
5.3.3 Household survey
A survey of 490 households (360 in Lubombo and 130 in Shiselweni, respectively) was
conducted. The sampling framework was stratified, with households and enumeration
areas selected randomly. The condition of benefitting of any programme of assistance
was not included as a selection criterion.71 In Lubombo 56% of the households in the
sample were beneficiaries of food aid intervention and the remaining 44% non-
beneficiaries. Since in Shiselweni no food aid is distributed, besides school feeding, all
households in the sample were categorized as non-beneficiaries.72
A first piece of information achieved through the survey was on the perspective use of
assistance eventually provided in the form of cash. In particular, non-beneficiaries were
asked how they would use an amount of 500 SZL if it was provided to them as cash free
of charge. Such amount was estimated a priori as roughly equivalent to the monthly
cost of food required for an average household with the addition of a relatively small
amount to cover other basic non-food expenditure. Beneficiaries of food aid were
presented with a double task: they were asked to estimate the monetary value of the
food commodities received through the latest distribution and to consider the alternative
70 The dataset available through the HEA baseline allowed the estimation of price elasticity of the staple
food (maize) but not any cross-price elasticity.
71 It is worth considering that the condition of being beneficiary or non beneficiary identifies two
different populations, as reflected in the underlying eligibility and selection criteria defining different
degree of need for assistance.
72 Information required to assess the effectiveness of targeting was not collected since this was not the
specific aim of the analysis.
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use they would make of such an amount if they had the chance to do so. Finally, all
interviewed were asked about their preference among value-equivalent forms of
assistance: food, cash, or half and half.
5.3.3.1 Use of cash
Table 5.7 reports the interviewees’ preferred repartition of eventual cash assistance or
cash-equivalent of food assistance. The very strong similarities between the shares
provided by households in Shiselweni and by non-beneficiary households in Lubombo
are interesting. The preferred allocation indicated by beneficiary households in
Lubombo highlights a reduced interest in food and a general increased interest in all
other categories of expenditure. It is worth considering the different amounts that
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were given the chance to allocate: the amount made
available to non-beneficiaries was more than double that of beneficiaries, mainly
because the latest food aid distribution before the interview had been limited to half
ration.73 Eventually, in line with the income elasticity of demand, the marginal increase
in disposable income generated through the provision of assistance is indeed expected
to determine a tendency to reduce the relative share of expenditure for food and other
basic needs. However, if there is an expectation that the assistance will be maintained in
the future, the perception in the medium term is more relevant than the disruptions
linked to occasional reductions in the amount of assistance received. In other words, the
fact that the previous food aid distribution had been run on a half-ration can be
considered irrelevant to the purposes of the analysis; and, if it is at all relevant, the
additional reduction in the share of expenses spent on food reported in Table 5.7 is
expected to be quite small and therefore can be reasonably ignored. As indicated above,
it is the expectation that average levels received in the past may be maintained in the
future, which generates in the beneficiaries a certain impression of welfare and suggests
increased attention to alternative uses of resources available or received as assistance.
73 The full ration provided by the WFP intervention is composed of: 400 gr. of cereals, 60 gr. of legumes
and 25 gr. of oil, corresponding to an individual daily intake of approximately 1,880 kcal.
Swaziland: Lubombo and Shiselweni
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
137
Table 5.7 Use of cash
food assets debts school fees medical non food other
Lubombo LCM non-beneficiaries 62.4 3.2 1.4 6.6 5.5 9.0 11.9
Lubombo LCM beneficiaries 42.8 10.4 5.9 10.7 7.9 7.7 14.6
Shiselweni TH 64.8 4.7 1.8 4.5 3.4 7.3 13.7
% of expenses
Source: Author’s estimates
5.3.3.2 Preference for cash or food
Table 5.8 presents the preference expressed by the interviewees about the form of
transfer. It is interesting to consider the strong similarities between beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries in Lubombo in terms of expressed preference for cash, averaging
around 25%. A certain gap is found in the other two cases (preference for food or a
combination of both), with the proportion in support of a commodity-based approach
decreasing from 64% to 50% when shifting from beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries. The
case of Shiselweni shows an even stronger support for food aid, which reaches almost
the two thirds of the sample. A review of the motivations provided by the households
for such support highlights a certain lack of confidence in the beneficiaries about their
capacity to make proper use of cash. It is somehow difficult to comment on such lack of
confidence since experience with cash distributions in the country is very limited and
potential beneficiaries have not been exposed so far to the opportunity of making such a
decision. It is as well to recognize that the perceived deficiencies in targeting of food aid
do not provide the interviewees with any confidence that cash assistance might be better
targeted.
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Table 5.8 Preference for food or cash (%)
Lubombo Shiselweni
Benef. Non Benef. All Benef. Non Benef. All Benef. Non Benef. All
Food aid 64.18 49.69 57.78 … 65.12 … 64.18 56.60 59.71
Cash 24.38 25.79 25.00 … 18.60 … 24.38 22.57 23.31
Half of both 11.44 24.53 17.22 … 16.28 … 11.44 20.83 16.97
Lubombo and Shiselweni
Source: Author’s estimates
5.3.3.3 Nutritional contribution of aid: cash versus food
The preferences expressed by the sample about their potential use of the resources
received were used to attempt a comparative analysis of caloric contribution provided
by food and by cash. In particular, the share of the potential cash transfer that
households had decided to spend on food was split into the various commodities that
they would eventually buy. This allowed the estimation of the nutritional value – in
kilocalories – of the transfer. This part of the analysis is obviously limited to the case of
beneficiaries of food aid in the sample. On average, the nutritional contribution
achieved through the simulated purchase of food by the recipients of cash assistance
covered 93% of that provided through food aid. This is remarkable, particularly
considering that, on average, 76% of the market value of the food aid basket was
declared to be spent on food. In other words, there seems to be an added value
transferred to the beneficiaries through the provision of assistance in the form of cash.
At this point, in order to avoid the subjective component linked to the individual
estimation of prices of the various commodities and of quantities, the estimation was
repeated with the imposition of the average price for each commodity in all cases. This
contributed to reducing the share of nutritional contribution provided through purchase
of food to 89% compared to that provided by the food aid basket distributed. This
amount, though slightly reduced, remains remarkable because still confirms the added
transfer value of cash assistance.
Swaziland: Lubombo and Shiselweni
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
139
Figure 5.8 Nutritional contribution of aid: cash versus food
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Figure 5.8 helps to show that 1% increase in the share of cash assistance spent on food
corresponds to 1.165% increase in the ratio between the nutritional contribution
generated through the provision of cash compared to food aid. The ratio is assumed to
be constant and therefore the advantage for the beneficiary increases with the amount of
the cash transfer. At the same time, the advantage for the beneficiary increases with the
increase in the share of cash used to buy food. As shown in Figure 5.8, on average a
beneficiary should be able to purchase the same number of kilocalories that s/he would
receive through food aid by spending the equivalent of 85.8% of the market value of the
food commodities received on food.74 This would make the remaining 14.2% of the
cash transfer available to the beneficiary to purchase additional commodities or for
additional expenses.
74 Transport costs faced by the beneficiary to go to the market or shop to purchase the food are minimal
and were ignored. In parallel, transports cost faced by the beneficiaries to reach food distribution points
and transport the food aid commodities received were also ignored.
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Table 5.9 Cost of kilocalories
kcal purchased SZL required to purchase SZL required to purchase
with one SZL 1880 kcal 1880 kcal on a daily basis
for one month
Shiselweni TH 928 2.03 60.78
Lubombo LCM (beneficiairies of food aid) 750 2.51 75.20
Lubombo LCM (non beneficiairies of food aid) 725 2.59 77.79
Lubombo LCM 738 2.55 76.42
Shiselweni TH & Lubombo LCM 811 2.32 69.54
Source: Author’s estimates
The food basket that the interviewees would be willing to purchase with the
hypothetical cash transfer can provide another interesting piece of information: the
amount of cash transfer required to achieve a certain nutritional contribution.75 Table
5.9 and Figure 5.9 help to estimate the food purchasing capacity of one SZL in the
different areas and for the different groups considered. The average number of
kilocalories purchased with one SZL ranges between 725 and 928. This gap reflects the
difference in market prices as well as different preferences expressed for the use of
cash. The amount required on a monthly basis to purchase the amount of food
equivalent to the calorific contribution provided through the ongoing food aid
intervention (1,880 kcal per person per day) would range between 60.8 SZL in
Shiselweni TH and an average of 76.4 SZL in Lubombo LMC. The overall average for
the two focus areas would be almost 70 SZL per person per month.
75 The following groups of food commodities were considered: maize, maize meal, rice, other cereals,
bread, irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, beans, vegetables including leaves, fruits, fish, meat, poultry, eggs,
oil and fat, sugar and sugar products, milk and milk products. A few households added the category of
soup; this was not considered in view of the reduced significance of its calorific content.
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Figure 5.9 Nutritional contribution obtained through the purchase of food
Source: Author’s estimates
Source: Author’s estimates
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5.4 The supply of food: a trader’s perspective
5.4.1 Scope of the analysis
As in all food deficit countries, an essential role in increasing food availability is
covered by trade. For this reason it is particularly relevant to provide closer attention to
one major category of players involved in the sector: traders. The aim of this part of the
analysis is to try to establish the relevance of the trading sector in responding to demand
for food, as well as its capacity to expand in response to an eventual increase in demand.
5.4.2 Traders’ survey: findings
A survey of 235 traders was conducted, 94 based in Lubombo, 92 from Shiselweni, and
49 from the major commercial centres in the country, mainly Matsapha and Manzini.
The selection process was essentially dictated by geographical considerations, with
preference given to major urban and trading centres. The survey is not necessarily
representative of the traders in the two focus areas; however, this limitation is somehow
balanced by the consideration that the sample size covered by this analysis is
remarkably large compared to the assumed traders’ population in the two areas.
It is worth noting that 91% of the traders in the sample showed interest an in increasing
their business size. However, as expected, major constraints were highlighted.
5.4.2.1 Business size
The first step in the estimation of traders’ capacity was to get a more in-depth insight
into their average business size. In this case the assumption is that the basket of
commodities traded is limited; on such a basis, size was estimated by considering the
value of the two major commodities traded which were assumed to represent
approximately half of the entire turnover eventually achieved by each trader. This is not
necessarily the total business size of each trader, but rather the individual size of the
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food trade business.76 This monetary value was finally converted into cereal equivalent,
as reported in Table 5.10, to estimate the quantity of food sold on a monthly average.
Table 5.10 Monthly turnover of food traders
food budget
avg 6635 555 48146
min 252 63 734
max 230040 4870 1442000
cereal budget
avg 2212 185 16049
min 84 21 245
max 76680 1623 480667
deciles
1 491 125 1843
2 665 196 2418
3 768 275 3522
4 840 345 4651
5 965 413 5822
6 1140 492 7517
7 1694 579 11497
8 2490 712 19573
9 4910 1026 33750
10 230040 4870 1442000
Manzini
SZL
SZL
Kgs
Lubombo Shiselweni
 Source: Author’s estimates
The comparison between the average business size of food traders in the three different
areas is striking. While the dominance reported by the traders based in Manzini was
expected, the values found in the case of Shiselweni are somehow below expectations.
Eventually, this can be considered in line with the typical livelihoods in the TH
characterized by higher self-sufficiency.
76 Information on the composition of trade in terms of food versus non-food were collected through the
survey, however an estimation of the total business size of each trader it is not considered relevant for the
purpose of this analysis.
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In addition to that, Table 5.10 gives an immediate impression of the high concentration
of the food trade business. In all areas considered the average business size among the
largest 10% is greater than the sum of the average sizes for all other shares. This is a
clear indication of the relevance, and eventually of the control, exercised by the biggest
traders on the rest of the market chain.
For homogeneity and simplicity all the traders in the sample were split into four size
groups: less than 1,000 SZL (“small”), between 1,000 and 5,000 SZL (“medium”),
between 5,000 ad 20,000 SZL  (“large”), and more than 20,000 SZL (“extra large”). It is
worth noting that according to such arbitrary classification only small and medium
traders are in Shiselweni and that very large traders are found only in Manzini.
5.4.2.2 Availability and access to key inputs: money and commodities
As a first step in the analysis the question of availability of – as well as access to –
additional key inputs which are a precondition for considering the feasibility of scaling
up the business size was considered: financial resources and commodities. Figure 5.10
reports general confidence in the availability of and access to additional key inputs, such
as money and food commodities. In particular, confidence about availability of and
access to additional financial resources seems on average slightly more difficult than
confidence about availability of and access to additional commodities. Figure 5.10
shows that on average a trader has around 70% probability of accessing additional
money required and around 80% probability of accessing additional commodities
required to scale up his/her business. In this case the focus is on perceived general
confidence, which is slightly higher in the case of commodities than in the case of the
financial resources required. This consideration seems to be common to all business
sizes.
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Figure 5.10 Traders’ confidence in getting access to key inputs
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5.4.2.3 Determinants of willingness to trade
Once the question of the comparative access to critical inputs was clarified, attention
was shifted to the analysis of other contextual factors that determine business
performance as well as decisions on business size. Five such factors were explicitly
included in this analysis (prices, security, accessibility, access to credit, storage
capacity) with the possibility of including others in order to properly capture the opinion
of the interviewees. Figure 5.11 helps to identify the main priorities and determinants of
willingness to trade of the different categories of traders.
As expected, the very good accessibility throughout the country, characterized by the
small size of the country as well as the excellent state of the roads, is reflected in the
results. Access to credit is reported to play an important role (though apparently this is
not the case for extra-large traders). Overall, the two most critical factors are prices and
security conditions, although it is difficult to interpret the meaning of traders’ concerns
over the security conditions in a country which is stable and peaceful. Of more interest
is the role played by price levels, and all categories of business size were concordant in
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defining the relevance of price levels and changes as a major constraint to business
performance as well as a major determinant of business size.
Figure 5.11 Constraints identified and determinants of willingness to trade
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Finally, the combination of residual factors identified under the category ‘other’ seems
to be relevant. A review of the answers provided under this category is revealing and
shifts attention towards a few critical aspects of market functioning. The vast majority
of these are covered by lack of demand and excessive supply, which cover 40% and
35% respectively of the problems combined under the category ‘other’. The first
problem is caused by a lack of purchasing capacity and the second is identified by
traders with the perceived relevance of informal business. Both factors contribute to
keep prices low; therefore, they confirm the relevance of prices in everyday’s traders’
decision making.
The analysis of traders’ opinion about the current price levels at the time does not look
straightforward. As shown in Figure 5.12, while a remarkable proportion considered
current price levels appropriate, the rest of the opinions seemed to be quite divergent in
the different regions. While in Manzini and Shiselweni a general tendency to consider
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Table 5.11   Average price increase
                        considered favourable
          to scale up business size
                                    (%)
Lubombo 9.36
Shiselweni 7.84
Manzini 9.15
Average 8.45
Source: Author’s estimates
current prices on the low side was reported, in Lubombo the tendency was in the
opposite direction.
Figure 5.12 Traders’ opinion on market price levels
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Despite such apparent divergence, most traders in all regions reported that they were
more or less in favour of a price
increase, and the increase they would
consider favourable for their decision
to scale up their activities ranged
between 7.8% and 9.3%, as shown in
Table 5.11.
From this perspective, we focus on
the feasibility of making use of prices
as a factor to increase food supply. In
other words, we make use of the
price factor as a determinant of the WTT to estimate the elasticity of food supply.
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5.4.2.4 Willingness to trade and elasticity of supply
The values in Table 5.11 were re-estimated on the basis of the traders’ business size and
their perception of availability and access to key inputs: cash and food. The following
ordered logit model was used:
iiii foodmoneysizeWTT   (5.1)
where:
iWTT is the willingness to trade manifested by the ith trader,
isize is the business size of the ith trader,
imoney is the ith trader’s expectation to access cash,
ifood is the ith trader’s expectation to access food commodities.
Table 5.12 presents the results of three different specifications of (5.1). The coefficient
of business size is insignificant which means that traders’ behaviour in response to price
changes is similar for all the groups considered.
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Table 5.12    Willingness to trade in response to price changes
traders' confidence in accessing cash  (%) ** ***
traders' confidence in accessing commodities  (%) ** ***
Ln business size
cut 1
cut 2
cut 3
cut 4
cut 5
N. obs
LR chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
A B C
0.417 0.406
0.488 0.488
0.043 -0.010
-1.135 -0.841 -0.778
-0.063 0.262 0.326
1.273 1.631 1.694
2.313 2.679 2.743
705 705 705
0.98 21.61 21.57
3.795 4.158 4.222
0.3222 0.0001 0.0000
0.0004 0.0094 0.0094
Source: Author’s elaboration
Table 5.13 and Figure 5.13 present the estimates of WTT of the various categories of
traders considered in this study, that is the likelihood that different groups of traders
may decide to scale up their business size in response to a certain price increase. The
possible price increases considered range between 0% (no increase) and 20% or more.
In this case the price changes do not refer to a specific commodity, but can be rather
generalized with reference to the combination of major commodities dealt with by each
trader interviewed.
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Table 5.13 Probability of WTT
0 5 10 15 20 >20
small 20.049 22.265 31.228 15.111 8.491 2.856
medium 18.584 21.604 31.792 15.900 9.056 3.064
large 18.614 21.553 31.756 15.923 9.081 3.073
extra large 16.303 20.700 32.764 17.048 9.840 3.346
all sizes 19.258 21.910 31.536 15.535 8.794 2.967
rate of price increase  (%)
Source: Table 5.12 specification B
Figure 5.13    Willingness to trade in response to price changes
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As already mentioned, the evolution of the WTT is very similar for all groups,
characterized by a certain value (between 16% and 20%) even in the absence of a price
increase and by a sharp increase before reaching their maximum values (between 30%
and 35%) in correspondence to a 10% rise in price.77 In line with Figure 5.13, Table
5.14 provides estimates of the WTT multipliers.
77 See note 53 in chapter 4.
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Table 5.14 WTT multipliers
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Trader category
Small 0.200 0.205 0.209 0.214 0.218 0.223 0.241 0.259 0.276 0.294 0.312
Medium 0.186 0.192 0.198 0.204 0.210 0.216 0.236 0.257 0.277 0.298 0.318
Large 0.186 0.192 0.198 0.204 0.210 0.216 0.236 0.256 0.277 0.297 0.318
Extra large 0.163 0.172 0.181 0.189 0.198 0.207 0.231 0.255 0.279 0.304 0.328
Rate of price increase
 Source: Author’s estimates
Table 5.15 provides estimates of inverse elasticity of supply for a few commodities.78
On average it can be expected to vary between 2.5% and 3.9% according to commodity.
From a geographical perspective the rates seem to be higher in Lubombo than in
Shiselweni for most of the commodities considered. However, the critical role in the
supply chain played by the main commercial centres in Manzini, particularly in the view
of the high reliance on imports, somehow forces a reduction in the effective range of
values by making them converge towards the values reported in Manzini.
Table 5.15 Inverse elasticity of supply by commodity and area (%)
Maize Maize meal Rice Beans Maize Maize meal Rice Beans
Lubombo 4.95 3.43 2.88 2.79 2.93 4.03 2.84 2.77
Shiselweni 2.28 2.98 2.69 4.34 2.34 3.99 2.15 3.35
Manzini 2.51 2.31 3.07 2.19 2.94 3.63 2.94 2.54
All 2.89 2.83 2.87 2.87 2.70 3.87 2.59 2.85
Average Weighted average
Source: Author’s estimates
78 It is worth stressing the different interpretation for WTT (in Table 5.14) and inverse elasticity (in Table
5.15) which are both expressed in percentage terms. While WTT rates indicate the probability that traders
will react to a certain price change, the inverse elasticity of supply indicates the percent change of
quantity marketed in response to a certain price change.
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5.5 A simulation exercise
5.5.1 A combined perspective: joining demand and supply
Once the elasticities of demand and supply were estimated, they were combined to
simulate intervention strategies and particularly to try to estimate the eventual
inflationary consequences that could be expected from such strategies. Figure 5.14
presents the supply and demand curves estimated on the basis of the inverse elasticities
as measured above. In particular, since the focus of the intervention is on the poorest
strata of the population, the demand curves in Figure 5.14 were estimated on the basis
of the average inverse elasticity for very poor and poor groups. For the sake of
consistency, since the elasticity of demand was estimated only in the case of maize, in
this case even the supply curve was limited to the staple food. It is interesting to notice
how both demand and supply seem to be rather elastic.
Figure 5.14 Demand and supply curves
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5.5.2 A simulation of cash transfer
In order to assess the feasibility of achieving an increased food supply through a cash
injection strategy a simulation was carried out. As a first step the increased demand was
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estimated. For the elasticity of demand the following scenarios, derived from the
various estimates provided in the previous parts of this analysis, were considered:
 the share of increased income/expenditure following the cash injection which
is spent on food varies between 64% and 70% for very poor and poor in
Lubombo and between 52% and 56% for very poor and poor in Shiselweni,
as derived from the HEA data and reported in Table 5.6;
 the share of increased expenditure following the cash injection which is
spent on food varies between 43% in the case of food aid beneficiaries in
Lubombo and 62% in the case of non-beneficiaries in Lubombo, and is
around 65% in Shiselweni, as derived from the household survey and
reported in Table 5.7.
In addition, we make the simplifying assumption that all additional demand for food is
covered by maize, since we do not have a cross-price elasticity of demand.79 Therefore,
we make use of the price elasticities estimated for maize.
On such a basis, the additional amount purchased by a household following a cash
transfer of say 100 SZL would vary between 62 and 70 SZL in Lubombo, with the
exception of food aid beneficiaries who would spend only 43 SZL on maize. In
Shiselweni the amounts would vary between 52 and 65 SZL. In terms of quantities, on
the basis of average market prices such additional demand would range between 24.8
and 28.0 kgs of maize in Lubombo (17.2 kgs in the case of food aid beneficiaries) and
would be between 20.8 and 26.0 kgs in Shiselweni. Obviously the additional quantities
would rise with the amount of the transfer and with the number of beneficiaries, as well
as with the number of distributions in the case of interventions protracted over time. For
instance, assuming a caseload of 5,000 households – corresponding approximately to
30,000 individuals – equally distributed between the two focus areas considered for this
study, with each household receiving a monthly cash transfer of 300 SZL for six
months, the additional quantities of maize demanded over a period of six months would
vary between 1,116 and 1,260 MTs in Lubombo and between 936 and 1,170 MTs in
Shiselweni. Such estimates are, of course, based on the assumption of constant prices,
and more realistically can be considered as the maximum increase in possible additional
quantity demanded.
79 Such an assumption is reasonable in view of the high share of total food demand covered by maize.
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At this stage, we can make use of the multipliers estimated for the various categories of
traders in Table 5.12 to simulate the expandability of supply. In this case we need an
estimate of the normal market supply. For such a purpose we assume that the quantity
purchased by the households in normal conditions is the average quantity which
corresponds to the equilibrium price. This quantity also corresponds to the average
tonnage handled by the various suppliers and traders in normal conditions. Therefore,
on the assumption of supply-demand equilibrium, we can estimate the quantities from
the HEA baseline. Converting the quantities of all food commodities into maize and,
more generally, into cereal equivalent, and multiplying the daily individual purchase of
the different wealth groups by their estimated number in each focus area, the aggregated
supply-demand equilibrium quantity over a period of six months can be estimated at
around 1,254 MTs in the case of Lubombo LMC and 647 MTs in Shiselweni TH. Such
amounts were arbitrarily split among the various business sizes on the basis of the
estimates provided in Table 5.10 and constitute the basis for the analysis of
expandability of supply.
Table 5.16 provides the results of the simulation exercise. In the case of Lubombo a
price increase estimated approximately between 2% and 6% should be able to generate
the increase in marketed supply expected through the injection of cash (300 SZL per
household per month over a period of six months). In Shiselweni the required price
increase would be higher, around 10%; this is a reflection of the weaker supply capacity
in the area.80 In both cases an increased reliance on very large traders based outside the
focus areas would contain the estimated rates of price increase.
80 As described earlier on, in Shiselweni the food trade structure essentially relies on small and medium
size business, and there is limited reliance on large and extra large traders based outside the area.
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Table 5.16     Expandability of food supply
Lubombo
Rate of price increase additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative
0% 25 151 93 595 934 5950 102 729 1052 6695
1% 26 151 96 598 963 5979 108 735 1085 6728
2% 26 152 99 601 993 6009 113 740 1118 6761
3% 27 152 102 604 1022 6038 119 746 1151 6794
4% 27 153 105 607 1052 6068 124 751 1184 6827
5% 28 153 108 610 1081 6097 130 757 1217 6860
6% 30 156 119 620 1183 6199 145 772 1332 6975
7% 32 158 129 630 1286 6302 160 787 1447 7090
8% 35 160 139 641 1388 6404 175 802 1562 7205
9% 37 162 149 651 1491 6507 190 817 1677 7320
10% 39 165 159 661 1593 6609 205 832 1792 7435
Shiselweni
Rate of price increase additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative
0% 130 777 421 2685 30 192 26 188 581 3654
1% 133 780 435 2699 31 193 28 190 598 3671
2% 135 782 448 2713 32 194 29 191 616 3689
3% 138 785 462 2726 33 195 31 192 633 3706
4% 141 788 476 2740 34 196 32 194 651 3724
5% 144 791 489 2754 35 197 33 195 668 3741
6% 156 803 535 2800 38 200 37 199 729 3802
7% 167 814 582 2846 41 203 41 203 790 3863
8% 179 826 628 2892 45 207 45 207 851 3925
9% 190 837 674 2938 48 210 49 211 912 3986
10% 202 849 720 2984 51 213 53 215 973 4047
627 6270
Traders category
Small Medium Large Extra - Large TOT
Normal Food Supply 125 502 5016
Expandability
Traders category
Small Medium Large Extra - Large
Expandability
TOT
Normal Food Supply 647 2265 162 162 3235
Source: Author’s estimates
5.5.3 Amount of cash transfer
As estimated in Table 5.9, the amount required on a monthly basis to purchase on the
local market an amount of food equivalent to the nutritional contribution provided by
the ongoing food aid intervention (1,880 kcal per person per day) would range between
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60.8 SZL in the case of Shiselweni TH and an average of 76.4 SZL in the case of
Lubombo LMC. Therefore the overall average for the two focus areas would be almost
70 SZL per person per month. The other categories of expenses can be estimated on the
basis of their share of total expenditure as reported in Table 5.7. On this basis the size of
the cash transfer required to achieve a calorific contribution of 1,880 is indicated in
Table 5.17. Once again, different scenarios were considered according to the different
estimates of income/expenditure elasticities of demand. At a first sight, the estimated
amounts of cash transfer range between 93.8 and 175.5 SZL per person per month. This
range is remarkably reduced if we ignore the case of food aid beneficiaries in Lubombo.
The high value recorded in their case is useful to consider the lower comparative value
of the cash transfer when provided in addition to food aid rather than in its – partial or
full – replacement. In fact, the wide difference in the size of cash transfers required to
achieve the same calorific transfer for the two groups in LCM (beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of food aid) shows how much more efficient it is to target the cash to non-
beneficiaries of food aid, or anyway not to provide it in addition to a parallel food aid
transfer. As a result, the estimated size of the cash transfer would range between 111
and 125 SZL for Lubombo LCM and between 94 and 118 SZL for Shiselweni TH.
Despite the slightly higher values estimated for Lubombo, the partial overlap between
the two ranges leads to consider reasonable a unique range for both cases. This is
particularly valuable for its operational implications. From this perspective and in a
certain arbitrary way, the average value of the two extremes, corresponding to 110 SZL,
can be considered a good approximation of the size of cash transfer that would allow an
average transfer of 1,880 kcal. As mentioned above, such amount is not supposed to be
additional to the provision of food aid. If for any reason the same person were to be
targeted with food aid and cash, the cash transfer should be reduced and provided as
replacement for an equivalent quantity of commodities. Such equivalence is both
economic and nutritional. For instance half of the food aid ration could be replaced with
half of the proposed amount of cash (55 SZL).
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Table 5.17 Estimated amount of cash transfer and foreseen distribution by
category of expenditure
Amount kcal
of transfer food assets debts school fees medical non food other purchased
(SZL per month)
Elasticity of demand based on HH survey
Lubombo LCM non-beneficiaries 124.6 77.8 4.0 1.8 8.2 6.8 11.3 14.8 1880
Lubombo LCM beneficiaries 175.5 75.2 18.2 10.3 18.8 13.9 13.5 25.7 1880
Shiselweni TH 93.8 60.8 4.4 1.7 4.2 3.2 6.8 12.8 1880
Elasticity of demand based on HEA
Lubombo LCM 110.9 77.8 1880
Shiselweni TH 118.2 60.8 1880
Amount of transfer spent on
(SZL per month)
Source: Author’s estimates
Along the example made above, we can try to estimate the inflationary impact which
can be expected from a six-month intervention with a caseload of 5,000 households –
corresponding approximately to 30,000 individuals – equally distributed between the
two focus areas. We can consider the proposed individual monthly transfer of 110 SZL
in both of the proposed intervention areas. As above, we make the simplifying
assumption that all additional demand for food is covered by maize. The additional
quantities of maize demanded over a period of six months would be around 2,800 MTs
in Lubombo and 2,189 MTs in Shiselweni. Such estimates are, of course, based on the
assumption of constant prices and more realistically can be considered as the maximum
increase in possible additional quantity demanded.
From Table 5.10 we can relate such quantities to estimated market capacity and
expandability of supply to estimate the inflationary consequences of the intervention. In
the case of Lubombo LCM the estimated price increase would be in the range of 10%,
while in the case of Shiselweni, characterized by a weaker trading structure, the price
increase is expected to go well beyond 10%. From this perspective, a smaller size,
possibly characterized by a combination of commodities and cash would be advisable.
In particular, a cash transfer of 55 SZL, combined with a half-ration of food aid, is
expected to contain the price increase to around 6-7% in Shiselweni and 5% in
Lubombo and therefore is considered more appropriate.
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It is worth considering how the price increase estimated above has a localized nature
and is additional to any “imported” inflation. Proper comparative analysis of import
parity prices versus local market prices at different proximity from the areas of cash
intervention was seen as the most appropriate way to assess the nature of any eventual
price rise. The relevance of some markets in the areas of the proposed cash intervention
makes their monitoring particularly interesting to try to capture early signs of price
changes as well as to try to distinguish the share of an eventual price rise determined by
what can be called “imported inflation” from the direct and indirect impact of an
eventual localized price injection. An eventual widening gap between the rates of price
increase in reference markets such as Nhlangano, Bigbend and Mbabane during the
period of cash intervention and its immediate aftermath could be used to measure the
inflationary consequence of the localized cash injection. If such gap in comparative
market price changes were to exceed alarming rates, it should be seriously considered
scaling down the cash intervention and its replacement through a commodity-only
intervention. There are no set rules at this regard, even in view of the reported different
market structure in the two proposed areas of intervention. As a benchmark, in this case
such alarming rates were identified around 15-20%.81
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the relevance of market capacity and functioning for food
security and related issues in Swaziland with particular reference to two areas of the
country: Lubombo LMC and Shiselweni TH. The aim of the study was to assess the
feasibility of a cash transfer strategy in response to the widespread households’ income
81 It is worth repeating that the proposed benchmark (15-20%) does not represent a measure of price
increase, but refers to the difference between price increase recorded in key reference markets in the
proximity of the proposed project areas (Nhlangano and Bigbend) versus the price increase recorded in
other reference markets, such as Mbabane. It is assumed that price changes in Mbabane would be
essentially linked to “imported inflation” and therefore the proposed method should help to isolate the
eventual inflationary impact of cash injection.
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deficit determined by harvest failure. The study led to the following conclusions and
recommendations.
The initial part of the analysis considered the use that beneficiaries would make of a
cash transfer. It was found that most recipients of cash transfers would spend a decent
portion of the funds received on food, with some expenditure on essential non-food
items and other services. The share spent on food is foreseen as ranging between 52%
and 70% of the cash transfer received by the poor and very poor strata of the population
in Lubombo LMC and Shiselweni TH, respectively. As expected, this share was
reduced to approximately 43% in the case of beneficiaries of food aid in Lubombo
LMC area, which highlights a reduced interest in food and a general increase in interest
in other categories of expenditure.
The preferences expressed by the sample regarding their potential use of the resources
received were used to attempt a comparative analysis of calorific contribution provided
by food and by cash. Interestingly, this revealed an added value transferred to the
beneficiaries through the provision of assistance in the form of cash. On average, a
recipient of a cash transfer was expected ceteris paribus to be able to purchase the same
number of kilocalories that s/he would receive through food aid by spending on food
purchase the equivalent of 85.8% of the market value of the food commodities received.
In other words, a cash-based strategy was found able to provide a comparative
advantage: an additional component, equivalent to 14.2% of the cash transfer, which
would be available to the beneficiary to purchase additional commodities or for
additional expenses.
Despite the latest point above, a general preference for in-kind assistance was expressed
by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of food assistance interventions ongoing at
the time of the fieldwork. The motivations provided by the households for such support
should be considered in light of an almost absolute lack of experience with cash
distributions in the country by then. Very likely, their luck of confidence was
compounded by the commonly perceived deficiencies in targeting food assistance which
did not help to increase their confidence that cash assistance would be better targeted.
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A second part of the chapter tackled the analysis from the supply side to assess traders’
capacity to respond to an eventual increased demand for food. A profiling of the traders
involved in food commerce in the focus areas and the neighbouring areas was carried
out to analyze the feasibility of an increase in trade inflow in the two focus areas.
General confidence was reported by the traders in their capacity to access the additional
commodities required as well as the additional financial resources.
As expected, the analysis highlighted the major role played by price levels in balancing
demand and supply. Some critical constraints to market functioning quoted by traders,
such as lack of purchasing capacity and the existing excessive supply, confirm the
relevance of prices and, more in general, of market functioning in traders’ everyday
decision making process. The overriding emphasis on price as the key determinant for
traders suggested that market was responsive. The relevance of the price factor as
determinant of traders’ willingness and capacity to scale-up business size was used to
estimate the elasticity of food supply. The analysis of traders’ willingness to intervene
in response to price increases highlighted the relevance of extra-large traders in the
national market. The analysis showed that a few at the top of the market chain play a
key role in responding to increasing demand for volume (mostly by importing) and do
not necessarily need price increases to achieve this. This is important in view of the
quantities that they are able to handle in normal conditions and the fact that they are the
main importers of all food commodities, with the exception of maize. In other words,
not only do they have the capacity to scale up their tonnage, but they also seem to be
ready to do so in response to an increase in effective demand, even without the need of a
price increase. However, large-size traders were not present in the focus areas and their
relevance in terms of direct source of supply to final customers was quite limited,
particularly in the case of TH Shiselweni. The weaker trading capacity at local level
compared to central level was associated to a slightly higher risk of a moderate price
increase.
On more general grounds, the political implications of the conditions of market control
exercised by the NMC are seen as a major constraint to the free flow of commodities.
The removal of such a constraint would be reasonably expected to improve the free
functioning of the market forces and to facilitate the quick adaptation of quantities
imported in response to an increase in domestic demand, as in the case examined.
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In the final part of the chapter, elasticities of demand and supply were combined to
simulate intervention strategies. In particular, the possibility of a cash injection into the
system through the provision of cash transfers to households was simulated and the
likely rate of price increase was estimated accordingly. A cash transfer of 110 SZL was
estimated as a good approximation of the amount that would allow an average transfer
of 1,880 kcal, equivalent to the caloric contribution provided by food aid programmes at
that time.
In order to estimate the price increase expected from the cash injection an overall
caseload of 5,000 households was considered. Higher caseloads were not considered
because the induced additional demand was expected to lead to higher price rises. For a
caseload of 5,000 households, corresponding to approximately 30,000 people, equally
split between the two proposed intervention areas, a monthly cash transfer of 110 SZL
per person for a period of six months was estimated to lead to 10% price increase in
Lubombo and higher in Shiselweni. As an alternative option, a combination of
commodities and cash would be preferable because this would be associated with lower
price increases. The optimum size of cash transfer was estimated as around 55 SZL
combined with a half-ration of food aid. This was expected to contain the price increase
to around 6-7% in Shiselweni and 5% in Lubombo.
It is worth considering how the price rise mentioned above has a localized nature and
was additional to what can be called “imported inflation”. In order to distinguish the
nature of an eventual price change in the areas of market-based interventions it is
necessary to strengthen price monitoring. This would help not only to capture early
signs of price changes, but also to enable a proper comparative analysis of import parity
prices versus local market prices at various distances from the cash intervention areas
and take appropriate corrective measures.
6
Southern Sudan:
Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes
6.1 Background
6.1.1 Introduction
Southern Sudan suffered disproportionately during the years of civil war. In addition to
the remarkable human toll taken by the conflict, the protracted fighting destroyed much
of the existing infrastructure. This has made harder any attempt of rehabilitation and to
launch a process of reprise after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). Having said that, household livelihoods have improved steadily, as confirmed
by various assessments conducted since the CPA. Resettlement activities have returned
among the many previously displaced hence allowing these households to resume their
livelihoods. This has contributed to bolster agricultural production. At the same time
migration to urban areas has increased market dependence leading to increases in
demand for agricultural commodities. As demand has increased so has trade.82
This case study analyzes market functioning and the appropriateness of food aid and
cash transfers in Southern Sudan, as part a rehabilitation strategy after a prolonged
period of civil war.
82 WFP et al., 2008
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The structure of this case study reflects the one adopted in the previous two chapters.
Initially, a general review of the context is provided. The analysis is then focused on
market functioning. Finally, the estimation of supply and demand for food enables the
simulation of intervention strategies.
6.1.2 Agriculture and food production
Agricultural performance during the 2007-08 season was quite good at aggregate level,
confirming the success recorded during the previous season. Two recent assessments,
the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) and the Food and Livelihood
Assessment (ANLA) have helped to provide an estimate. The favourable rainfall
patterns contributed to increasing the estimates of areas cultivated as well as of yields
achieved.83 This was also made possible by increased security and accessibility.84
Figure 6.1 confirms the favourable trend achieved until 2007 in the traditional sector
and the improvements in the mechanized sector compared to the performance of the
previous year. This aggregated perspective, however, masks varying performance at
sub-national level. In particular, in the traditional sector, despite some general
improvements in Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria,85 a big decline in production was
suffered in Upper Nile due to the floods.
83 The quantity of rainfalls, well above average, resulted in a generalized average or better than average
vegetation index throughout Southern Sudan.
84 The CFSAM Report reckons that these factors have contributed to increasing the size of cultivated
areas (estimated at 1.01 ha). For instance, in the productive Eastern Equatoria improvements to the road
network and a reduction in hostilities have been determinant in allowing farming on more-distant fields.
85 With the exception of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Central Equatoria, where mild reductions in
production over the previous year have been recorded.
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The net estimate of 859,000 MTs of cereal production achieved by the traditional sector
was estimated after taking into account the impact of floods which destroyed
approximately 60,000 MTs. 86 In addition, this estimate takes into account the activities
of approximately 130,000 assisted returnees, but does not consider the activities of
spontaneous returnees (around 1,100,000 of IDPs and refugees), whose capacity to farm
was expected to be low. In the production of the mechanized sector, estimated by
CFSAM at 159,000 MTs, cereal production achieved results in excess of the estimated
requirements, even after including in the equation an assumed 10% rate of
harvest/storage losses.87
86 It is worth considering the regular occurrence of floods in parts of Southern Sudan. To get a full
account of the consequences of the floods it would be necessary to take into account also the secondary
beneficial effects of the floods, such as increased fish availability, replenishment of soil fertility through
siltation of flooded areas, and extended period for recessional farming.
87 As regular practice in Southern Sudan, the average per capita cereal consumption is assumed to be 85
kg per year (ranging between 60 and 120, according to location). This is based on food economy
estimates carried out since the late 1980s and adjusted upwards by the CFSAM in 2003. The balance is
made up of non-cereal products, animal products, and wild food.
 Figure 6.1 Evolution of cereal production
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6.1.2.1 Agricultural inputs
Agricultural performance is strictly linked to availability and use of inputs. Despite the
reported increase in average farm size, a lot of potential remains unexploited. FAO has
estimated that the use of animal traction could help to more than double the cultivated
areas, though such input is recognized as unaffordable for many farmers. Such access
problems, in addition to problems of availability of spare parts, are seen as major
constraints in the uptake of the technology. The problem of availability of and access to
inputs was aggravated by the large-scale movement of returnees. Besides the likely
affordability constraints, it is unlikely that local markets can respond to the increased
demand for seeds and tools.
6.1.3 Agricultural marketing
The positive agricultural performance is reflected in the market. The evolution of
sorghum market prices during 2006 and the first three quarters of 2007 had a clear
decreasing trend reflecting the good supply situation: i.e. the good performance
experienced in 2006-07 and the expectation of good performance during the 2007-08
marketing year. This was mirrored by the increasing trend of livestock prices,
confirming a phase of improving terms of trade. Such patterns were common
throughout Southern Sudan and provides and important signal of reducing of the
prevalent regional fragmentation of the market. In fact, though a proper analysis of
market integration in Southern Sudan has not yet been conducted, it is expected that a
combination of factors (among which the most relevant are: more than two decades of
conflict and insecurity, the poor quality of transport routes and in general of physical
infrastructure with consequent high transport costs, the presence of formal and informal
taxation systems) would drastically reduce the movement of grains, as well as other
goods, from surplus areas to areas of deficit. As well-expressed by the CFSAM Report,
“… Although some movements of surpluses between adjacent zones will occur through
the activities of the petty traders, who move from state to state by bicycle and motor-
cycle, neither the physical infrastructure nor the trading patterns yet exist that will
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enable the movement of large quantities of surpluses necessary to meet the estimated
deficits in Equatoria to Upper Nile, Unity, Jongley, or Bahr-el-Ghazal. … Large
sorghum prices in Renk may have influenced the prices in Upper Nile. Maize meal
imports from Uganda into Juba, at an estimated 10,000 MTs per annum, are very likely
to have influenced cereal prices in Juba and elsewhere in Central Equatoria.” 88
From the perspective of such fragmented markets, each market is to be considered as a
reality on its own and the protracted co-existence of similar price trends is a clear
indication of a generalized positive performance achieved. From this perspective it can
be reasonably expected that the decreasing trend in cereal prices would be further
strengthened along a certain convergence among the various markets if the degree of
integration were to increase with consequent more rational allocation of surpluses.
6.1.4 Livelihoods
As expected, the 2007 Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment highlighted a
substantial improvement in livelihoods since the signing of the CPA. This is in line with
the findings of previous similar exercises and indicates the ongoing process of
livelihoods improvement.
6.1.5 Food Consumption
On the basis of both frequency and quality of food consumption it was estimated that
around 18% of households in Southern Sudan can be classified as falling under the poor
consumption group, 25% can be considered borderline and the remaining 57% fall in
the good food consumption group.89 The geographical distribution of the different
88 CFSAM 2008, pag.28 and pag.30
89 The analysis was conducted with reference to the threshold of an individual daily consumption of 2,100
kcals. While this reflects accepted international standards, it is to be considered that an analysis more
reflective of the actual average consumption (unknown for Southern Sudan, but reasonably expected to be
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groups is presented in Figure 6.2. The highest share of the poor food consumption group
was found in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile and the lowest share in Northern
Bahr el Ghazal.
Subsequently, through an arbitrary choice, the poor and borderline food consumption
groups were merged and used to identify, as proxy, the food insecure group. 90 Figure
6.3 presents the geographical distribution of the derived food insecure group. The
highest concentrations are found in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Gahzal,
Western Bahr el Gahzal and Warab. The ANLA remarks how the distribution of the
food insecure group follows the patterns of the areas affected by floods and by localized
insecurity. This is supported by another finding by ANLA: the percentage of households
that did not manage to cultivate even for one season, which is in fact higher in the states
identified above as affected by the higher proportion of people vulnerable to food
insecurity. Finally, in terms of residency status, the analysis conducted by ANLA does
not find a significant difference between the prevalence of household vulnerable to food
below the standard adopted in this case) would arrive at lower estimates of the poor food consumption
group than the ones estimated in this case.
90 While the need to proceed to an integration of two groups is understood, such a process inevitably loses
the capacity to maintain a focus on the poorest food consumption group in the proceedings of the
analysis.
 Figure 6.2     Food consumption groups by State
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World Food Programme, South Sudan
VAM Unit, September 2007
insecurity (as estimated though the analysis of food consumption) of returnees and
residents. For both groups the prevalence of vulnerable households is estimated at
slightly more than 40%. This is quite relevant, particularly in view of its programmatic
implications. At the same time, the analysis estimates a significantly higher prevalence
(60%) of vulnerable households among the Internally Displaced People (IDP). In other
words, according to the findings of such analysis, while there is the same probability
that a resident and a returnee may be in conditions of vulnerability to food insecurity,
such probability results to be 50% higher in the case of an IDP.
6.1.6 Coping with shocks and food insecurity
According to the ANLA analysis, the highest proportion of households with lowest
resilience which had to resort to worst coping strategies was found in Jongley and
Upper Nile. With the exclusions of the Equatorias, the lowest – though still a
remarkable 31% – share of households resorting to worst coping strategies are in Unity
Figure 6.3     Distribution of population vulnerable to food insecurity
Source:  ANLA 2007
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State. Such findings support the results presented above through the analysis of food
consumption.
6.1.7 Malnutrition
The nutritional situation has generally improved compared to the conflict period.
However, surveys conducted before this fieldwork indicate that in 8 out of 10 of the
states of Southern Sudan global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates were still above the
emergency threshold of 15%.  They were found particularly high91 in Unity State
(39%), Upper Nile (37%), Western Bahr el Ghazal (35%), and Northern Bahr el Ghazal
(32%). Although each case has its own peculiarities, recent analysis of a robust conflict
and post-conflict dataset seems to show that, in general, many of the cases of
malnutrition were not primarily due to lack of food but rather related to problems with
water and sanitation and, more generally, health. In addition, it is considered that
feeding habits that developed as a result of the long civil war have not evolved into
healthier and more diversified forms of diet, resulting in chronic malnutrition
problems.92 Many of the vulnerable population spoken to did complain about a lack of
food and that they had not received any food deliveries from WFP in two years, but this
is rather a manifestation of the perseverance of a dependency attitude despite the
appropriate scaling down of food aid intervention.
Figure 6.4 reports the GAM rates estimated from surveys carried out between Jan 2007
and March 2008. From a general perspective it is possible to identify the typical
sinusoidal curve which reflects seasonal changes. On the basis of Figure 6.4, it seems,
in general terms, that a certain range (approximately between 10% and 25% on a
seasonality basis) can be pragmatically considered normal in Southern Sudan.
91 Figures: courtesy of UNICEF.
92 See: CARE, 2007
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6.1.8 Response
6.1.8.1 Food aid
By the time of the fieldwork, Sudan was still WFP’s largest humanitarian operation
aiming to provide food assistance to 5.6 million people throughout the country. Since
2006 the various WFP interventions have been combined into one EMOP in order to
increase flexibility in resource allocation and ultimately improve performance. Despite
the fact that such a combination is indeed helpful in adapting resource allocation
reasonably quickly to changing priorities dictated by accessibility problems due to
security, environmental and infrastructural constraints, it does not necessarily help with
a review of its different components. According to initial plans, the share of the
operation which refers to the South Sudan component varies between 16% of total
tonnage and 25% of total beneficiaries. This point, combined with the different standard
ration provided in the South and balanced by a higher unit of transport-related costs,
Figure 6.4 Global Acute Malnutrition rates during 2007 and 2008
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Figure 6.5    EMOP components
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leads to estimation the share of the EMOP budget associated with the South Sudan
component around approximately one fifth.93
Four components can be identified
within the structure of the EMOP in the
South (saving life, livelihood support,
nutritional programmes, education),
with a prevalence of livelihood support
which is typical of a rehabilitation
approach. As appreciated through the
field visits, WFP’s attempt to adapt
programming strategies to the changing
environment towards a more
rehabilitative approach is quite
appreciated.
Benefiting from continued favourable agricultural performance, WFP had planned to
procure 150,000 MTs in North Sudan, while efforts to carry out local purchase in the
South were constrained by the prevalence of small-size farming and trading.
6.1.8.2 Food aid versus food production
Based on the strong agricultural potentialities in Southern Sudan, FAO has been
advocating more support for food production programmes. Their programme is
organized in three components focusing on restoration of agricultural production,
promotion of appropriate agricultural technologies and enhancing coordination in the
food security sector.
Twenty years of continuous food aid has not been a very imaginative or sustainable
strategy or use of funding, and it is debatable whether it has, in the long run, improved
the overall humanitarian situation, having created a major dependency culture that will
93 The net energy contribution of the food ration provided by the EMOP in the South was 1,789 kcal
versus the 2,006 kcal provided in Darfur.
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be difficult to wean the vulnerable population away from.  Nevertheless, a) the priority
in the years of the war was to save lives, and b) nowadays when stability allows a more
sustainable approach, there is need for major interventions to stimulate food supply by
strengthening both food production and marketing. FAO is keen to promote food
production through the introduction of simple technology for improving farming, and in
this respect ox-plough technology would play a major role. On the contrary, the
priorities of GoSS are in support of large scale mechanized farming, good strategy but
which raises wider problems of sustainability. Despite some major discussion going on
this critical issue, in view of the focus of this study, we turn now towards a market
perspective.
6.2 Market analysis
6.2.1 Rationale and scope of the analysis
Trade and exchange provide a relevant source of household food consumption. The
ANLA report estimates that such a source covers between 35% and 46% of the food
needs of different food consumption groups (i.e. 46% for the poor food consumption
group, 35% for the borderline group, and 40% for the good food consumption group).
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the progressive improvement recorded in terms of
market stability since the CPA as well as the synergic process established between the
process of economic growth and the development of trade highlight the need to promote
all strategies which support, directly and/or indirectly, the improvement of market
functionality. With this background, the aim of this part of the study is to consider
market functionality and the feasibility and appropriateness of cash-based interventions
in Southern Sudan. In particular, the study is focused on the food market in general and
cereals in particular. The analysis is conducted from an economic perspective and is
restricted to two geographical areas, characterized by similar agro-ecological and
livelihood systems.
Southern Sudan: Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
173
6.2.2 Methodology
The initial part of this study focuses on the analysis of food market prices and tries to
assess the degree of functionality of the local food market. In particular, it tries to assess
the degree of trade interconnection among the various areas of Southern Sudan as well
as between the local market and the global markets.
As part of the study, fieldwork was conducted in February and March 2008. In
particular, a household survey and a traders’ survey were conducted throughout the
focus areas. The aim of such activities was to capture some characteristics of the
demand and supply of food and arrive to an estimate of their elasticities.
The household survey covered a sample of 557 units: 248 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal
(NBeG) and 309 in Lakes, respectively. The sampling framework was stratified, with
households and enumeration areas selected randomly. In NBeG 26% of the households
in the sample were found to be among the beneficiaries of food aid intervention, while
in Lakes the share was 19%.
The traders’ survey covered a sample of 235 units, 150 based and/or operational in
NBeG and 223 in Lakes.
The methodology applied in the different parts of the analysis follows the one presented
in chapter 3.
6.2.3 Market prices
Figure 6.6 presents the evolution of sorghum prices in four major markets (Aweil, Juba,
Malakal, Wau) in comparison with the evolution on the US market, taken as proxy for
the global market. The short duration of the time span covered (six months) is a major
limitation to the current analysis; having said it has been done full use of data available
and it was decided to limit the timeframe to the period after the CPA for reasons of data
homogeneity.
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Figure 6.6 Evolution of sorghum prices on selected markets
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In a comparative perspective it is worth noting:
 The remarkable gap between the price on the various local markets and the
international market. By the end of the period considered, local prices were
more than double those on the international market. While such a gap can be
partly explained by the sum of all costs involved in the hypothetical
movement of the commodity from the international market to local markets,
not enough information was available to estimate the respective Import
Parity Prices.
 After a decrease in 2006 and the first half of 2007 (not in the figure), a
certain tendency to increase can be spotted in most price series. Such
tendency towards a price rise leads to a certain convergence towards the
higher values recorded.94
94 The highest price is found in Juba. This is probably a reflection of the major urban and economic
centre. At the same time, Juba registers the lowest price increase among the four markets considered. This
is probably a reflection of: a) the reduced relevance of sorghum as staple food, b) the different source
pattern (mainly from Uganda and Kenya, contrary to the other markets considered where sorghum trade
proceeds from the North); c) the strong financial inflow experienced in Juba since the CPA.
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 On the basis of the timing of the price rise mentioned above, two groups can
be identified: Aweil and Juba on one side, and Malakal and Wau on the
other.
6.2.4 Market integration
The purposes and methodology of this part of the analysis are described in section 3.2.4.
6.2.4.1 Findings
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is applied to test the condition of
stationarity of each price series. In a second step, the ADF test is to be applied to the
series of residuals ut of the two initial time series. Finally, the analysis of the Error
Correction Mechanism (ECM) manages to estimates the various relevant aspects of
price transmission. Results are reported in Table A6 and Table A7 in Annex 2.
Table A6 shows that all price series are integrated of order 1: I(1). Table A7 reports
different aspects of price transmission such as the magnitude of long-run and short-run
adjustment to price changes and the speed of adjustment. Summary results of price
transmission are reported in Table 6.1. Such results reflect different aspects of market
integration. In particular, they inform about the magnitude of adjustment as the short-
run effect of price changes (2), the speed of adjustment (3), and the magnitude of
adjustment as the long-run effect (). A few disaggregated data are in Table A3 in
Annex 2.
Table 6.1  Market price transmission: magnitude and speed of adjustment
2 2 3 h 2 / h 2 2 3 h 2 / h
NBeG 0.566 … 0.441 1.061 0.534 0.747 0.578 … 1.212 0.616
internal external
Source: Author’s estimates
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Within the few markets considered, a significant degree of integration is found only
among Aweil, Juba, Malakal and US as proxy for the international market. Therefore,
the findings provided by this type of analysis are rather limited and need to be
considered with caution.
All in all, results show that the markets most exposed globally are Juba, Aweil and
Malakal.95 In the short run Aweil is the most sensitive to changes of the global market
prices, while in the long-run Juba seems to be more integrated. At the local level, results
are even sparser and report the existence of a significant relationship only between
Aweil and Malakal.
Overall, Aweil appears to be the most relevant predictor of market signals among the
markets considered in this case study and, therefore, monitoring price evolution on such
a market can provide useful and early signals of price changes in the country, both in
response to price changes on the domestic market and on the global market. Such a
contribution can be very useful in monitoring the effect of any eventual cash
intervention: price monitoring can help not only to capture early signs of price changes,
but also to distinguish the share of an eventual price rise determined by what can be
called “imported inflation” from the direct and indirect impact of an eventual cash
injection.
6.3 The demand for food
The aim of this part of the analysis is to improve our knowledge of consumer behaviour
with a particular focus on the demand for food. From this perspective this part of the
analysis essentially tries to estimate the elasticity of demand for food.
Two datasets were used:
95 Although, as reported in Table A3, the granger test detected a link with bi-directional causality between
US and Aweil, it is reasonable to assume that the US market, as proxy for the global market, is dominant
and the relationship can, therefore, be considered uni-directional.
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c) one collected by various organizations over time and consolidated with the
establishment of the Household Economy Assessment (HEA) baseline,
updated in 2007;
d) one collected through a household survey conducted ad hoc for the present
study with the major aim of assessing household preferences and any
comparative advantages between cash-based and commodity-based
assistance.
6.3.1 Estimation of demand elasticity through Household
Economy data
While a full presentation of the household economy background and characteristics in
the different livelihood zones in Southern Sudan can be found in the HEA baseline
report,96 Table 6.2 provides the key information required to start the analysis. It is
limited to the two livelihood zones which are the focus of the present study: the Western
Flood Plains North (WFP-N) here identified more generally as NBeG, and the Western
Flood Plains South (WFP-S) here identified more generally as Lakes.
Table 6.2 Household expenditure and relevance of food consumption
Very Poor Poor Middle Better Off Very Poor Poor Middle Better Off
Expenditures SDG 304 315 304 316
Food share of total expenditures % 100.0 88.9 25.7 8.7 100.0 80.1 36.1 8.7
Kcal consumed kcal 2100 2100 2100 2310 2100 2100 2100 2394
Kcal purchased as % Kcal consumed % 22.0 18.0 10.0 4.5 22.0 16.0 15.0 4.4
Kcal purchased as % of 2100 Kcal % 22.0 18.0 10.0 5.0 22.0 16.0 15.0 5.0
662 1159 662 1158
NBeG Lakes
Source: Author’s estimates based on LAF Household Economy Assessment Baseline
96 See Muchomba, Sharp (2007)
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As expected, estimates of expenditure by the different groups, as well as the wide gap in
terms of share of expenditure on food purchase, reflect a concentrated distribution of
wealth. The estimate of kcal consumed by the poorest group may be overestimated. It is
interesting to consider the different relevance of purchase – and in general external
sources – for different groups: it is much higher for the poorest and most vulnerable
groups.
Because of the structure of the data set used (cross-section of a limited sample) the
application of traditional techniques for the estimation of income elasticity cannot
provide significant results. Therefore, and in line with similar studies, we resorted to
estimating a linear interpolation of the average values of what can be called “effective
demand for food” estimated for each wealth group as the ratio between the market value
of food consumed by the household and the sum of total expenditures plus the market
value of food produced by the household and/or received as food aid. The results of this
approximation are shown in Table 6.3. The results are limited to NBeG, but in view of
the very strong similarities between the two livelihood zones they can also be assumed
to be representative for Lakes.
Table 6.3 Elasticity of demand for food from different wealth groups
Wealth groups Very poor Poor Middle Better Off All
Expenditures 1.52 1.14 0.39 … 0.64
Price (staple only) -1.04 -1.05 -1.26 … -1.08
NBeG
Source: Author’s estimates
In the case of price elasticity, also reported in Table 6.3,97 the demand for food is quite
elastic: a percentage increase in price is expected to determine a (just more than)
proportional decrease in the quantity demanded, which is a reflection of balanced
market conditions.
97 The dataset available through the HEA baseline didn’t allow the estimation of cross-price elasticity.
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6.3.2 Household survey
A survey of 557 households (248 in NBeG and 309 in Lakes, respectively) was
conducted. The sampling framework was stratified, with households and enumeration
areas selected randomly. The condition of benefitting of any programme of assistance
was not included as a selection criterion.98 In NBeG 26% of the households in the
sample were among the beneficiaries of food aid intervention and 19% in Lakes State.
A first information achieved through the survey regards the prospective use of
assistance eventually provided in the form of cash. In particular, non-beneficiaries were
asked about how they would use an amount of 200 SDG if it was provided to them as
cash free of charge. Such an amount was estimated a priori as roughly equivalent to the
monthly cost of food required for an average household in addition to a relatively small
amount to cover other basic non-food expenditures. Beneficiaries of food aid were
presented with a double task: they were asked to estimate the monetary value of the
food commodities received through the latest distribution and to consider the alternative
use they would make of such an amount if they had the chance to do so. Finally, all
interviewees were asked their preference among value-equivalent forms of assistance:
food, cash, half and half.
Table 6.4 reports the interviewees’ preferred repartition of an eventual cash assistance
or cash-equivalent of food assistance. It is interesting to consider the gap between the
average share which would be spent on the purchase of food in the two areas. First of
all, such share is on average higher in NBeG than in Lakes. In general, this seems to
reflect the higher availability of and stronger access to food in NBeG. However, such an
interpretation seems to be rather contrary to expectations, mainly in view of the security
problems along the northern border reported during the few months before the survey.
Such security problems may have affected the traditional commercial flows from the
North and are said have consequently determined a certain price increase, particularly in
98 It is worth considering that the condition of being beneficiary or non beneficiary identifies two
different populations, as reflected in the underlying eligibility and selection criteria defining different
degree of need for assistance.
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the northern part of NBeG. The comparison between residents and IDPs/returnees
provides interesting results in the case of NBeG, with the latter group willing to spend
less on the purchase of food than the residents. This is somehow expected and is
interpretable as the result of effective targeting of ongoing food aid interventions. Such
interpretation is supported by the allocation reported by food aid beneficiaries – on
average 49.8% of the transfer spent on food purchase – the lowest among all the groups
considered. The data from Rumbek are more difficult to interpret, with the
IDPs/returnees willing to allocate a higher share of the theoretical transfer to the
purchase of food than the residents. Such a result could be interpreted as the
consequence of poor targeting of food aid in that area, and this interpretation would be
supported by the significant differential between the preference reported by the group of
IDPs/returnees who had been in the area for more than one year compared to those who
had been there for less than a year. Having said that, the consideration that the food aid
beneficiaries group would allocate most of the cash transfer to the purchase of food
seems excessive and is more difficult to interpret.
Table 6.4 Use of cash
food assets debts school fees medical non food other
NBeG
all 55.1 8.4 5.6 11.3 10.1 7.5 2.0
residents 57.1 7.5 4.8 11.1 9.9 7.7 1.8
IDPs / returnees (< 1 year) 52.3 9.6 6.7 11.6 10.5 7.2 2.1
IDPs / returnees (< 2 years) 52.2 9.9 6.8 11.2 10.2 7.7 2.0
Food aid beneficiaries 49.8 9.3 6.8 11.6 11.4 8.2 2.9
Lakes
all 43.6 13.0 9.0 12.3 10.4 8.5 3.4
residents 39.7 12.5 9.2 14.0 11.9 9.0 3.6
IDPs / returnees (< 1 year) 51.4 13.8 8.7 8.7 7.2 7.3 3.0
IDPs / returnees (< 2 years) 46.5 13.8 9.2 10.6 9.2 8.1 2.7
Food aid beneficiaries 59.8 11.2 7.6 6.9 6.5 6.9 1.0
Source: Author’s estimates
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Table 6.5 presents the preference expressed by the interviewees on the form of the
transfer. As expected, there is a general preference to receive commodities
(approximately half of the sample) and substantial support for a combined transfer (food
and cash), while the explicit preference for cash remains quite limited. The preference
for cash is remarkably higher in Lakes than in NBeG. A review of the motivations
provided by the households for such preferences highlights a certain lack of confidence
in the beneficiaries of their capacity to make proper use of cash. It is difficult to
comment on such lack of confidence since experience with cash distributions in the
country is almost inexistent.
Table 6.5    Preference for food or cash (%)
Food aid Cash Half of both Food aid Cash Half of both Food aid Cash Half of both
All 53.94 11.20 34.85 41.41 23.05 35.55 47.48 17.30 35.21
Beneficiaries 58.06 14.52 27.42 48.00 10.00 42.00 53.57 12.50 33.93
Non beneficiaries 52.51 10.06 37.43 39.81 26.21 33.98 45.71 18.70 35.58
IDPs / Returnees 51.92 12.50 35.58 50.98 10.78 38.24 51.46 11.65 36.89
Residents 55.47 10.22 34.31 33.17 23.41 43.41 42.11 18.13 39.77
NBeG and LakesNBeG Lakes
Source: Author’s estimates
The preferences expressed by the sample about their potential use of the resources
received were used to attempt a comparative analysis of the caloric contribution
provided by food and that by cash. In particular, the share of the potential cash transfer
that households decided to spend on food was split into the various commodities that
would be eventually bought by beneficiaries. This allowed estimation of the nutritional
value – in kilocalories – of the transfer. This part of the analysis is obviously limited to
the case of beneficiaries of food aid in the sample. On average the nutritional
contribution achieved through the simulated purchase of food by the recipients of cash
assistance was rather low compared to that provided through food aid, varying between
44.0% in NBeG and 35.1% in Lakes approximately. Such an estimation is based on the
weak assumption that all the food aid received is consumed and not exchanged by the
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beneficiary to achieve other purposes.99  As a consequence of a combination of factors,
among which, in particular, the relatively high local market prices and rather high share
of the potential cash transfer spent for non-food purposes (mainly in response to a large
series of needs still uncovered or not sufficiently covered), the comparison between the
nutritional value provided by a cash transfer and a commodity-based transfer seems to
be in favour of the latter. In fact, Figure 6.7 helps to show that 1% increase in the share
of cash assistance spent on food corresponds to approximately 0.6% increase in the ratio
between the nutritional contribution generated through the provision of cash compared
to that from food aid. But beyond such an average, Figure 6.7 shows rather different
results in the two cases considered. The effectiveness – and, presumably, the efficiency
as well – of the cash transfer strategy considered here seems be higher in NBeG than in
Lakes: a 1% increase in the share of cash assistance spent on food purchase corresponds
to approximately 0.73% increase in the ratio between the nutritional contribution
obtained through the cash transfer compared to the food basket in NBeG, compared to
only 0.55% in Lakes.
99 A certain degree of exchange of food commodities received as food aid is assumed to occur even in
normal circumstances. A proper assessment of the nutritional – and, in general, economic – consequences
of such exchange in favour of or against the beneficiary’s interests should take account of all major
transactions as well as the relative local market prices at which the transaction occurred. However, for
simplicity, such indirect/secondary uses of the food commodities have been ignored here.
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Figure 6.7 Nutritional contribution of aid: cash versus food
NBeG and Lakes combined
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The last point mentioned above means that, on average, the amount of the cash transfer
should be higher than the 200 SDG per household proposed in the field test for a
beneficiary to be able to purchase the same amount of kilocalories that s/he would
receive through food aid.100 To establish such amounts, the food basket that the
interviewees indicated would be purchased with the hypothetical cash transfer was used
to estimate the food purchasing capacity of one SDG in the different areas and the
different groups considered.101
Table 6.6 Cost of kilocalories
kcal purchased SDG required to purchase SDG required to purchase
with one SDG 1940 kcal 1940 kcal on a daily basis
for one month
average 2061 0.94 28.23
beneficiairies of food aid 1988 0.98 29.28
non beneficiairies of food aid 2078 0.93 28.01
IDPs / returnees 2042 0.95 28.50
residents 2076 0.93 28.04
average 1830 1.06 31.80
beneficiairies of food aid 1851 1.05 31.45
non beneficiairies of food aid 1820 1.07 31.98
IDPs / returnees 1845 1.05 31.55
residents 1819 1.07 32.00
N
B
e
G
L
a
k
e
s
Source: Author’s estimates
100 In this case, the transport costs faced by the cash recipients to go to market to purchase the food and
the transport costs faced by food aid beneficiaries to reach the food distribution point and move the food
aid commodities received are not included in the estimation.
101 The following groups of food commodities were considered: sorghum, maize, maize meal, rice, other
cereals, bread, sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, yam, groundnuts, simsim, other vegetables including
leaves, fruits, fish, meat, poultry, eggs, oil and fat, sugar and sugar products, milk and milk products.
Southern Sudan: Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
185
Figure 6.8 Nutritional contribution obtained through the purchase of food
Source: Author’s estimates
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As shown in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.8, the average number of kilocalories purchased
with one SDG ranges between 1,819 and 2,078. Such a gap reflects the difference in
market prices as well as different preferences for the use of cash expressed by the
interviewees. With reference to the nutritional contribution provided through the food
aid intervention ongoing by the time of fieldwork (1,940 kcal per person per day), the
amount required on a monthly basis for food purchase able to provide the equivalent
amount of calorific contribution would range between 28 SDG in the case of population
non benefiting from food aid in NBeG and 32 SDG in the case of the resident
population in Lakes. Under a more comparable perspective, focusing on the category of
food aid beneficiaries, the required cash transfer would range between 29.3 SDG and
31.5 SDG per person per month in NBeG and Lakes respectively. This seems to
confirm the point raised above on the greater effectiveness, and probably efficiency, of
a cash transfer strategy in NBeG than in Lakes. Such consideration is valid in general
terms and reminds us how intervention strategies should be considered on an ad hoc
basis.
6.4 The supply of food
The good performance presented in the previous section raises a lot of optimism on the
potential role that trade can play in increasing food availability. In order to investigate
such potentialities further it is particularly relevant to provide closer attention to the
category of traders as major players involved in the sector. The aim of this section is to
try to establish the part so far played by the trading sector in responding to the demand
for food, as well as the flexibility of its capacity to expand in response to an eventual
increase in demand.
A survey of 373 traders, 150 based and/or operational in NBeG and 223 in Lakes, was
conducted. The selection process was essentially dictated by geographical and logistic
considerations, with preference given to areas close to major concentrations of IDPs and
returnees. Such a survey is not necessarily representative of the traders in the two focus
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areas; however, it this limitation is balanced by the consideration that the sample size is
remarkably large compared to the assumed traders’ population in the two areas.
The traders’ business size was estimated by considering the value of the two major
commodities traded and assumed to represent approximately half of the entire turnover
eventually achieved by each trader. The estimate derived in this way does not
necessarily reflect the total business size of each trader, but rather the individual size of
their food trade business.102 On this basis, Figure 6.9 illustrates the distribution of
average monthly turnover for the various deciles.
Figure 6.9    Distribution of traders’ business size
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles
NBeG
Lakes
Source: Author’s erstimates
The striking difference between the two distributions is the much higher degree of
concentration in the case of Lakes, signalled by the strong presence of a group of big
traders, a category which seems to be missing in NBeG. A possible explanation can be
found in the different patterns of trade links assumed to be prevalent in the two areas,
which are mainly characterized by stronger links with Ugandan and Kenyan markets in
the case of Lakes, while the markets in NBeG seem to be more under the influence of
markets in North Sudan. For simplicity, all traders in the sample were split into three
102 Information on the composition of trade in terms of food versus non-food was collected through the
survey, however an estimation of the total business size of each trader is not considered relevant for the
purpose of this analysis.
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groups (small, medium, large), with the small and large groups covering the first and
last quarters respectively.
The major objective of this part of the analysis is to assess the feasibility to scale up the
size of businesses as a way to improve overall supply. It is worth noting that 97.5% of
the traders in the sample manifested an interest in increasing their business size, with
the vast majority of those unwilling to do so being in NBeG.103 However, beside
traders’ willingness, two major constraints are the availability of and access to the major
inputs: money and commodities. Figure 6.10 reports traders’ confidence about
accessing such additional key inputs. The general confidence about accessing additional
financial resources is remarkable; such confidence was shared by an amazingly high
78% to 80% of all sizes of business. While such generally strong confidence may seem
unjustified, a possible explanation may be found in the general expectation that the
continued and progressive economic improvement enjoyed since the CPA would
continue and even strengthen further. However, a more cautious approach was reported,
particularly by small-size traders, in terms of accessing additional food commodities. A
very likely interpretation of the large gap may be linked to access to transport capacity,
which, although improving in recent years, still remains for obvious reasons
inaccessible to the category of small traders.
103 Nine traders out of 373 (i.e. eight from NBeG and one from Lakes, approximately 5.3% versus 0.5%
respectively) did not express interest in scaling up their business.
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Figure 6.10 Traders’ confidence about availability of and access to key
inputs
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Having clarified the question of comparative access to critical inputs, attention was
shifted to the analysis of other contextual factors which play a determinant role in
business performance and the decision about the business size. Five such factors were
explicitly included in this analysis – prices, security, accessibility, access to credit,
storage capacity – as well as possible others in order to capture the opinions of the
interviewees. Figure 6.11 helps to identify the main priorities and determinants of
willingness to scale up business in the different categories of traders. Different factors
seem to play a different role in the various size groups. Access to credit and security
seem to be priority concerns for small traders.104 The relevance of price levels for this
group is low, mainly due to their negligible influence on the market in their role of price
takers. For medium traders, the quality of roads and in general accessibility are the
major concern. Any improvement in this direction can be a strong motivation. This is
understandable in view of how they move around in search of best business
104 The varying relevance of access to credit for the different size groups as expressed in Figure 6.11
seems to contradict what is said above. However, while Figure 6.10 focuses on traders’ confidence about
accessing additional credit as a critical input, Figure 6.11 emphasizes the relevance of different factors as
constraints/determinants of an eventual decision to scale up business size by the different size groups.
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opportunities. In their case, price matters and they are willing to face higher security
risks than the other groups. Obviously, to afford all this, particularly the necessary use
of transport, there is a certain need for credit. The patterns of large traders are less
defined and in general all factors considered here are less relevant than for the other two
groups. It is worth considering that one constraint was frequent throughout the sample:
the discouraging pressure of taxation exercised in various forms, both legal and mainly
illegal.
Figure 6.11 Constraints to scaling up business size
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Source: Author’s estimates
Despite the limited relevance of prices as determinants of traders’ decisions to scale up
their business size, as shown in Figure 6.11, traders’ opinions of current price levels
were far from homogeneous. Figure 6.12 shows how such opinions were varied but
tended in general to be distributed in a rather normal way. Such distribution appears to
be more normally shaped in the case of Lakes than in NBeG; this can be interpreted as a
reflection of a more stable market structure in the former case.
Southern Sudan: Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
191
Table 6.7    Average price increase
                    considered favourable to
                    scale up business size
(%)
NBeG 3.69
Lakes 4.36
Source: Author’s estimates
Figure 6.12 Traders’ opinions of market price levels
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Source: Author’s estimates
The average rate of price increase that
traders would consider favourable for their
decision to scale up their business size
ranges between 3.7% and 4.4%, as in
Table 6.7.
From this perspective we focus on the
feasibility of making use of prices as a
factor to increase food supply. In other
words, we make use of the price factor as determinant of the WTT to estimate the
elasticity of food supply.
The values in Table 6.7 were re-estimated by traders’ business size group and their
perception of availability and access to key inputs: cash and food. The following
ordered logit model was used:
iiii foodmoneysizeWTT   (6.1)
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where:
iWTT is the willingness to trade manifested by the ith trader,
isize is the business size of the ith trader,
imoney is the ith trader’s expectation to access cash,
ifood is the ith trader’s expectation to access food commodities.
Table 6.8 presents the results of three different specifications of (6.1). The coefficient of
business size is significant which means that traders’ behaviour in response to price
changes is different among the groups considered. On the contrary, traders’ confidence
in accessing cash is insignificant and is dropped. Specification (C) is used to estimate
probabilities of WTT summarized in Table 6.9.
Table 6.8 Willingness to trade in response to price changes
traders' confidence in accessing cash  (%)
traders' confidence in accessing commodities  (%) *** ***
Ln business size *** *** ***
cut 1
cut 2
N. obs
LR chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
A B C
-0.235
-0.369 -0.397 -0.402
-3.079 -2.778 -2.675
-0.300 0.074 0.174
0.0000 0.0000
1026 1026 1026
0.920 0.832
0.0092 0.0275 0.0267
17.83 53.54 51.86
0.0000
Source: Author’s elaboration
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.13 report the likelihood that different groups of traders may
decide to scale up their business size in response to certain price increases. The possible
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price increases referred to in this study fall within a range which is unexpectedly limited
compared to the previous case studies: between 0% (no increase) and 10%. It can be
assumed that the general process of economic expansion characterized by a trend of
decreasing prices may have an influence in this regard. In this case the price changes do
not refer to a specific commodity, but can be rather generalized with reference to the
combination of major commodities dealt with by each trader interviewed.
Table 6.9 Probability of WTT
0 5 10
small 37.985 52.873 9.142
medium 30.264 57.095 12.641
large 35.712 54.413 9.875
all sizes 30.437 56.710 12.853
rate of price increase  (%)
Source: Table 6.8 specification C
Figure 6.13     Willingness to trade in response to price changes
 Source: Table 6.9
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The evolution of the WTT is quite similar for all groups of traders, characterized by a
good response even in the absence of a price increase and by reaching their maximum
values (around 55%) around a 5% rise in price.105 In this case the level of price increase
required to generate the strongest response reaction results lower than the ones
estimated earlier on in different contexts.
Table 6.10 provides estimates of the inverse elasticity of supply for different
commodities in the two areas considered. Such estimates range between 6.3% and 7.6%
showing a remarkable confidence in responding to even small price changes. Such
elasticities result to be regularly higher in Lakes than in NBeG.
Table 6.10 Inverse elasticity of supply by commodity and area (%)
Sorghum Maize Maize meal Beans Sorghum Maize Maize meal Beans
average 6.51 6.30 6.34 6.25 6.86 6.73 6.59 6.30
weighted average 7.17 6.67 6.51 6.86 7.60 7.60 7.54 6.88
NBeG Lakes
Source: Author’s estimates
6.5 Simulation of cash transfers
Once the elasticities of demand and supply have been estimated, they can be combined
to simulate intervention strategies. Figure 6.14 presents the supply and demand curves
estimated on the basis of the inverse elasticities as measured above. In particular, since
the focus of the intervention is the poorest strata of the population, the demand curves in
Figure 6.14 were estimated on the basis of the average inverse elasticity for very poor
and poor groups. For the sake of consistency, since the elasticity of demand was
estimated only in the case of sorghum (as in Table 6.3), in this case even the supply
curve was limited to the staple food. It is interesting to notice how both demand and
105 See note 53 in chapter 4.
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supply seem to be rather elastic, but with higher elasticity on the demand side. In other
words, both buyers and sellers react to price changes, but this reaction is faster and
stronger on the side of the buyers. This is an important finding, according to which
incapacity to react to price changes seems to be rather dictated by traders’ limited
capacity. In this, the availability of commodities as well as traders’ capacity to access
them (in terms of both financial and physical access) can be assumed to play a relevant
role.
Figure 6.14      Demand and supply curves
Source: Author’s estimates
It is clear that in order to respond coherently to the points raised above, much should be
done to increase food production and marketing. Such interventions would help to
overcome a few of the strongest constraints identified. However, such a case requires
rather long-term measures, which is not the perspective adopted within the framework
of the present analysis. In a shorter term perspective, strategies focusing on the demand
side may seem more appropriate, as well as capable to provide a more targeted
approach. From such a viewpoint, the provision of a cash transfer, particularly to the
most vulnerable groups, is easiest to consider.
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In order to assess the feasibility of inducing an increased food supply through a cash
injection strategy a simulation was carried out. As a first step the increased demand was
estimated. For the elasticity of demand the following scenarios were considered on the
basis of the various estimates provided in the previous parts of this analysis:
 the amount provided through a cash transfer would be entirely spent on food
purchase, as derived from the HEA data and reported in Table 6.3;
 the share of increased expenditure following the cash injection which is
spent on food ranges between 50% and 57% in NBeG for different categories
and ranges between 40% and 60% in Lakes, as derived from the household
survey and reported in Table 6.4.
In addition, we made the simplifying assumption that all additional demand for food is
entirely covered by sorghum, since we did not have a cross-price elasticity of demand106
and therefore we made use of the price elasticities estimated for the staple food.
On such a basis, the additional amount purchased by a household following a cash
transfer of say 100 SDG would vary between 50 and 100 SDG in NBeG. In Lakes the
additional demand would vary between 40 and 100 SDG. In terms of quantities, on the
basis of average market prices the additional demand would range between 40 and 80
kgs of sorghum in NBeG and 32 and 80 kgs in Lakes. Obviously the additional demand
would rise with the amount of the transfer and with the caseload of beneficiaries, as well
as with the number of distributions in case of interventions protracted over time. For
instance, assuming a caseload of 5,000 households to be equally distributed between the
two areas considered for this study, with each household receiving a monthly cash
transfer of 100 SDG for six months, the additional quantities of sorghum demanded
over the period would vary between 1,200 and 2,400 MTs in NBeG and 960 and 2,400
MTs in Lakes. Such estimates are, of course, based on the assumption of constant
prices, and can more realistically be considered the maximum increase in possible
additional quantity demanded.
At this stage we need an estimate of the normal market supply. A series of assumptions
was made, since no reliable estimate of number and capacity of traders operational in
106 Such an assumption seems reasonable in view of the high share of total food demand covered by
sorghum.
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the areas was available. It can be assumed as well that the estimates of quantities and
prices utilized for the analysis reflect a condition of equilibrium and therefore reflect
both demand and supply in normal conditions. Therefore, on the assumption of supply-
demand equilibrium the estimate of supply can be inferred from the estimate of demand
provided through the HEA baseline. Converting the quantities of all food commodities
purchased by all household groups into cereal equivalent and multiplying the daily
individual purchase of the different wealth groups by their estimated number in each
focus area, the aggregated supply-demand equilibrium quantity over a period of six
months can be estimated at around 79,525 MTs in the case of NBeG and 33,559 MTs in
the case of Lakes.107 Such amounts can be taken as rough estimates of the quantities of
food that are exchanged in the markets in the focus areas in normal circumstances over
a period of six months.108 They were arbitrarily split among the various business sizes
on the basis of the distribution presented in Figure 6.9 and constitute the basis for the
analysis of expandability of supply.
107 In the absence of population data per livelihood zone, the recently revised state demographic data were
used (NBeG: 1,377,056; Lakes: 551,050). See WFP VAM South Sudan, Population estimates, 2007.
Though such a solution is recognized as not ideal, the limited divergences in terms of food sources among
the various livelihood zones involved helps to contain the risk of error.
108 Another approximation introduced in this part of the analysis is the seasonality of market exchanges,
which in this case is ignored. It is to be said, however, that the various assumptions and approximations
introduced in this part of the process are not considered to significantly affect the final results. In fact, as
will become evident, the increased quantity demanded as a consequence of a reasonable cash-based
intervention remains quite limited when compared to the amount of total food exchanged in the two areas
covered by the analysis. Such a consideration would stand even if the total amount of food assumed to be
sourced by the households through exchanges were significantly scaled down.
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Table 6.11      WTT multipliers
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Trader category
Small 0.380 0.410 0.439 0.469 0.499 0.529
Medium 0.303 0.356 0.410 0.464 0.517 0.571
Large 0.357 0.395 0.432 0.469 0.507 0.544
Rate of price increase
Source: Author’s estimates
The WTT multipliers provided in Table 6.11 – derived through interpolation of data in
Table 6.8 – were used to assess the expandability of food supply. The multipliers are
arranged by trader category, which helps to take into account the similar relevance of
different business sizes in terms of expandability of supply in response to price changes.
Table 6.12 provides the results of the simulation exercise. With reference to the case
considered above (i.e. provision of a monthly cash transfer of 100 SDG per household
to a caseload of 5,000 households) the required increase in supply induced by the cash
injection seems to be well within the reach of the market system. It is surprising to
consider how a programme on a much bigger scale (i.e. the provision of a monthly
transfer of 200 SDG per household to a caseload of 10,000 households109) seems to be
feasible with no inflationary consequence in either NBeG or Lakes.
109 The additional demand expected to be generated through such intervention would range between 4,780
and 9,600 MTs in NBeG and between 3,811 and 9,600 MTs in Lakes.
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Table 6.12 Expandability of food supply
NBeG
Expandability of Food Market Supply
Rate of price increase additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative
0% 9062 32920 12034 51796 5680 21585 26776 106301
1% 9773 33630 14168 53930 6275 22180 30215 109740
2% 10483 34341 16301 56064 6870 22775 33654 113179
3% 11193 35051 18435 58197 7465 23370 37093 116618
4% 11904 35761 20569 60331 8059 23964 40532 120057
5% 12614 36472 22702 62465 8654 24559 43971 123496
Lakes
Expandability of Food Market Supply
Rate of price increase additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative additional cumulative
0% 3824 13892 6094 26229 1198 4554 11117 44676
1% 4124 14192 7174 27310 1324 4680 12622 46181
2% 4424 14491 8255 28390 1449 4805 14128 47687
3% 4724 14791 9335 29471 1575 4931 15634 49193
4% 5023 15091 10416 30551 1701 5056 17140 50699
5% 5323 15391 11496 31632 1826 5182 18645 52204
79525
Small Medium Large TOT
33559
Small Medium Large TOT
Traders category
Traders category
Normal Food Market Exchange during
six months 10068 20135 3356
Normal Food Market Exchange during
six months 23858 39763 15905
Source: Author’s estimates
As estimated in Table 6.6, the sum required on a monthly basis to purchase on the local
market an amount of food equivalent to the nutritional contribution provided by the
ongoing food aid intervention (1,940 kcal per person per day in the case of General
Food Distribution) would be on average 28.2 SDG per person in NBeG and 31.8 SDG
in Lakes. Therefore, despite the slightly higher values estimated in the latter case, the
small gap between the two values leads to a unique value for the two focus areas of
approximately 30 SDG per person per month. The other categories of expenses can be
estimated on the basis of their share of total expenditure as reported in Table 6.4. On
such a basis the size of the cash transfer required to achieve a calorific contribution of
1,940 kcal is indicated in Table 6.11. In the case of NBeG the value of the monthly cash
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transfer seems to range between 51 and 54 SDG per person. The higher value in this
range refers to IDPs and in general to beneficiaries of ongoing food aid programs and
seems to be the appropriate amount for a cash transfer to address the immediate needs
of the most vulnerable groups. In the case of Lakes the range of estimates is wider and
on average higher. Adopting again the focus on IDPs and food aid beneficiaries as the
leading criterion to reflect the needs and attitudes of the various categories considered in
this case, it seems reasonable to estimate 58 SDG as the recommended size of monthly
cash transfer per person.
Table 6.13 Amount of cash transfer
kcal
food assets debts school fees medical non food other purchased
all categories 51.2 28.2 4.3 2.9 5.8 5.2 3.8 1.0 1940
residents 51.2 29.3 3.8 2.5 5.7 5.1 3.9 0.9 1940
IDPs / returnees 53.6 28.0 5.1 3.6 6.2 5.6 3.9 1.1 1940
food aid beneficiaries 53.6 26.7 5.0 3.6 6.2 6.1 4.4 1.6 1940
all categories 73.1 31.8 9.5 6.6 9.0 7.6 6.2 2.5 1940
residents 79.2 31.5 9.9 7.3 11.1 9.4 7.1 2.9 1940
IDPs / returnees 62.3 32.0 8.6 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.5 1.9 1940
food aid beneficiaries 53.5 32.0 6.0 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.7 0.5 1940
Amount of transfer spent on
(SDG / person / month)
N
B
e
G
L
a
k
e
s
Amount
of transfer
(SDG / person / month)
Source: Author’s estimates
As considered above, the analysis seems to show that the proposed amounts of cash
transfer are not expected to generate any inflationary process induced by an increased
demand. However, such an optimistic finding should be taken with caution in view of
the dispersed distribution of food production as well as the limited operational and
financial capacity of the largest share of traders. In order to prevent and contain any
possible inflationary impact it would be advisable to consider the provision of cash
transfers through small-scale pilot initiatives, as far as possible located in proximity to
regular surplus areas and well established and connected markets. To optimize the
effectiveness of the system, the transfers should be targeted at the most vulnerable
groups, expected to be found mainly within the categories of IDPs and beneficiaries of
food aid. The amounts proposed above refer to the full transfer and therefore should not
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be provided in combination with other forms of transfer unless the value of the transfer
is reduced accordingly. It would be considered good practice to provide the transfer to
the most vulnerable free of charge. A cash-for-work transfer is advisable if the potential
beneficiary household can provide labour resources which, it can be expected, would
remain otherwise under-utilized. In such a case the amount of the transfer should be
increased in line with the calorific contribution provided by the ongoing food-for-work /
food-for-recovery intervention: 67 SDG (corresponding approximately to 32.8 USD)110
per person per month.
There is no valid comparison for such values estimated above since only very recently
cash transfer programmes have been initiated on a pilot basis in Southern Sudan.111 At
this stage the only comparison can be with the costs of the WFP intervention, though
even here the analysis is biased from various perspectives:
 the WFP EMOP covers a set of quite different contexts, including Darfur,
with associated different cost structure;
 economies of scale introduce a major bias in favour of the commodity based
strategy;
 the amount recommended above for cash transfer includes a series of non-
food expenses that reflect uncovered basic needs;
 this analysis does not take into account the transactions/exchanges of food
commodities which normally involve losses for the beneficiary of food aid
and reduce the efficiency of a commodity based intervention.
The points above prevent any significant comparison between the unit costs of the two
intervention strategies. Having said that, for informative purposes Table 6.12 compares
the cost of the daily ration provided under the current EMOP with its cost as a cash
transfer. The cost of the daily ration (i.e. the cost of food commodities included in the
daily ration only, against the amount of money transferred to allow the beneficiary to
purchase his/her equivalent of the daily ration plus covering other basic needs)
110 Exchange rates used: 1 USD = 2.040 SDG.
111 In this regard interesting information is expected from a cash-transfer pilot project initiated in 2009 in
NBeG by SC.
Southern Sudan: Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
202
estimated under an hypothetical cash transfer is more than five times higher than the
cost estimated in the case of a commodity-based intervention strategy. Taking into
account the points mentioned above, the gap between the two estimates gets reduced,
but this is achieved at the cost of reducing the significance of the results. A major
unknown in this analysis due to lack of hard data in the case of Southern Sudan is the
overhead costs of an eventual cash transfer. In other contexts diverging results have
been provided, and analysis based on actual cash-based interventions has shown that the
overall unit cost of a cash-based strategy is not necessarily lower than a commodity-
based one. Following Table 6.12, if in the present case the overhead costs of a cash-
based strategy were the same as those estimated for the WFP EMOP, the overall cost of
a daily ration would be 1.358 USD112, which corresponds to 2.3 times the overall cost of
a daily commodity ration, therefore reducing the disadvantage of a cash-based
approach. Such a consideration is just in the realm of hypothesis, but it makes the point
in stressing the relevance of non-food costs in WFP intervention.
Table 6.14 Comparative cost of daily ration
EMOP 1102 0.590 338 0.180
cash … … … 0.948
Tot cost Cost of transfer
USD /
MT
USD /
1940 Kcal
USD /
MT
USD /
1940 Kcal
Source: Author’s estimates
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the relevance of market functioning for food security in two
areas of Southern Sudan: NBeG and Lakes. The aim of the study was to assess the
feasibility of a cash transfer strategy in a context characterized by a sustained
improvement in food production during the initial phase of economic reprise after a
prolonged civil war. Such a positive agricultural performance and the good expectations
112 See note 103.
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for the future were reflected in a certain decreasing trend of cereal prices. This was
mirrored by a substantial improvement in livelihoods.
The initial part of the analysis considered household’s preference for cash or food. It
revealed a general preference to receive commodities as well as a certain support for a
combined transfer, while the explicit preference for cash remains quite limited. This can
be interpreted as a certain lack of confidence in the beneficiaries about their capacity to
make proper use of cash.
A comparative analysis of the calorific contribution provided by food and by cash was
attempted on the basis of the preferences expressed by households about their potential
use of the cash transfer. Such a comparison seems to be in favour of a commodity-based
strategy, mainly due to the relatively high local market prices and to the high share of
the potential transfer declared to be spent for non-food purposes.
With reference to the food aid programme going on at the time of fieldwork, the sum
required on a monthly basis to purchase on the local market an amount of food
equivalent to the calorific contribution provided by the food aid basket is estimated at
approximately 30 SDG per person per month. The average estimate for Lakes is slightly
higher than the one for NBeG.
Very interestingly, the analysis seems to show that the provision of cash transfers is not
expected to generate any inflationary process induced by an increased demand. This can
be explained by a combination of factors among which the most relevant seem to be:
 a certain decreasing trend of market prices, maintained at high levels for
protracted periods du to the conflict and insecurity;
 traders’ confidence about their capacity to cover the increased demand
associated to the cash injection. This is in line with the general improvement
in security conditions, which allow a stronger implementation of the existing
supply capacity.
Having said the above, it is to be considered that such a result may be also a reflection
of the enthusiasm associated to the process of economic reprise after the CPA.
Therefore, such an optimistic finding should be taken with caution in view of the
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dispersed distribution of food production as well as the limited operational and financial
capacity of a large share of traders.
The lack of data related to cash-transfer projects in Southern Sudan makes it difficult to
compare unit costs of different strategies. An estimate based on a series of
approximations made to the budget of the food aid operation indicates that the unit cost
of a cash transfer programme may be between 2.3 and 5.2 times the one of a
commodity-based programme. It is expected that further improvements in security and
scale-up of supply capacity may reduce such a gap between unit costs.
7
Contextual factors as
determinants of supply
7.1 Introduction
The analysis of the case studies has shown how context can affect market functioning.
A set of diverse realities has been considered, ranging from a chronically low level of
development in Turkana, characterized by severely limited resources to much higher
living and economic conditions affected by a long-term recession in Swaziland. Finally,
the Southern Sudan case falls between the two extremes with a context which in some
respects is close to that of Turkana but whose conditions of development have been
affected by a long conflict and which is currently undergoing the initial stages of
rehabilitation and general reprise.
In such a diverse set of conditions the process of institutional development is arguably
at different stages, and the market, considered either as an institution in itself or as the
outcome of the initiative and control of other institutions, is no exception. At this point
it may be tempting to let the discussion shift towards the contraposition between market
and economic and general development in the effort to establish a complex set of
institutional and economic links, but that is not the perspective which is taken in this
analysis. The focus here is rather on market functionality and its varying degrees in
different contexts, with the final aim making use of such functionality to optimize
intervention strategies. The assumption throughout this analysis is that in the presence
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of a functional market market-based strategies are preferable because they are more
effective and efficient than alternative strategies, while it is more difficult to make a
choice in the case of low market functionality. Through the previous chapters this
perspective has been applied to the analysis of each case study, the findings of which
are considered below in a comparative manner.
7.2 The context
When analysis is conducted from a contextual perspective the focus is on both the
characteristics of the context and the interaction between the main players and the
context itself. In the present case with the focus on the supply side of the food trade
relationship, the players are the traders, while the context is provided by the various
aspects of natural, social, economic, institutional structure and infrastructure.
The links among the various factors shaping the functioning of the local market can be
complex and articulated. To simplify the analysis, a degree of sequentiality can be
assumed among them. Some general factors play a major role, both directly and
indirectly, in making the local environment more or less conducive for business. Among
these are: a) political and institutional factors such as governance and security, and b)
mobility, in terms of both availability of infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, etc) and
measures in support of transport. Economic, political and governance factors, eventually
in combination with ethnic and cultural ones where relevant, determine the degree of
competitiveness in the market which affects the process of price formation and profit.
This is reflected in the distribution of business size as well as the spatial integration or
segmentation of markets. The degree of competitiveness and business size affect access
to inputs, costs and pricing process, finally contributing to the determination of profit
rates and consequent reinforcement or exclusion of individual traders.
In reality such links are much more complicated than as briefly sketched above;
however, a simple comparative review of the case studies can help in understanding
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how different strategies can facilitate or constrain the development of local business and
how contextual analysis can support the design of intervention strategies.
7.2.1 Market power and profitability
An initial contextual aspect to be considered is the degree of competitiveness in the
local market and how this affects profitability. For such a purpose various measures are
commonly used. This analysis uses the Herfindal-Hirshman Index (HHI), a measure of
competitiveness introduced in section 3.2.2.1, as well as measures of market power,
such as the Lerner Index, and of profitability.
The data in Table 7.1 seem to show a reduction in competitiveness when shifting the
analysis from Southern Sudan to Kenya and from Kenya to Swaziland. However, at
country level the picture is rather diversified. In Kenya the value of the index is reduced
and therefore the degree of market competitiveness increases when moving southwards
within Turkana and beyond towards the more productive and commercially lively areas
of the Rift Valley. Conversely, in Swaziland a substantial reduction in the degree of
competitiveness is recorded when moving towards the commercial centre of the
country. A possible interpretation of this distribution could be given by the assumption
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the local economic environment and
general development and market power. The very low levels recorded in Southern
Sudan could support such an interpretation. However, it is to be recognized that the
survey may have been unable to fully capture in the estimation of this index the role
played by transporters based outside the most remote and economically depressed areas.
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Table 7.1 Indicators of competitiveness and profitability
HHI
maize
maize
flour rice sorghum beans maize sorghum
Kenya
Turkana North 0.112 0.201 0.166 0.122 27.120 20.890 15.930
Turkana South 0.070 0.166 0.184 0.138 20.380 22.990 16.570
Rift Valley 0.049
Swaziland
Shiselweni 0.013 0.227 0.101 0.201 30.980 12.150 27.120
Lubombo 0.199 0.066 0.122 0.254 7.640 14.920 36.670
Manzini 0.379 0.074 0.046 0.180 8.550 4.960 24.910
Southern Sudan
NBeG 0.003 0.067 0.060 0.078 7.230 6.400 8.810
Lakes 0.002 0.066 0.063 0.066 6.750 6.700 7.099
Lerner index Profit rate
maize
flour rice beans
Source: Author’s estimates
Another measure of market power reported in Table 7.1 is the Lerner Index (L). This
index provides a wider view of market power and competitiveness than that provided by
the HHI on the basis of business size.  The L index is defined for each individual firm as
the ratio between the profit margin achieved for a product and the price at which such a
product is marketed. The index ranges from a high of one to a low of zero, with higher
numbers implying greater market power. In this case the highest values are once again
recorded in Swaziland and refer to higher-value products such as beans and maize flour.
However, the geographical distribution of market power appears to be quite different to
that seen so far. Competitiveness appears to decrease from North Turkana southwards
and to increase in Swaziland from the two peripheral regions towards the economic and
administrative centre of the country.
Although the aim of the L index is to reflect the market power of firms, due to the
construction of the index its values are strictly linked to those of the profit rate. The
contradictory findings reported by the HHI and L indexes should be considered from
this perspective. Figure 7.1 combines average data on price and profit rates related to
Contextual factors as determinants of supply
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
209
different commodities in the different areas and tries to detect the shape of a possible
profit function for each of the three areas. For this purpose price data have been
converted into a common currency: US dollars (USD).
 Figure 7.1 Profit functions
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According to basic principles of microeconomics, the profit function (p) should aim at
the maximum profit attainable at prices p and one of its properties is its convexity in p.
In other words, as the output price increases, the profit function increases at an
increasing rate. A general case can be visualized in the first part of Figure 7.1, which
can be taken as a reference to countercheck the profit functions estimated for each of the
specific cases considered here in the second part. The convexity in p of the profit
function is quite clear in the case of Swaziland as well as that of Southern Sudan,
although to a lesser extent. Conversely, data from Turkana shows a less clear pattern
giving the impression of a decreasing slope. There are good reasons to assume that
traders in Turkana and Southern Sudan are not maximizing profits due to various
constraints such as the level of technology utilized (i.e. transport), access to inputs and
availability of basic infrastructure. However, in this case the explanation is rather found
on the demand side: the downward trend shown in the case of Turkana is solely linked
to high-priced commodities, beans and particularly sugar, which in such contexts can be
considered a luxury commodity. The removal of such items completely changes the
slope and shape of the trend line. Figure 7.1 shows that in Turkana traders manage to
achieve comparatively high profit rates by dealing solely with the cheaper commodities
and the usual increasing pattern could be expected to apply even in this case if the
purchasing power were able to generate higher demand for high-price commodities.
Table 7.2 provides some further insight into the profitability and efficiency of trading
activities. It reports the contribution of major costs incurred by traders in their activities
estimated through the Cobb-Douglas model:
iubij
b
ijij eXXY 21 21 (7.1)
where:
ijY is the output achieved by trader i dealing with commodity j;
ijX 1 is the procurement cost faced by trader i in relation to commodity j;
ijX 2 is the transport cost faced by trader i in relation to commodity j;
u is the error term;
e is the base of natural logarithm;
21 ,bb are the parameters to be estimated.
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In equation 7.1 a few factors such as labour costs are omitted due to lack of data.
Therefore, the focus here is on procurement and transport costs. Under the reasonable
assumption that labour costs are not correlated with those of procurement and transport,
equation 7.1 provides unbiased estimates.113
Table 7.2 Cobb-Douglas coefficients of trading production function
procurement cost 0.822 *** 0.792 *** 0.758 ***
transport costs 0.103 *** 0.139 *** 0.065 ***
constant 0.932 ** 0.729 *** 0.450 ***
R2 0.894 0.637 0.975
N 45 222 67
(0.030) (0.030) (0.006)
(0.376) (0.084) (0.033)
Lubombo & Shiselweni NBeG & Lakes
(0.113) (0.048) (0.068)
North & South Turkana
significance:  *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
robust standard errors in brackets
Source: Author’s elaboration
It is to be stressed that in this case no account has been taken of different technology
adopted by traders, essentially relevant in terms of access to different prevalent forms of
transport and related costs. This is somehow reflected in the different value of the
coefficient for transport costs, highest for the Swaziland case and lowest for Southern
Sudan. However, the most interesting thing to consider is how the combined
contribution of procurement and transport costs to the value of output is very close in
the case of Turkana and the areas of Swaziland at 92% and 93% respectively, while it is
much lower for the areas of Southern Sudan. Under the major assumption that the
113 Throughout this analysis problems of omitted variables are not investigated. In the specific case labour
costs are not expected to be correlated with the variables included in the model (i.e. procurement costs and
transport costs); therefore the omission of labour costs is not expected to generate biased estimates.
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contribution of all inputs would add up to unity, the results leave unexplained a major
share of additional costs, equivalent to almost one fifth of the output value in the case of
Southern Sudan, more than double that of the other two cases. In other words, a higher
degree of inefficiency is found in the case of Southern Sudan.
7.2.2 Access to inputs
One of the prerequisites of any market-based intervention strategy is expandability of
supply, which ultimately leads to traders’ access to critical inputs. The list of such
inputs is quite long, however the analysis of such key inputs as cash, essentially in the
form of credit, and commodities, can go a long way.
Data related to the case studies covered in this analysis are summarized in Table 7.3. In
each case study traders’ confidence in the accessibility of each key input has been
considered separately in order to avoid any risk of simultaneity bias.
The first remark is about traders’ regularly greater confidence in accessing food
commodities rather than cash, with the only exception Northern Bahr el Ghazal in
Southern Sudan. The gap in confidence ranges from a mere 3% recorded in Lakes,
Southern Sudan, and Lubombo, Swaziland, to a maximum of almost 40% in North
Turkana. Such information could provide substantial assistance in exploring alternative
intervention strategies. The greater the traders’ confidence about accessing commodities
and the larger the gap between their ability to access the two key inputs, the stronger the
justification for cash-based strategies. The contrary is the case when traders’ confidence
in the accessibility of cash appears to be significantly higher than their confidence in the
accessibility of the quantity of commodities envisaged as necessary to respond to an
increased demand. From this perspective, among the cases considered in Table 7.3,
North Turkana and Shiselweni seem to be ideal candidates for a cash-based intervention
strategy, while in North Bahr el Ghazal a commodity-based approach appears to be
more appropriate.
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Table 7.3 Confidence in accessing key inputs (%)
cash commodities
Kenya
Turkana North 0.497 0.889
Turkana South 0.588 0.794
Kitale - Eldoret 0.809 0.979
Swaziland
Shiselweni 0.489 0.739
Lubombo 0.840 0.872
Manzini 0.816 0.918
Southern Sudan
NBeG 0.867 0.647
Lakes 0.807 0.834
Source: Author’s estimates
However, a certain caution is deemed appropriate since a biased attitude may be
expected from traders: this may occur in two ways. In traders’ opinion their ability to
access cash may be downscaled in order to support a cash-based intervention which
would stimulate local demand and, hopefully, their business as well. The same attitude
may lead them to overemphasize their optimism about accessing additional
commodities.
When considering the points above it may be worth as well enlarging the geographical
scope of the contextual analysis in order to consider food trade links in the markets or
area considered within a wider picture. A review of the links between local markets and
the supplying areas would help to understand the solidity of traders’ confidence in the
accessibility of inputs and therefore in their supply capacity.
At the end of the day, it is important to keep in mind that commodities need to be
sourced somewhere, and every time we enlarge the geographical scope for cash
intervention, it is necessary to include in the analysis an additional level of source
markets. This analysis cannot go on forever and such a process could confidently stop
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only after reaching a solid level which can ensure a stable flow of commodities capable
of covering the increased demand. Such observation is crucial for areas and markets that
rely on imports from other areas to satisfy local requirements.114 This leads to the
crucial role of the integration of different areas and markets in affecting local supply
capacity.
7.2.3 Market integration
The analysis of market integration can help to examine the effectiveness of market
functioning. In chapter 3 we presented the basic principles and tools of this part of the
analysis, which have subsequently been applied to the various case studies analyzed with
reference to respective staple food commodities.115
Results from the analysis of the case studies have been combined in Table 7.4. In
addition to average values of size of adjustment in the long-run  and the short-run 2,
and the speed of adjustment 3, this features the half-life index h. The h index measures
the number of time units required for the process of price change in one market to take
effect in the other market, per each pair of markets, before restoring half of the long-run
equilibrium between their prices. The values of the h index are particularly useful in
order to derive a combined picture of the characteristics of the adjustment process and
facilitate comparisons. Such a combined view is provided by the ratio 2 / h.
114 Incidentally, it is worth remarking that such local requirements may not necessarily manifest as local
demand, but may consist as well of a regular flow of commodities procured and moved by residents or
relatives for their own consumption.
115 Maize for Kenya and Swaziland and sorghum for Southern Sudan.
Contextual factors as determinants of supply
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
215
Table 7.4 Average coefficients of price transmission
2 2 3 h 2 / h 2 2 3 h 2 / h
Kenya
North Turkana 0.348 0.262 0.403 1.042 0.334 0.217 … 0.618 1.027 0.212
South Turkana 0.482 0.356 0.443 0.976 0.494 0.340 … 0.420 1.007 0.336
Rest of Kenya 0.910 0.580 0.404 1.066 0.854 0.873 0.492 0.309 1.047 0.834
Swaziland
Shiselweni 0.876 0.314 0.146 1.530 0.573 0.915 0.467 0.261 1.317 0.695
Lubombo 0.921 0.652 0.225 1.396 0.660 0.892 0.442 0.191 1.511 0.590
Rest of Swaziland 0.926 0.272 0.197 1.135 0.815 0.745 0.305 0.239 1.282 0.569
Southern Sudan
NBeG 0.566 … 0.441 1.061 0.534 0.747 0.578 … 1.212 0.616
internal external
Source: Author’s estimates
First of all, higher rates of long-term adjustment are found in Swaziland and differences
among the different areas of the country are rather minor. This is understandable in
view of the limited size of the country and its excellent transport system. A similar level
of integration is found in Kenya, with the exclusion of Turkana and other arid and
semiarid areas. The size of long-run adjustment in Turkana ranges between one third
and half of the average in the rest of the country and, as expected, shows a decreasing
degree of market functionality when moving northwards. Southern Sudan appears to be
closer to Turkana than to Rest of Kenya or Swaziland; however a word of caution is
required since such a value reflects only a very limited number of markets for which
data are available and which result to be cointegrated.
Data on the speed of adjustment bring in an interesting new perspective, surprisingly
characterized by a slower process of price transmission in Swaziland compared to the
other areas considered. This finding appears to be generalized throughout this small
country and also affects areas that are more commercially active than others. This is
reflected in both the size of short-run adjustment and the time required for the price
adjustment to be completed.
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The two effects of size of long-term adjustment and time required to complete
adjustment are summarized through the combined measure 2 / h. As expected, the
commercially advanced areas of Kenya and Swaziland record the highest scores and
North Turkana the lowest.
The analysis of external cointegration is conditioned by the market used as a term of
reference. For the purposes of each case study a different reference has been considered
appropriate as proxy for the external market, mainly reflecting the neighbouring areas
rather than the global market per se. Therefore Ugandan markets along the Kenya-
Uganda border and the main South African food market are used as references for
Kenya and Swaziland respectively. In other words, in the present analysis the reference
reflects a regional rather than an international dimension.116 Once again the exception is
represented by Southern Sudan, where the paucity of data constrains the analysis and
some significant cointegration has been found only with the market in the United States,
usually taken as proxy for the global market.
Coefficients are generally lower than their internal counterparts, with the exception of
Shiselweni in Swaziland and North Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan. There is no
evident reason for this stronger degree of integration between Shiselweni and South
Africa compared to the rest of Swaziland. Conversely, the case of Southern Sudan can
be seen in light of the protracted constriction of external117 trade links with
neighbouring countries experienced during the decades of civil war and the heavy
reliance on international aid, particularly in terms of food aid.
In terms of comparison between commercial centres and peripheral areas, in Kenya and
Swaziland the reduction in the degree of integration seems to follow different patterns.
In the former case the higher reductions are reported in Turkana, while they seem to be
116 The stronger relevance of the regional rather global dimension of staple food market integration in
East Africa and Southern Africa is confirmed by other studies. For instance, a recent study (World Bank,
2009) confirms the strong integration of maize market between Kenya and Uganda and the weaker
integration between such two countries and the international market.
117 As well as domestic trade links.
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quite minor in the rest of the country, while in the Swaziland case it is the other way
around.
7.2.4 Density of road network
Roads are known to be among the major drivers of economic growth at local level. A
recent study has estimated the dominant role of transport charges in the structure of
food marketing costs in Eastern Africa.118 Not only are such charges transmitted to end
users by raising market prices; it has also been shown that in Africa such costs have also
a significant impact on agricultural productivity and supply response.119 Therefore, the
simple indicator of the road density in an area can be quite revealing, particularly when
considering market-based development strategies. Table 7.5 provides a summary view
of average values of this indicator in the areas considered in the case studies.
Table 7.5 Road density
km / km2
Kenya
Turkana North 1.54
Turkana South 1.69
Pokot 4.10
Kitale - Eldoret 8.88
Swaziland
Shiselweni 7.52
Lubombo 8.14
Manzini 8.62
Southern Sudan
NBeG 0.97
Lakes 1.96
Source: Author’s estimates
118 The study (World Bank, 2009) reports that in Eastern Africa about 45% of average transport charges
occur during the initial 28% of the distance due to disproportionately higher transport costs on rural roads
compared to national/tarmac roads.
119 Dorosh et al., 2008; Lall et al., 2009.
Contextual factors as determinants of supply
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
218
The data utilized for the estimation of road density have been selected on the basis of
purposive sampling120 and cannot therefore be considered as representative, but are
deemed good enough for the purposes of this study.
The index shows a striking difference between more and less developed areas. This is
particularly evident in the case of the Kenyan data, with an almost sixfold increase in
road density from North Turkana southwards through Pokot down to the very
productive and commercially lively area of Rift Valley along Lake Victoria.
The data from Southern Sudan reflect the North-South increase in road density observed
in Turkana, although with a higher disparity between the states of Lakes and Northern
Bahr el Ghazal.
The Swaziland case shows a relatively small disparity among the three areas considered.
Once again, as expected, the most developed area has the highest road density.
7.2.5 Security
Physical security is expected to play a role in defining trader behaviour and productive
activity in general. The assumption is that ceteris paribus activities are discouraged in
areas of higher insecurity. Table 7.6 reports security levels defined by the United
Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS). The index is constructed in such
a way to express a measure of insecurity: it ranges between zero and five with the
higher the value the poorer the security conditions. It is interesting that the index
follows the distribution of road density, above, quite closely, showing a direct
relationship between roads and security, as expected.
120 In each case three spots have been selected and from each of them the estimation area has been defined
as a circle with a radius of approximately 18 km. For the estimation of the index of road density weights
have been attributed arbitrarily to different types of roads: primary roads have been given a weight of one
and secondary roads a weight of 0.75.
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Table 7.6 Security
security
level
Kenya
Turkana North 3
Turkana South 1
Pokot 1
Kitale - Eldoret 1
Swaziland
Shiselweni 0
Lubombo 0
Manzini 0
Southern Sudan
NBeG 3
Lakes 3
Source: UNDSS
7.3 Elasticity of supply
The variables considered above are either a direct or an indirect expression of market
functioning or of some of its determinants. In both cases they provide different points of
view from which is possible to consider market functioning. As such, their study can
provide an invaluable contribution to response option analysis. The same type of
contextual analysis is also useful on the demand side;121 however in line with the
approach taken in this part of the study the focus here is on how the analysis of
contextual factors can help to assess supply elasticity and more generally traders’
response to an increase in demand.
121 The focus in such case would be on the eventual beneficiaries and communities, with particular
reference to their involvement with local markets.
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Table 7.7  Correlation among variables relevant to market analysis
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herfindal index 1
trader's  confidence (access  to cash) 0.134 1
traders' confidence (access  to commodities) 0.481 -0.028 1
profit rate 0.224 -0.726 0.282 1
market integration (local) 0.475 0.587 0.406 -0.071 1
market integration (with neighbouring areas) -0.085 0.630 -0.067 -0.271 0.783 1
road dens ity 0.594 0.188 0.475 0.441 0.835 0.639 1
insecurity -0.627 0.071 -0.301 -0.662 -0.628 -0.357 -0.867 1
Source: Author’s elaboration
Table 7.7 provides a summary view of the relationship among the variables considered
above.122 A series of strong links, already mentioned above, is evident, such as those
between security and density of road network and between both variables and local
market integration. As expected, the availability of a good road network in a secure
environment provides favourable conditions for profitability and growth of business
initiatives. Local market integration seems to strengthen conditions of market power in
favour of large traders, though contributing to mild reductions in profit rates. Trade
integration with neighbouring areas seems to play a stronger role in reducing local
traders’ profit margins but is less relevant to business size and market power. Finally, it
is worth considering the high profit rates associated with low trader confidence in the
accessibility of cash; this could be explained as the consequence of high demand for
credit in a favourable business environment.
At this stage the links highlighted in Table 7.7 can be formalized in such a way as to
gear towards the analysis of determinants of supply and elasticity of supply. Therefore
122 A larger set of variables can be considered for such type of exploratory analysis; the limitation being
mainly availability of relevant data.
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the rest of the analysis seeks to determine the role and relevance of each of the factors
considered above in influencing traders’ decisions to scale up their business size. For
this purpose data on traders’ response to eventual price increases simulated through the
traders’ survey in the three case studies is used. It is worth remembering that on such
occasions traders’ potential response to an eventual rise in demand has been elicited by
considering various eventual price changes ranging between a zero and a 30% price
increase. In particular, two price changes have been considered: a) a minimum price
change considered necessary by each trader before deciding to scale up own business
size, and b) a 20% price increase. Traders’ response to both price changes were elicited
in terms of changes in quantities they would be interested in and capable of supplying.
This process has generated a set of three price-quantity combinations for each unit; the
first based on actual data (p0, q0 at t0) and the other two on the basis of the simulations
just described (p1, q1 at t1; p2, q2 at t2). This has allowed to generate a panel dataset for
each commodity and the same process has been repeated in each case study for the three
major commodities traded by each unit within a predefined set of major commodities.
The combination of the three case-study datasets provides a shift in perspective from the
local to a more general dimension allowing the introduction into the analysis of a few
contextual variables which would otherwise be difficult to capture in each individual
case study.
Model specification has tried to put together a few contextual factors deemed critical in
influencing supply elasticity. These are expressed either as perceived by traders (i.e.
availability and accessibility of commodities and credit), or as totally exogenous such as
road density, security, market integration in both local and neighbouring areas, degree
of market power. Business size and profit rate are included in a sort of intermediary
position, with a degree of multi-collinearity expected. The inclusion of business size in
quadratic form to capture a possible parabolic link between business size and supply is
regularly dropped and has been omitted. Since the structure of the dataset is based on
simulations, no lag is considered between price formation and trader response; therefore
variables values at t0, t1 and t2 are considered independently and all are summarized as t.
The basic model specification is:
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

(7.3)
where:
ijtq is the current or simulated quantity of the jth commodity supplied by the
ith trader at time t;
ijtp is the current or simulated market price of the jth commodity supplied by
the ith trader at time t;
isize is the business size of the ith trader;
icash reflects the ith trader’s expectation of accessing the additional cash
eventually required to scale-up his/her business size;
ifood reflects the ith trader’s expectation of accessing additional quantities of
food commodities required to satisfy an eventual increase in demand;
localmarket is a measure of price integration in the local markets;
market is a measure of price integration in the markets in neighboring areas;
neighbor
hhi is a measure of market power in the local markets;
profit is a measure of average profit rates achieved by traders in the local area;
roads is a measure of road density in the local area;
uritysec is a measure of security in the local area.
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Table 7.8 Determinants of supply elasticity
ln p 1.213 *** 1.208 *** 0.906 *** 1.232 *** 1.679 *** 1.584 *** 0.565 *** 1.576 *** 1.342 *** 1.333 *** 1.031 *** 1.336 ***
ln size 0.894 *** 0.902 *** 0.540 *** 0.925 *** 0.893 *** 0.579 *** 0.906 *** 0.897 *** 0.609 ***
cash 0.170 0.183 * 0.603 *** 1.068 *** 0.169 * 0.243 ** 0.497 *** 0.768 *** -0.113 -0.073 0.174 0.441
food -0.338 *** -0.380 *** -0.951 *** -0.814 *** -0.382 *** -0.401 ** -0.251 -0.183 0.062 0.057 -0.194 0.040
market local 6.359 *** 0.586 4.329 *** 6.088 *** 4.919 *** 2.372 *** 3.487 *** 8.852 *** 2.577 * 0.834 8.395 *** 11.347 ***
market neighbor 28.539 *** 3.934 *** 4.251 *** 3.353 *** 15.205 *** 4.072 *** 2.767 *** 3.713 *** 11.820 ** 3.697 *** 5.290 *** 3.889 ***
hhi 86.023 *** 37.929 *** 27.979
profit 0.645 *** -0.289 *** 0.061 -0.327 *** -0.042 -0.348 ***
roads -16.721 *** -2.179 *** -0.373 *** 0.219 * -8.821 *** -2.002 *** 0.321 ** 0.850 *** -7.028 ** -2.179 *** -0.643 *** 0.423 ***
security -31.359 *** -5.904 *** -0.914 *** 0.091 -17.059 *** -4.892 *** 0.995 *** 2.776 *** -13.899 *** -5.371 *** -0.460 * 2.073 ***
constant 83.925 *** 18.806 *** -0.735 -1.374 46.134 *** 14.204 *** -7.004 *** -13.390 *** 38.522 *** 16.532 *** -5.821 *** -11.568 ***
N. obs 543 543 612 612 759 759 768 768 417 417 450 450
chi2 1857.74 1788.18 2329.32 1400.02 1481.35 1415.15 781.54 503.26 1171.36 1163.02 1417.23 933.37
R2 within 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
R2 between 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.33 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.62
R2 overall 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.77 0.76 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.62
u 0.51 0.52 0.54 1.27 0.53 0.53 0.58 1.11 0.53 0.53 0.53 1.22
e 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
rho 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99
continued
Maize Maize flour Beans
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Table 7.8  continued
ln p 2.182 *** 2.182 *** 2.135 *** 2.584 *** 1.316 *** 1.316 *** 1.100 *** 1.100 *** 1.112 *** 1.112 ***
ln size 1.030 *** 1.030 *** 0.986 *** 0.570 *** 0.795 *** 0.795 *** 0.820 ***
cash -0.131 -0.131 -0.176 0.180 0.021 -0.050 -0.086 -0.086 -0.112 0.797 ***
food 0.487 ** 0.487 ** 0.485 ** 1.159 *** 0.092 0.330 *** 0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.530
market local -14.039 ** -14.194 *** 4.374 21.925 *** -0.298 0.568 -1.190 -1.190 -9.666 *** 1.954
market neighbor 34.460 *** 34.931 *** -2.602 ** 1.671 10.641 *** 4.127
hhi -0.159
profit -1.293 *** -1.305 ***
roads -0.018 -0.836 ** -1.412 ** 0.031 0.267
security -3.745 *** -1.880 **
constant 7.124 7.303 -1.332 -5.675 *** 1.596 *** 4.728 *** -6.865 *** -6.865 *** -6.594 *** -2.440 **
N. obs 315 315 327 327 351 351 258 258 285 288
chi2 690.02 690.02 920.56 380.75 3810.60 3739.05 4391.90 4391.90 4666.72 4127.55
R2 within 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
R2 between 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.49 0.38 0.07 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.64
R2 overall 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.49 0.40 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.64
u 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.95 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.62 1.17
e 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
rho 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
significance: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
1 Kenya and Swaziland only; 2 South Sudan only; 3 Kenya only.
Rice1 Sorghum2 Sugar3
Source: Author’s elaboration
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In terms of model specification, the random effect approach is preferred since the fixed
effect cannot accommodate invariant regressors.123 Results reported in Table 7.8 show a
generally high significance confirming the appropriateness of the adopted model
specification.
As expected, the highest values of the chi2 test refer to the single-country analysis, as it
is the case for sorghum and sugar. In such cases there is less variation within the data,
allowing for higher explanatory power of the model as confirmed by the higher values
of R2. However, this lower variation raises the risk of collinearity among variables, as it
is particularly evident in the case of sorghum.
The coefficient related to commodity price is particularly relevant in this part of the
analysis. Expressed in logarithmic form, it represents the price elasticity of supply. The
range of coefficient values reported through different model specifications for each
commodity is rather contained, with the largest gap related to maize flour and the
smallest to sorghum and sugar, the latter both referring to single-country samples. For
staples such as maize and sorghum, as well as for beans, price elasticity ranges between
0.9 and 1.3. The range seems to be wider in the case of maize flour: between 0.6 and
1.7, though averaging at the higher end. The other two commodities, rice and sugar,
which in this case can be both considered luxury goods, show different patterns. The
coefficient is significantly higher in the case of rice compared to the other commodities
considered, while in the case of sugar it falls within the range of staples. This difference
can be explained by the different degree of perishability of the two products which,
despite the high profitability of both commodities, affects their shelf life and the
associated risk of loss. The estimation of sugar price elasticity is limited to the Turkana
sample, where there is limited storage capacity and harsher climatic conditions than in
the combined Turkana-Swaziland sample applied for rice, supporting this interpretation.
Furthermore, the higher average income elasticity of demand expected in the Swaziland
case study provides further support in explaining the different pattern observed.
123 Since all contextual variables are fixed per each area considered, they are automatically omitted under
a fixed effect approach due to collinearity. Results are not reported.
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The coefficient for business size has the expected sign in all cases. Its size is
remarkable, ranging between 0.5 and one, thus confirming the higher capacity in scaling
up supply expected from large-size business. This is supported by the high positive
coefficient of market power, though significant only for maize and maize flour: a higher
degree of market power seems to be associated with higher supply response capacity.
There are conflicting signals about traders’ confidence in their ability to access
additional critical inputs such as cash and commodities. Confidence about availability
of and access to additional cash appears to be significant only for maize, maize flour
and sugar. In such cases, traders’ confidence can be a good predictor of local supply
capacity. Expressed as a percentage, it can be interpreted in terms of elasticity: a 1%
increase in average confidence can predict between 0.2% and 1% increase in supply
capacity for maize and slightly lower on the upper end for maize flour. Contrary to the
case of cash input, it is more difficult to interpret results related to the role of traders’
confidence about accessing additional commodities. Significant results have different
signs for different commodities: negative for maize and maize flour and positive for rice
and sorghum, respectively. It is difficult to find a single general answer to such different
patters. A possible interpretation could link such different relationships to the different
staple/non-staple nature of maize and maize flour on one side and rice on the other.
Individual traders’ perceptions of the availability and accessibility of additional
quantities of rice is more likely to be correct, and as such lead to actual increases in
supply. Conversely, the staple nature of maize and maize flour, reflected in a more rigid
demand, can be misleading to the individual trader, with the consequence that the higher
quantities of staple regularly marketed may give to him/her the erroneous impression
that it is possible to scale up his/her individual supply, while this is prevented by a
tighter balance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. However, while such
an interpretation may intuitively sound acceptable, it is not supported by the positive
coefficient detected for sorghum.
Market integration has the expected positive sign for maize, maize flour and beans. A
higher degree of market integration in both the local area and neighbouring areas has a
positive effect in raising local supply capacity. The size of the coefficients is reasonably
high, varying according to model specification, with higher values reported
interchangeably at the two levels. This provides strong support for the relevance of
Contextual factors as determinants of supply
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
227
market functioning as a precondition for the use of market-based strategies. A higher
degree of market functioning can strongly support a supply response to an increased
demand.
The relevance shown by market integration not only in the areas of concern but as well
in neighbouring areas is of particular interest. In an open local economy trade is not
carried out in isolation from neighbouring areas and limiting the analysis to the local
context can be misleading. This is even more evident when focusing on areas that are
not self-sufficient and rely, to various degrees, on other areas to source their supplies.
Therefore there is a need to place the analysis of local trade links within a wider picture.
Strong integration with the supplying areas can help in understanding the solidity of
traders’ confidence about accessing additional inputs, mainly commodities, and
therefore in assessing the flexibility of local supply capacity. In fact, commodities need
to be sourced somewhere, and when considering the feasibility of cash-based
interventions it is necessary to include in the analysis an additional layer of possible
source markets.124
Having said the above, it is necessary to recognize how the link between market
integration and local supply capacity comes up less clearly from the findings related to
the other commodities. Such variables are dropped in the analysis of sorghum and show
contrasting patterns in the cases of rice and sugar. These finding raise a question about
the general validity of the relevance and role of market integration outlined above, and
whether this relevance and role may get eventually decrease or even disappear
altogether when the focus is shifted to higher price and luxury-type commodities.
The role that profitability of different commodities plays on their local supply provides
controversial results. Anyway, the doubtful reliability of the data on which profit rates
are estimated and their inclusion in the model in average form do not contribute to
making it of enough interest, so it has been dropped, increasing the fitness of the model.
124 In principle the geographical focus of such an analysis can be ignored only on reaching a solid level of
confidence about aggregate production and trade capacity which can ensure a stable flow of food
commodities towards the geographical area of interest and which is capable of covering the increased
demand stimulated at local level.
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Density of local road network is expected to contribute positively to market functioning
and therefore to increase traders’ capacity to scale up their business size. However, even
in this case different models provide conflicting results.
Finally, similar findings are reported in the case of security. In view of the structure of
the index, higher values signal worsening security conditions and therefore a negative
coefficient sign is expected. This expectation is fulfilled with reference to maize and
rice, but only partially in the case of maize flour and beans.
7.4 Willingness to trade and price increase
Some of the aspects of the elasticity of supply considered above can be tackled from a
slightly different angle. Estimation of elasticity of supply requires sufficient knowledge
of the prices and quantities at which the transaction has been made or is expected to be
made. Even with the assumption of a good knowledge-based decision making process
followed by the trader, it would be rather ingenuous to assume that it is possible for the
trader to gather this amount of knowledge. After all, reality is more complicated than
theoretical models. Various types of constraints – which ultimately translate into
potential or actual costs – can be assumed to be faced by the trader when considering
scaling up his/her business. Trying to detect and measure all such big and small costs at
the level of the individual trader, while still trying to maintain a certain level of rigour in
the analysis, may be difficult. Even more so if this is done in the rush dictated by the
preparation of an emergency response. In such conditions a quicker method of assessing
existing response capacity is to accept a higher degree of approximation in the analysis
and focus on the triggers of traders’ responses to market signals. As seen above, price
changes can play a major role in raising the entrepreneurial attitude typical of a trader.
But what level of price change? In other words, how much do prices need to rise before
action can be expected? And after all, prices cannot be expected to be the only
determinant of traders’ behaviour: other factors play a role, whether related directly to
the individual trader or a certain typology of traders, or simply to external factors. Such
exogenous factors are linked to the context in which the trader happens to operate and
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can be called contextual factors. They can be either a direct or indirect expression of the
context, or, more subtly, be a reflection of how the trader, either as an individual or a
professional category, perceives a specific aspect of the context. All such factors,
endogenous or contextual, real or perceived, contribute to forming the trader’s
willingness to trade and consequent action. A system capable of combining and
analyzing information on these contextual factors is required. A few components of the
a system can be identified. A certain knowledge of local trading structure and capacity
is necessary, with a summary identification of local trader categories. This component
refers to the core of the implementation of a potential response to an eventual
disequilibrium manifesting in the local market. This core component does not operate in
isolation but is linked to another focal point of the system: the source of the additional
quantity to be supplied. This may involve the farming sector only marginally, but as
long as the area under consideration is not a surplus producing area the focus of the
analysis will be on the identification of the major trading links for major commodities
both at the local level as well as mainly in neighbouring areas. The strength of these
links constitutes a key component in assessing the solidity of any market-related
strategy, and price transmission analysis is the appropriate tool for the job. A good
understanding of transport-related factors (e.g. availability and access to transport) as
well as other eventual constraints, such as security in the source markets and along the
main transport routes, will contribute to the contextual picture. Finally, information
required from traders is limited to: a) estimation of the minimum average price increase
at which they would be willing and ready to invest and scale up their business size, and
b) their perception of the eventual availability and accessibility of additional critical
inputs such as credit and commodities.
The use of the WTT approach has been introduced through the case studies in parallel
with and/or in support of the estimation of the supply elasticity. At this stage it is
applied through the combined dataset related to the case studies as used earlier in this
chapter to estimate supply elasticity. The ultimate purpose of its use is related to the
estimation of the likely price increase expected to be associated with a local increase in
demand. At this stage it can be useful to show how contextual information collected
through the various case studies can help to model very different market conditions.
Table 7.9 provides the results of a likelihood analysis conducted through a few
variations of ordered logit and probit models. The use of such a type of model is
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justified by the structure of the dependent variable (i.e. price increase) where values are
condensed along the average value in each class considered. In this case, ordinary
regression analysis would fail to capture the discrete scale used for the underlying
continuous variable. Finally, probabilities estimated for the various case studies through
the logit model (C) are reported in Table 7.10.
Table 7.9 Modelling willingness to trade in the three case studies
traders ' confidence in access ing cash  (% ) ** *** ** ***
traders ' confidence in access ing commodities   (% ) *** *** *** *** *** ***
L n business  s ize *** *** *** *** ***
market integration (local) *** *** *** *** *** ***
market integration (neighboring areas) *** *** *** *** *** ***
security *** ***
road dens ity *** ***
security * road dens ity *** *** *** ***
hhi *** ***
cut 1
cut 2
cut 3
cut 4
cut 5
N . obs
L R  c hi2
P rob >  chi2
P seudo R 2
2379
659.36
0.0000
0.0960
2379
644.09
0.0000
0.09380.1002
2379
686.36
0.0000
0.09990.1048
2379
661.11
0.0000
0.0962
2.192
2379
719.64
0.0000
2379
688.36
0.0000
-0.791
0.280
0.809
1.130-3.165
-3.698
-1.557
0.273
1.280
-2.946
-1.863
-1.337
-1.0171.972
-8.906
-6.724
-4.862
-3.856
-3.523
-1.366
0.490
1.502
-0.713
0.365
0.893
1.211
-1.969-4.212 -2.042
3.068
0.475
1.223
0.033 0.030
1.028
-1.443
0.059 0.050
-0.580
-3.336 -3.295
-2.986 -1.888 -1.576 -1.578 -1.081 -0.944
-5.733 -5.574 -5.580 -3.375
0.264 0.251
-0.090 0.100 0.084 -0.012 0.074 0.068
0.390 0.469 0.444 0.230
C
-0.081 -0.216 -0.255 -0.076 -0.131 -0.151
A B A B
logit probit
C
significance:  *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
Source: Author’s elaboration
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Table 7.10 Probabilities of WTT
 0-2  3-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  > 20
All areas 20.134 38.636 28.432 7.420 2.552 2.825
Turkana 6.677 29.355 40.832 13.101 4.709 5.326
RoK 26.255 47.408 20.917 3.372 1.010 1.038
Lubombo 6.060 29.633 42.211 12.727 4.439 4.931
Shiselweni 9.779 38.281 37.341 8.731 2.835 3.033
Manzini 4.731 25.169 43.070 15.119 5.555 6.356
NBeG 42.053 43.948 11.506 1.571 0.457 0.464
Lakes 29.503 48.669 17.633 2.627 0.776 0.792
rate of price increase  (%)
Source: Table 7.9 Logit model specification C
Among the coefficients in Table 7.9, market integration in its various forms records the
strongest values throughout all the model specifications considered, always with the
expected sign. This supports the position held throughout this analysis about the key
relevance of market functioning as a determinant of the choice between a cash-based or
a commodity-based strategy or a combination of both. As expected, the stronger the
degree of market functioning, particularly at local level but also in neighbouring areas,
the lower the inflationary consequences of a cash injection.
Traders’ confidence in accessing key inputs also has the expected sign. Confidence in
the availability and accessibility of cash helps to limit price increase; however this holds
only if balanced by access to commodities. Once the latter becomes more restricted than
the former, financial surplus automatically translates into price increase.
Conditions of security help to contain price increase. In this case the original scores
have been inverted, retaining the original domain of the index. This inversion is
motivated by the need to align the security variable and the measure of road density, on
the consideration that density of roads cannot necessarily contribute to containing prices
on its own if prevailing security conditions do not allow proper use of the road network.
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However, road density does not seem to help to contain price increases either on its own
or in combination with a secure environment.
Finally, business size and market power provide an additional dimension. The sign of
the business size coefficient provides conflicting information throughout the different
model specifications, probably due to problems of multicollinearity. This does not help
to support the hypothesis of economy of scale. Conversely, as expected, it is clear that
conditions of market power favour price rise and increase the risk of inflation.
Table 7.10 reports the probability of each range of price increase considered for each
area and thus provides a good basis from which to easily compare the likely inflationary
consequences of various intervention strategies. The highest probabilities are related to
rates of price increase from 3-5% to 6-10%. However, some differences are worth
considering. Interestingly, the highest probability for the lowest range of price increase
(0-2%) is recorded by NBeG. This very good result, and that achieved by Lakes, are
encouraging, but should be considered with caution in view of the doubtful significance
of some of the data related to Southern Sudan utilized in the model mainly due to the
limited data available.125 A similar distribution of probability of price increase is
reported for the three areas of Swaziland, reflecting similar conditions as well as similar
potentiality for scaling up supply. The major divergence reported refers to the Kenyan
case. The distribution of price increase probabilities in Turkana seems to be
significantly different to that in Rest of Kenya as well as for the average of all the areas
considered, as clearly shown in Figure 7.2. This finding, somehow expected, does not
express any a priori judgement of the feasibility and appropriateness of a cash-based
intervention strategy in Turkana, but can be very useful in a decision making process.
Not only does the analysis manage to draw attention to the higher-than-average risk of
inflation; it also helps in estimating this risk and can be expanded to consider, on a
preliminary basis, eventual mitigating measures that can be adopted in order to contain
this risk.
125 This consideration refers essentially to the limited price data utilized for the analysis of market
integration.
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Figure 7.2 Probabilities of price increase
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7.5 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the relevance of contextual factors in affecting local supply.
A few key factors shaping the functioning of the local market have been examined. The
case studies considered in the previous chapters have been combined to provide a
simple comparative perspective. This approach has shown quite helpful in highlighting
how different strategies can facilitate or constrain the development of local business,
remarking therefore how contextual analysis can provide a critical contribution in the
design of intervention strategies.
The case studies have provided a diverse background to the analysis of contextual
factors and of the various relevant links among them. This has geared towards the
analysis of elasticity of supply as well as of the relevance of various factors in
influencing traders’ decisions to scale up supply. Commodity prices, business size,
market integration, and confidence in accessing key inputs have been found among the
main determinants of supply elasticity, at least with reference to the main staple food
commodities.
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Finally, some of the aspects of elasticity of supply have been tackled from a different
angle. The consideration that price changes can play a major role in raising the trader’s
entrepreneurial attitude raises the question about the price rise required before trader’s
action can be expected. At the same time, the consideration that such a decision is not
merely the result of price changes, but involves other contextual factors, as faced or
perceived by the trader, highlights the need for a system capable of combining and
analyzing information on these contextual factors.
The WTT approach, earlier on applied through the case studies, has been now applied to
the combined case-studies dataset. Results of the analysis stress the relevance of market
integration, used as proxy of market functioning. This supports the position held
throughout this analysis about the relevance of market functioning as a determinant of
the choice between a cash-based or a commodity-based strategy or a combination of
both. As expected, the stronger the degree of market functioning, the lower the
inflationary consequences of a cash injection.
In more general terms, the ultimate purpose of this exercise is the estimation of the
likely price rise associated to a certain increase in local demand which can be
reasonably expected from an increase in purchasing capacity as in the case of cash-
based programmes. Therefore, this approach can be quite helpful to compare
intervention strategies that may provide more or less emphasis on the provision of cash.
At this regard the analysis of the combined case-study dataset reveals some interesting
results. The rate of price increase expected in Turkana (i.e. 6-10%) results significantly
higher than the one expected in the other parts of Kenya as well as in all the three case
studies (i.e. 3-5%). This type of information can be very useful for decision making
purposes when designing or fine-tuning an intervention strategy.
8
Relevance of contextual
factors for the choice of
intervention strategy
The case of market prices in Turkana
8.1 Introduction
According to general principles of sound project management, decision making needs to
be based on a balance between the key concepts of effectiveness and cost-efficiency.
However, concerns about the way in which such a balance can be put into practice are
common. The choice between drastic alternatives such as a commodity-based versus a
cash-based response to a situation of food insecurity is an example of such a case. Is too
much attention to cost-efficiency detrimental to the selection of the most appropriate
strategy? What is the trade-off between effectiveness and cost-efficiency? How relevant
are localized contextual factors for decision making and for such a trade-off?
This chapter considers the appropriateness and cost-efficiency of cash-based and
commodity-based interventions in food insecure situations. It focuses on the
comparative analysis of available options in order to support the decision making
process. In particular, it examines the relevance of contextual factors, such as market
prices, in choices about the composition of the package to be transferred.
It is intuitive to consider how a price decrease on the local market helps to increase the
transfer value of money, while the opposite happens in case of a price increase. In the
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former case, since an increase in local prices has the effect of reducing the purchasing
power of cash, the more the intervention relies on the use of money the greater is the
effective loss suffered through the transfer.
The concern expressed above is evident in instances of high price rises or price
volatility. It is well known that cash transfers are not suitable in the case of price rises:
not only because in such conditions they can be a very inefficient and ineffective
transfer system, but also because they are likely to contribute to exacerbation of the
price rise. The soaring food price crisis experienced in 2007-2008 and the expectation
that for some time food prices will remain higher than they used to be have attracted
attention to this topic.
This chapter highlights the relevance of market prices in fine-tuning the composition of
the donation package. The analysis is conducted from the supply perspective;
nevertheless, this is adjusted through the inclusion of a few side-effects which partially
reflect the utility of transfer recipients.
The applicative part of the analysis in this study builds on the experience of food aid
and cash-based interventions implemented and piloted respectively in Turkana, Kenya.
Contrary to the general picture at country level, the high prices prevalent in the district
make a commodity-based strategy more cost-efficient than a cash-based one. However,
this is seen as a constraint to the growth of the local economy and to any attempt to
overcome the current condition of semi-isolation experienced in the district.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
conceptual framework of this analysis. Section 8.3 expands on the case-study
considered in chapter 4 with a comparison of unit cost estimates of alternative strategies
and their relevance for decision making. Section 8.4 presents concluding remarks.
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8.2 Relevance of effectiveness and cost-efficiency for
decision making
8.2.1 A supply perspective
Earlier, when considering the basic framework of our analysis, we considered how
market functioning can play a critical role in defining the optimum response strategy or
combination of response options to a food security crisis. In general, although
sometimes the decision maker tends to emphasize a certain perspective on the basis of
institutional factors such as “mandate” and “comparative advantage”, a sound decision
making process should be based on a wider perspective if it is to lead to optimum
choices. According to economic theory a certain strategy can be considered appropriate
in a specific setting when, besides being feasible and responding to the specific needs
previously identified, it proves to be effective and cost-efficient. When a plurality of
possible options is available, a strategy or combination of strategies should be preferred
on the basis of a substitution effect that reflects the preferences of the decision maker.
The last mentioned case reflects the situation presented in the I quadrant of Figure 3.1,
where a choice among multiple strategies is to be made. This process should help to
select an appropriate intervention strategy. However, the framework presented in Figure
3.1 is only a general one which needs to be contextualized from case to case in order to
avoid basing strategies on principles, or even worse, fashion. In fact, assuming that
some critical deficit is identified in either monetary or in kilocalorie terms, the strategic
choice is not just a matter of principle but instead should be made on the basis of a
careful analysis of the context. Even if the aim of the programme is a simple nutritional
transfer, the context in which the initiative is to be placed can make a difference. In
particular, market prices play a major role in this regard; a role that can affect the
efficiency of the intervention even more than such programme-related factors as its size
and, consequently, the possibility of achieving economies of scale.
Let us define the model from a donor’s perspective. We will suppose that the donor tries
to optimize the quantity of the donation package (the transfer) as measured in terms of
kilocalories or another type of indicator. Defining the total donation requires knowing
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the total cost (restraint) involved in the program. We will use a classical production
model (isoquant-isocost analysis) to find the optimal decision for the donor in terms of
the combination of cash and food to form any donation package. For this a purpose the
concepts of total donation and total costs are defined below.
The total donation is given by:
 MFgD , (8.1)
which depends upon two inputs, food and money. The function g can be thought of as a
strategic decision of the donor (i.e. it involves political, economic, and other issues). F
is the quantity of food required to produce a donation package and M is the amount of
money required to make a donation package. For consistency purposes both F and M
are measured in terms of kilocalories.
The total cost is equal to:
McFcTC mf  (8.2)
where:
TC is the total cost
fc is the total cost of one unit of food in the donation package
F is the quantity of food needed to form a donation package
mc is the total cost of one unit of money in the donation package
M is the quantity of money, measured in kilocalories, required to form a donation
package.
The unitary cost for each input fc  and mc  are defined as a linear combination of
different costs required to produce the donation package:
othmantgf cccPc   (8.3)
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with 1,,,0    and 1 
  othmanm ccrMc ''' 1   (8.4)
with 1,,0 '''    and 1'''  
where:
gP is the consumer price of one unit of food on the international market
tc is the transportation cost per unit of food
manc is the management and administrative unit cost
othc reflects any other costs per unit of transfer
r is the interest rate, taken here as an estimate of the opportunity cost of money. In
principle, r should reflect a combined measure of the rate faced by the donor and
by the recipient for the effective use of M.
As such, TC can be expressed as the relationship between the weighted costs of the two
transfer mechanisms, that is the relationship between the quantity of food transferred
measured either in nutritional terms (i.e. kilocalories, metric tonnes, etc) or economic
terms (i.e. USD) and the amount of cash measured in the same unit. This relationship
can take different shapes, of which the most relevant are presented in Figure 8.1.
Box 8.1 The shape of a donation package curve
The donation package curve can take different shapes. Such shapes reflect different
assumptions made by the donor about the rate of substitution between money and food;
in other words they reflect the donor’s preferences according to the estimated
productivity/efficiency of the different ways in which the donation is given.
Theoretically speaking, we could have three different donation functions: a) a straight
line in which the rate of substitution between the two inputs is assumed to be constant;
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b) the Cobb-Douglas case in which the curve is convex from the origin, thus involving
different substitution rates between food and money; and c) the Leontieff curve with
fixed coefficients.
These three functional forms reflect a different attitude towards the choice under
discussion and each can provide the best representation of the donation curve according
to initial assumptions about the donor’s perspective and key contextual issues.
While the straight line identifies a condition of indifference towards one strategy or the
other, a Cobb-Douglas-shaped curve identifies a certain more or less strong preference
for one solution. As well known, this provides a good reflection of the current
diversification among donors’ attitude about the use of food and/or cash, with a few
convinced supporters of rather extreme positions and the bulk spread between the two
sides. But it also raises the choice that each donor is confronted with when considering
specific allocations of donations to interventions in different contexts. In order to
optimize the efficiency of the transfer, the same donor may want to adjust the food-
money combination to the specific characteristics of the context in which the package is
finally transferred. In theory this means that each context may be defined by different
points within the entire range of the possible combinations along a Cobb-Douglas curve.
The convexity of the curve reflects the opportunity cost of moving along it: shifting
from a food-predominant combination to a money-predominant one and vice-versa
involves different rates of substitution and therefore opportunity costs, according to the
position along the curve.126
Despite the simplifications provided by the linear function and the higher sensitivity
shown by the Cobb-Douglas curve, the Leontieff function seems to better reflect current
practice in the provision of food and money combination packages, with the ratio
tending to be fixed over time within each intervention among some reference values
usually expressed in terms of shares of the assumed total transfer value (e.g. 80%-20%
or 70/-30%, etc). In fact, first of all, despite the high interest developed in the recent
126 The upward concavity means that moving downwards along the curve allows the ratio to shift from a
condition which is initially favourable to money (i.e. ceteris paribus it is necessary to give out more units
of food against money) to the opposite one.
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years in the increasing substitution of food in favour of money, the share of the latter
remains on average modest and therefore it very rarely happens to span along the full
range of possible combinations. But, in particular, the limited number of combinations
among the range of possibilities that are actually implemented highlights some rigidities
dictated by implementation constraints.
Figure 8.1 Isocosts and isoquants
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Along the points highlighted above it is probably impossible to find any functional form
that is more appropriate in absolute terms to represent the donation function, because it
will depend on such key determinants as the donor’s preference, beneficiaries’
preference, contextual factors of destination such as market functioning, institutional set-
up, implementation bottlenecks, etc, the costs involved in the package, and so on.
In this case the relationship is assumed to be linear, which means imposing the
simplifying assumption that the market substitution rate between the two transfer
systems is constant and equal to mf ccP  . In terms of isoquant-isocost analysis this
can be thought of as the Marginal Rate of Substitution given by the market.
The above is supported by the consideration that since McFcTC mf   is fixed,
the optimal market decision involves the differentiation of this expression:
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dMcdFcdTC mf  which, under the imposition of 0dTC , leads to:
m
f
c
c
dF
dM  (8.5)
From a donor’s perspective the main transfer strategy decision is related to selecting the
best combination of food and money to be donated. In broad terms this is expected to
reflect the preferences of each donor behind the donation, be they countries, agencies or
interest groups. In this case, considering the donation package given by (8.1), if the
target pursued is to provide a fixed package D = _D (isoquant) the optimal decision
involves the maximization of the donation function subject to the cost constraint. Thus:
0

 dMM
gdFF
g (8.6)
and hence:











M
g
F
g
dF
dM (8.7)
where:
F
g

 may be considered in light of the efficiency of the transfer, as well as of a certain
selfish attitude of the donor. The latter may be justified by donor interest in
stabilizing an eventual surplus on the domestic market (reflected in low
domestic prices), or in response to an eventual unfavourable imbalance on the
international market. The aim of maximizing the transfer efficiency reflects the
utility of the beneficiary, taking into account the local market price of the
commodity in the donation package.
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dF corresponds to the marginal change in the quantity of food measured in
kilocalories.
M
g

 may be seen in light of the beneficiary’s interests and consequently is associated
with a higher efficiency of the transfer. In economic terms, the use of cash
allows avoidance of unnecessary losses in the eventual resale of food
commodities. From a nutritional perspective, the contribution of cash transfers
towards a higher diet diversification is regularly highlighted. Furthermore, it is
appreciated that such a form of transfer is more respectful of the recipient’s
dignity.
dM corresponds to the marginal change in the amount of money measured in
kilocalories.
Despite the various factors that may affect the donor’s choice of the combination of
cash and food, for the purposes of this study our analysis is limited to an economic
perspective. It is assumed here that this perspective is mainly aimed at the maximization
of the transfer efficiency under the constraint of a higher or lower predisposition
towards a cash-based or commodity-based approach. In this case, if we assume that the
total amount of the donation is given, the donor tries to maximize the amount of the
transfer D – as shown in equation (8.1) – subject to a cost constraint shown in equation
(8.2).
Summing up, the allocation of D is based on the ratio shown in equation (8.7) and the
relative market prices given in equation (8.5).
However, no criterion is set as a general rule in this regard, with contrasting opinions
expressed by different donors and the international community in general. Our opinion
is that this combination is to be defined on a case-by-case basis according to the market
prices prevailing in the area of destination of the transfer as well as on the degree of
market functioning in the same area. In particular, the higher the local market prices, the
lower the effective value of a cash transfer (either in terms of size of transfer to each
recipient or in terms of number of recipients, or ceteris paribus in terms of the duration
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of the intervention). Conversely, in the case of high local market prices a commodity-
based transfer would both leave the transfer unaffected in physical and nutritional terms
and increase the money that a recipient could receive through eventual monetization of
part of the transfer. The opposite would hold in case of low food prices on the local
market.
The relevance of market functioning concerns the very nature of cash as a tool for
exchange. The degree of market functioning reflects the supply capacity to respond to
the increase in demand generated through the cash transfer. In a functioning market, a
lower degree of price increase is to be expected, if any at all. But the opposite is
expected to be the case when dealing with a malfunctioning market. In these conditions
a cash injection is expected to generate an increase in the price of the food, which in
turn will alter the relative price between food and other goods.
Having said the above, in our model the donor’s optimal choice is obtained by
equalizing equations (8.5) and (8.7):














m
f
c
c
M
g
F
g
dF
dM (8.8)
which in turn means that the optimal decision is given by:
mf c
M
g
c
F
g 










(8.9)
Equation (8.9) sets the condition that determines the optimal donation package for the
donor. It is given by the equalization between a) the efficiency of the last US dollar
contributed to the donation package in the form of food and b) the efficiency of the last
US dollar contributed to the package in the form of money.
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8.2.2 What would happen if the donor’s preference is
different from the donation package defined by the
relative price of food and money?
With reference to the straight line donation curve presented in Figure 8.1, the donor’s
preference affects the slope of the line: a higher slope reflects a preference for a higher
share of the donation package to be covered by food – as it is the case with
__
**D – and
the opposite otherwise, as with
__
**
1D . In the two cases considered the optimization of the
aid package would be achieved in the two corner solutions obtained by contributing the
entire package in the form of food (i.e. corner solution achieved through
__
*D  in A) or in
the form of cash (i.e. corner solution achieved through
__
*
1D  in B). These corner solutions
correspond to the following conditions:
a) Corner solution with food:
m
f
c
c
M
g
F
g











(8.10)
b)  Corner solution with money:
m
f
c
c
M
g
F
g











(8.11)
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8.2.3 An enlarged perspective
A more elaborated version of (8.3) and (8.4) is given by (8.12) and (8.13) which try to
take into account some forms of unintended uses of the transfer.
  lresothmantlgf PSFcccPPc   ***** (8.12)
with 1,,,,0 ****    and 1****  
     lgfothmanm PPSMccrMc   11 '*'*'** (8.13)
with 1,,,0 '*'*'*    and 1'*'*'*  
where:
resSF is an estimate of the share of food commodities received that are
eventually resold by the beneficiary;
lP is an estimate of the price at which food commodities are eventually
resold. In this case, for simplicity the resale price is assumed to be equal
to the local price of food;
fSM is an estimate of the share of the cash transfer used by the beneficiary to
purchase food. Therefore the quantity  1  measures the share of
money transfer eventually used by the beneficiary for non-food related
purposes.
Expressed in such a formulation, the role of relative prices is critical in defining the
optimum composition of the donation package. Ceteris paribus, a change in gP  and/or
lP   due to exogenous factors would determine a shift in the isocost.
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8.2.4 What would happen if the relative price of food
changes for exogenous reasons?
Let us assume that the donor has different preferences about the composition of the
package. In this case it is better to use the Cobb-Douglas curve.
First of all, shortened *fc  and *mc  can be reduced as follows:
  lreslgf PSFPPc   ** (8.14)
   lgfm PPSMc   1* (8.15)
where   and  are fixed:
othmant ccc ***   (8.16)
  othman ccrM '*'*'* 1   (8.17)
As a simplification, let us make the assumption that the beneficiary can spend the
money transfer only on the purchase of food – which means imposing the condition:
0fSM  in equation (8.13) – so that any variation of the international price just affects
the unit cost of food *fc . Along the same lines we make also the assumption that no
resale of food commodities received occurs, which means assuming that 0resSF . In
these conditions:
 

 lg
m
f PP
c
c *
*
*   =   lg
PP*  + 
  =  
l
g
P
P (8.18)
where  and  are constant.
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As the relative price lg PP  decreases, the cost of food *fc  will decrease. In turn, this
means that the donor will face a different cost constraint and hence his preference may
change, which will affect the optimum combination of food and money in the donation
package.
Figure 8.2 Changes in relative prices determine changes in relative costs
f"
m" M
TC
TC" TC'
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F
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f = m
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fm cc
Source: Author
As *fc  depends on  lg PP* , the final impact on the combination of the donation
package is related to the value of  . As   moves between zero and one, the closer its
value to zero, the lower the impact of a change in the relative price, and the opposite
otherwise.
This is shown in Figure 8.2 where the shift in the relative prices determines an increase
in the relative cost, which is reflected in a shift in the isocost: a decrease in the relative
price of food – determined either by a decrease in gP  or by an increase in lP – will
determine a shift in the isocost. The isocost will move towards the origin pivoting on A.
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The size of the shift is determined by  : values of  close to zero will determine small
shifts, while values of   close to one will determine large shifts.
Each shift in the isocost will determine a change in the point of tangency between the
isocost and the isoquant; this will modify the optimum composition of the donation
package. This can be clearly visualized by considering eventual shifts of the isocost line
from an optimum combination equally formed by money and food, which corresponds
to a point of tangency positioned along the 45 degree line. A small shift of TC, as from
TC to TC’, will only marginally affect the composition of the package, determining a
slight increase in the share of the transfer covered by food and decreasing the share of
money accordingly. Conversely, a larger shift, as from TC to TC”, will be reflected in a
wider gap between the point of tangency and the diagonal, determining an optimum
combination package formed by a higher share of food (f”) and a lower share of money
(m”).
8.2.5 Relaxing the assumptions
At this stage let us reconsider one of the assumptions made above. In particular we are
going to focus on the assumption that all food received through the donation package is
consumed by the beneficiary.127 This assumption is quite unlikely.
The assumption that the totality of the food commodities received is consumed by the
beneficiary has allowed consideration of these commodities only for their nutritional
value and not for their economic value. This theoretical limitation can be overcome by
allowing that all possible combinations which include some quantity of food can
involve a certain rate of monetization (i.e. partial resale of the food received).
127 Another major assumption made above imposes the condition that the recipient spends all money
received through the donation package on food. This assumption involves the analysis of the beneficiary’s
utility and goes beyond the perspective adopted throughout the present study, which focuses instead on
the efficiency of the provision of aid. For this purpose the assumption made above is maintained, or at the
maximum can be partially relaxed by imposing the condition that all money received that is not spent on
food is used by the recipient for other purposes which have the same cost-efficiency of kilocalories as
would have been otherwise achieved through the consumption of the same quantity of food.
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Under the assumption that this would happen at the local market price lP , TC would
shift, pivoting on B in response to a change in the ratio lg PP  and consequent change
in the slope of the isocost. If gl PP   the ratio lg PP  will decrease and TC will shift
downwards. Conversely, if gl PP   the ratio will increase and the isocost will shift
upwards. The size of the shift would depend on the share of food commodity received
which is resold: the higher the share, the higher the size of the shift.
Figure 8.3 Accounting for any eventual monetization of food aid
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Source: Author
The case in which gl PP   is shown in Figure 8.3. The initial optimum combination is
identified by the point of tangency between the donation curve D and the isocost TC
which happens to fall on the point of tangency along the 45 degree line where m = f.
Starting from this initial optimum combination, a small share of monetization will lead
to a shift from TC to TC*. In this new condition the point of tangency between TC* and
the donation curve D* will generate a minor change in the composition of the optimum
package. Conversely, a larger share of monetization will cause the isocost to move from
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TC to TC**. In this case the point of tangency between the donation curve D** and
TC** is farther from the 45 degree line, and this corresponds to a wider gap between
food and cash with an increase in the share of cash in the composition of the optimum
donation package.
8.2.6 Relative advantage
Based on the above, some areas of relative advantage have been identified. These areas
are identified by a series of factors considered above: donor preferences, relative price
of food on the global and local market, size of eventual resale of food. The first factor
determines the shape of the isoquant, while the others determine the position and
movements of the isocost.
As summarized in Figure 8.4, the area of relative advantage of different strategies is
identified by the movements of the isocost. It depends on a) whether the shift of the
isocost happens by pivoting on its point of intersection with either of the two axes, and
b) the direction of the shift.
When TC happens to pivot on its point of intersection with the food axis, as in Figure
8.4a, a shift of the isocost to the right makes any combination which involves a certain
component of cash transfer less efficient. In particular, the higher the relevance of the
cash transfer and the reduction in the relative price lg PP , the less efficient the
donation package. The opposite is the case if the isocost shifts leftwards. In this case, as
said above, while a reduction of lP does not affect directly the cost-efficiency of a
commodity-based (i.e. mainly providing food through the donation package)
programme, it makes it less efficient in comparative terms by increasing the transfer
value of a cash-based transfer. In other words, while in the former case we have
identified a relative loss for a cash approach – and, consequently, this is of relative
advantage for a food approach – in the latter we have identified a relative advantage for
a cash approach and consequently, this is a relative loss for a food approach.
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The inverse results to be the case when TC pivots on the intersection with the money
axis, as in Figure 8.4b.
In Figure 8.4 light-shaded areas identify areas of relative advantage of food, dark-
shaded areas otherwise.
Figure 8.4 Areas of relative advantage
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While the movements of the isocost allow identification of the areas of relative
advantage of different strategies, the estimation of the differential cost associated with
each strategy requires the definition of the isoquant. This is reflected in a shift of the
point of tangency between the isoquant and the isocost. As a consequence of this shift,
the differential cost is measured by the transposition of the points of tangency onto the
relevant axis: the M axis in Figure 8.4a and the F axis in Figure 8.4b.
As indicated above, the shape of the isoquant reflects the donor’s a priori attitude
towards the composition of the donation package in terms of higher preference for
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either food or money. Therefore, the higher the donor’s preference for money (food),
the closer will be the point of tangency to the M (F) axis.
In Figure 8.4a the estimate of the loss or advantage in case of a package composed
entirely by money is given by BB’ or BB” respectively. In this case the size of
advantage or loss is determined solely by the change in the ratio ** fm cc and ultimately
in the ratio lg PP . In view of the linear structure of the isocost, the size of the loss or
advantage will decline linearly as the point of tangency moves along the isocost.
Therefore the size of advantage or loss can be estimated as a function of the price ratio
and of the composition of the donation package.
The same reasoning can be followed in Figure 8.4b with the due changes.
8.3 Possible applications
The estimation of relative advantage which can be eventually associated with different
strategies, as well as the simulation of possible scenarios, can provide major support in
different phases of an intervention. In fact, its role can be critical at the planning stage
when considering alternative intervention strategies. In the same way it can also be quite
helpful in a monitoring phase when reviewing the performance of an intervention and
projecting it into the future through the simulation of future conditions associated with
either expected or hypothetical events.
More generally, the process described above is useful for fine-tuning intervention
strategy in time and space. In the first case, the change over time in the price ratio,
determined by changes of either gP and/or lP , can help to adjust the composition of the
donation package accordingly.128 In the latter case, when used in a time-invariant
128 In this case prices are the only exogenous factor allowed to change over time. In other words, the
analysis maintains a comparative statics perspective. The different dynamic implications of the two types
of strategies are ignored here because their discussion goes beyond the purpose of this study.
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fashion it can help to provide a snapshot of the different values of the price ratio in
different contexts, be they countries or parts of the same country. When the comparative
analysis is conducted from this static perspective, changes in gP become irrelevant and
the focus of the analysis centres on the eventual spatial differences in the relative value
of lP .
While the information presented so far is mainly focused on a cost-efficiency
perspective, it may be of help to also consider the selection of intervention strategy in a
wider perspective which goes beyond a project dimension and is able to take into
account not only direct and positive effects, but also indirect and negative ones. The
problem usually encountered with this approach is the lack of homogeneity of the issues
at stake. Unfortunately, even in this case the quantification of the relative advantage of
one strategy against the others does not help to answer recurrent questions, such as the
estimation of the value added in terms of total effectiveness expected from an
intervention which can be associated with a marginal increase of its unit cost. What is
feasible instead, though less robust, is an ordinal approach which allows estimation of
the cost associated with strategies that, on the basis of a pre-set list of principles, can be
given an ordinal value. In other words, as long as we are able to identify the priority of
one strategy over another we should be able to estimate, ceteris paribus, the differential
cost associated with the selection of the one considered most effective.
To make a simple case, let us consider the task of deciding between a cash-based and a
commodity-based strategy for a relatively small intervention in a remote area
chronically affected by food shortage and dependent on imports of food commodities.
Assume that a preliminary assessment has indicated that local market functioning is
rather mixed and that a cash-based strategy is feasible. The consideration the decision
maker is confronted with is that while commodity-based assistance is vital to
maintaining the commodity flow, a cash-based strategy would not only provide the
same inflow of food commodities but would also be beneficial in stimulating the local
economy and helping to overcome the current situation of isolation. In this case, the
main objective of the strategy remains the nutritional and livelihood support to be
achieved through the improvement of food availability and food access. However, the
two strategies considered here (on the assumption of total reliance on either one of the
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two inputs) are quite different, first and foremost because of the different concerns
about possible side-effects, which may be relevant to a perspective of longer duration
than the intervention under discussion. This wider perspective taken by the decision
maker allows consideration to be given to aspects which would be normally neglected,
as they are deemed secondary to the purposes of the specific initiative. Through a
simulation exercise we could try to get a reasonable grasp of the possible impact in
terms of the identified side-effect, and this could eventually allow the decision maker to
evaluate such an impact and include this value in the analysis of cost-efficiency. Having
said that, even without making this effort, the cost-efficiency analysis will help to give a
shadow value to the side-effect under discussion, in our case estimated as the difference
between the unit costs of the two strategies considered. This estimate is a measure of the
additional costs that need to be faced in order to achieve the side- or secondary effect
identified in addition to the main aim of the intervention. In other words, such an
analysis will tell us how much the unit cost of the less expensive option needs to be
increased by in order to achieve, ceteris paribus, the additional result proposed as a
side-effect. With specific reference to the case mentioned earlier, this analysis should
help to estimate the increment in unit cost required to make the intervention favourable
to the local economy, in addition to it being capable of properly pursuing its main
objective.
A possible application of the process presented above is in helping to adjust strategies to
the specific conditions of implementation by fine-tuning the combination of available
options according to variables such as space and time. The former would mean that the
strategy is diversified geographically according to localized characteristics such as
market strength and livelihood, and the latter would involve the adjustment of strategies
over time to take into account seasonal variation of relevant factors. This would allow
enlargement of the scale and time frame of the analysis by drawing as many isoquants
as the number of areas and periods for which estimates of both relevant project costs
and contextual relevant data are available. By comparing the specific isoquant with the
relevant isocost it is possible to estimate a monetary value of the comparative advantage
of each option within a set of strategies for each area and period.
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In more general terms, the process presented above can be expanded and inverted in
order to compare the differences in cost-efficiency between a series of alternative
strategies assumed – or adapted – to have similar level of effectiveness.
The following section provides a simple application of the analytical process presented
above, using project data from Kenya.
8.4 The case of Turkana: cost-efficiency of cash-based
and food-based strategies
Chapter 4 highlighted the critical role played by trade within the food economy of
Turkana and consequently as a major determinant of food supply and nutritional status.
The complexities of the Turkana case, its chronic dimension and particularly its strong
dependence on food imports from neighbouring areas make it an ideal case to underline
the need to adapt development policies as well as short-term strategies in a way to
provide due attention to trade issues.
The comparative analysis conducted in chapter 4 about the implementation of food aid
and cash-based programmes in Turkana considered the relative performance of both
strategies. Relevant indicators were considered such as the share of food requirements
covered through food assistance and traders’ and beneficiaries’ preferences for the
various strategies. However, no attention was paid to a basic efficiency analysis which
can provide some valuable insights into and critical support for decision making.
The role of food aid comes at a remarkable cost. For an estimate of the cost of food aid
distributed in Turkana, we can refer to the overall budget of the emergency operation
(EMOP) implemented by WFP in Kenya in response to the drought. The operation was
started in August 2004 for an initial period of six months and has gone through a series
of budget revisions which have both modified the budget and the duration of the
intervention. The latest budget revision considered for the present analysis was
approved in February 2006, extending the intervention till the end of June 2007 and
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increasing the budget from 128.93 million USD to 354.32 million USD. Table 8.1
provides a summary of the unit cost estimated on the basis of the official budget for the
intervention and of the various revisions undergone up to June 2007.
Table 8.1    Estimated unit cost of food aid delivered through EMOP
                    10374.0
USD / 1000 Kcal USD / MT
Initial Budget 0.129 426
Budget Revision n.1  (combined to previous budget) 0.134 442
Budget Revision n.3  (combined to previous budget) 0.139 458
Budget Revision n.4  (combined to previous budget) 0.140 463
Budget Revision n.6  (combined to previous budget) 0.152 500
Budget Revision n.6  (on its own) 0.158 522
Budget Revision n.6  (on its own) - EMOP 0.106 350
Budget Revision n.6  (on its own) - Turkana 0.128 424
 Source: Author’s elaboration of EMOP data
It is interesting to note how the average total cost of the intervention has consistently
risen over its period of implementation, from 426 USD per MT in terms of cereal
equivalent to 500 USD. In particular, limiting the estimation to the latest budget
revision, the unit cost rises to 522 USD per MT of cereal equivalent. Both estimates
(500 and 522 USD per MT) refer to the same budget revision, considered either as an
average for the tonnage of the entire EMOP, or as an average for the tonnage of the
sixth budget revision (which on its own represents almost two thirds of the cumulative
budget).
However, if we want to establish an estimate limited to the case of Turkana, we can
expect this to be higher than the average, mainly in view of the longer distance from
major logistic centres. At this point an arbitrary approximation is made and, following
discussions with WFP, it seems reasonable to consider the average transport-related
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costs (identified by the acronym LTSH in WFP jargon)129 for Turkana as around 25%
higher than the average for the rest of the areas covered by the EMOP.130 On this basis,
and with reference to an average unit cost estimated at 511 USD per MT of cereal
equivalent, the average estimate in the case of food aid delivered in Turkana would be
ceteris paribus around 556 USD per MT.
It is necessary to recognize how the unit cost just estimated is based on an ex-ante
budget rather than on a review of tonnage actually delivered and costs actually incurred.
Unfortunately, a review of costs actually incurred is not available, either in the case of
the EMOP or in particular in the case of the share of food aid distributed in Turkana.
Despite the higher-than-average LTSH rate which can be reasonably assumed in the
case of Turkana, there are a few considerations that could help in approximating the unit
cost estimate to its real value. A major adjustment is feasible in the estimate of the
LTSH rate applied in the budget. As is normal practice, this rate is fixed around its
maximum value in order to ensure the feasibility of the operations. Following
discussions with WFP it seems possible to reduce the average LTSH for the EMOP to
70-75 USD per MT without undermining its operational feasibility.131 On the basis of
this consideration, taking 75 USD per MT as a shadow rate for the EMOP LTSH, the
value of this rate in the case of food aid delivered in Turkana would be 100 USD per
MT. On the basis of these shadow values of the LTSH rate the unit cost is re-estimated
at around 350 USD per MT and 424 USD per MT respectively as the EMOP average
and as the average for the Turkana share of the EMOP. These are presented in Table 8.1
in italics.132
129 The acronym LTSH stands for Land Transport Storage and Handling and reflects the unit cost
estimated for the movement of one MT of commodity.
130 Source: Informal discussion between the author and the logistics unit of WFP Kenya country office.
131 Ibidem
132 Some additional reduction of the unit cost could be envisaged with reference to the procurement cost
of the commodities; however such approximation has not been taken into account in this case. In
particular, the possibility of purchasing a part of the commodities required in Kenya, in case of favourable
overall production and supply, should help to reduce some costs initially budgeted for such as
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At this stage, in order to get a complete view of the process, it is appropriate to include
in the estimate the distribution cost incurred by WFP collaborating partner and not
included in the EMOP budget. In the case of Turkana the non-refundable cost incurred
by WFP collaborating partner, OXFAM, has been estimated at around six USD per MT.
This leads to an estimated average unit cost of 430 USD per MT.133
Finally, in order to gain a full comparative perspective between the food aid and CFW
interventions implemented in Turkana, a unit cost for the cash-based programme is
estimated. As in the case of the food aid programme considered above, reference is
made to ex-ante budget data. In particular, the relevant unit costs have been estimated
from the six-month budget. In this case, attention has been paid to the transfer value of
the intervention and particularly to the nutritional equivalent value of the cash transfer.
Therefore the cost of the CFW material input has not been included in the analysis.134,
135
international transport and associated costs as well as various components of the LTSH rate, besides
providing a favourable contribution to the Kenyan economy.
133 This is a minimum estimation of non-refundable costs strictly linked to a larger unit cost (estimated in
this case to be around 31 USD / MT) which is included in the EMOP budget and is to be refunded by
WFP to its collaborating partners on the basis of MTs distributed. Bearing in mind that the number of
MTs distributed by the partner depends on the WFP pipeline, which can be affected by various problems
including funding and operational delays (procurement of commodities, international and local transport,
etc), it is possible to understand how, in normal circumstances, the non-refundable costs incurred by the
WFP partner are expected to increase in view of the fixed costs, which are obviously not related to the
tonnage finally distributed.
134 The inclusion of the CFW component would have involved a much deeper analysis which is not
necessary to the central aim of this study.
135 For reasons of homogeneity all the costs in Table 8.2 are expressed as unit costs and include the value
of the transfer. In other words, as the estimate of 659 USD includes the cost of the food commodities, the
estimate of 1.77 USD includes the value of one USD to be transferred.
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Table 8.2 Unit cost of transfer through CFW and EMOP
Cost to transfer: USD Cost to transfer: USD
1 USD 1.766 1 USD  -
1000 Kcal 0.188 1000 Kcal 0.128
1 MT cereal equivalent 659 1 MT cereal equivalent 424
Cost to transfer: USD Cost to transfer: USD
1 USD 1.327 1 USD  -
1000 Kcal 0.142 1000 Kcal 0.128
1 MT cereal equivalent 496 1 MT cereal equivalent 454
Cost to transfer: USD Cost to transfer: USD
1 USD 1.327 1 USD  -
1000 Kcal 0.094 1000 Kcal 0.128
1 MT cereal equivalent 330 1 MT cereal equivalent 454
CFW E MOP
Ex-ante
Ex-post adjusted to scale of intervention
Ex-post adjusted to scale of intervention and national average prices
Source: Author’s elaboration of EMOP and CFW data
The upper part of Table 8.2 provides an opportunity to compare the average costs
estimated for the two strategies. Surprisingly, it seems to be more expensive to deliver
and distribute cash than the equivalent in terms of food: 659 versus 430 USD per MT of
cereal equivalent. A few clarifications are required:
 In both cases the unit cost has been estimated on ex-ante budgets rather than on
expenses actually incurred;
 The scale of the intervention can be expected to affect the unit cost;
 The transfer value, for the conversion of cash into food, is based on local market
price, expected to be higher than national average.
To address the first two points raised, the analysis has been repeated, refocusing on the
timeframe and the scale of the intervention. In particular, it has been repeated on the
costs incurred by OXFAM in a previous phase of both interventions (CFW and GFD).
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This gives us the chance to deal with ex-post data, which are sufficiently comparable in
terms of the scale of the intervention. It is necessary to specify that in this case costs
included in the analysis purely reflect the costs supported by OXFAM through the two
interventions: distribution of food aid as WFP’s collaborating partner and distribution of
cash.136, 137 As shown in the central part of Table 8.2, the comparison now gives us a
different picture: the cost to transfer cash has decreased, while the cost to transfer food
has increased, drastically reducing the gap between the two estimates. This is essentially
linked to the cost structure of the two interventions, with the EMOP having a higher
share of fixed costs, and is therefore more sensitive to discrepancies between planned
and actual tonnage delivered.138
Finally, as mentioned above, a major determinant of the transfer value is given by the
prices of food on the local market because such market prices determine the amount of
food that can be purchased with the cash transferred. Clearly, the higher the price of the
food on the local market, the lower the effective value of the cash transfer. As shown
earlier in Figure 4.8, prices prevailing on the Turkana markets are almost double the
national average. These high prices prevailing on the local market drastically reduce the
cost-efficiency of cash transfers. In order to get a clearer idea of the imbalance caused
by the level of prices prevailing on local markets, the unit costs have been re-estimated
on the basis of national average market prices. This provides us with a simulation of
incurred project costs on the theoretical assumption that market prices prevailing on the
136 The two interventions under discussion in this case have been implemented by OXFAM respectively
during the periods May – November 2005 (CFW) and October 2004 – August 2005 (implementation of
WFP EMOP).
137 Once again, the budget analysis of the cash-related intervention does not include the cost of material
inputs in order to focus on the component of cash transfer. In addition, the usual 7% share for indirect
administrative costs, previously included, has been deducted from the budget of the cash-related
intervention in order to make the budget of the two interventions as much as possible homogeneous
reflecting the actual costs at local project implementation level.
138 The discrepancy between planned and actually delivered quantity of food is a regular feature of food
aid programs and can vary widely. In the specific case considered here – WFP EMOP implemented in
Turkana through OXFAM – the rate delivered–versus–planned is around 42% in terms of MTs and 44%
in terms of nutritional value transferred.
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Turkana markets are in line with the national average ones. The new estimates, reported
in the lower part of Table 8.2, show how in this case the unit cost of CFW is reduced by
almost a third, evidencing its much higher cost-efficiency. This consideration offers a
clear reminder of the relevance of contextual factors, such as local price levels in
particular, on the cost-efficiency of intervention strategies and, therefore, on their
relevance for decision making.
A graphic visualization of the unit costs estimated in Table 8.2 can assist in comparing
intervention strategies: in Figure 8.3 any input combination above or on the right side of
the isocost is in favour of a commodity-based strategy, while the opposite applies below
or on the left side of the isocost line. In Figure 8.3.a an amount of 42 USD per MT (i.e.
496 USD per MT – 454 USD per MT) can be estimated as the savings deriving from
choosing to implement a 100% commodity-based strategy rather than a 100% cash-
based strategy in Turkana. When shifting to a combined input approach such a saving is
expected to continuously fall towards zero at any increase of the cash component. In the
same way, when considering the non-Turkana part of the operation the unit cost
estimated for a cash-based strategy is mainly on the left side of the isocost, in the area
that in Figure 8.2 was defined as the area of cash comparative advantage. In this case
the maximum average loss associated with the choice of a commodity-based strategy
proves to be quite high: 124 USD per MT (i.e. 454 USD per MT – 330 USD per MT).
Under a combined strategy, this loss continuously falls towards zero at any increase of
the cash component.139
139 If relevant data are available for various locations, using the same process it is possible to estimate the
isoquant associated with the various geographical components of the current EMOP as well as the
difference between the appropriate unit cost and the isocost. By comparing the localized isoquant against
the isocost it is possible to estimate for each area a monetary value of the comparative advantage of a
different set of strategies. In the absence of relevant data at local level, it seems reasonable to expect that
for areas reasonably well integrated with the national market the unit cost associated with a 100% cash-
strategy is closer to the lower end of the range identified (i.e. 330 USD per MT rather than 454 USD per
MT). The opposite would apply for areas less integrated.
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Figure 8.5    Comparative analysis of preferential advantage of cash-based versus
                       commodity-based strategies
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In Figure 8.3.a the isoquant connecting the possible strategy options for non-Turkana is
based on the assumption that the scale of the intervention implemented in Turkana is
replicated in other parts of the country, the only difference being local market prices,
which affect the transfer value. This assumption is rather theoretical since it does not
take into account factors such as the economies of scale or price-related side-effects of
the intervention, particularly relevant when dealing with large size interventions. Under
the strong assumption that a commodity-based strategy affects downwards prices in the
beneficiary areas and the opposite happens following a cash-based strategy, it is
possible to consider a wide range of effects that can be expected from a full set of
possible intervention options. The dataset on which the analysis is based does not
consider how the substitution effect would influence prices in the rest of the country,
but we can refer to the estimate conducted in chapter 4 about the inflationary effect of a
switch from a commodity-based to a cash-based approach in Turkana. Through the
analysis of supply capacity expandability and traders’ willingness to scale-up business,
it has been estimated that around a 5% price increase would be required to cover,
through market channels, the gap eventually determined by the end of the food aid
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programme in the district. This price increase is remarkable considering that local
market prices are already much higher than the national average. As a result of such a
price increase the isoquant for Turkana would shift rightwards along the x axis and
downwards along the y axis. The new values for the unit cost in the rest of the country
have been estimated under the reasonable assumption that the rate of price increase
induced by a complete substitution of food aid with cash would generate a price
increase not higher than that expected in the case of Turkana. Therefore, taking a
pessimistic view, the new unit costs have been estimated assuming the same rate of
price rise as simulated for Turkana. This assumption is rather in favour of a commodity-
based perspective. Figure 8.3.b presents the new estimates and the adjustment in the
isoquant analysis. The unit cost of the commodity-based strategy would be affected by
the price rise only with regard to the share of food aid monetized by the beneficiaries.
Assuming an average rate of monetization of around 25%, the isocost should shift
slightly downwards; however this shift is minimal and the effect on the unit cost can be
ignored (i.e. the effective unit cost of a 100% commodity-based strategy is reduced
from 454.280 USD per MT to 454.279 USD per MT).
The overall adjustment of unit cost estimates determined by a change in market prices
shows, as expected, an improvement in favour of a commodity-based approach. The
difference between the old and the new area of each input advantage appears to be
modest. In Turkana the gap associated with a 100% cash-based strategy increases from
42 USD per MT (i.e. 496 USD per MT – 454 USD per MT) to 67 USD per MT (i.e. 521
USD per MT – 454 USD per MT). This improvement does not affect the strong relative
advantage of a cash-based approach in food aid intervention areas outside Turkana. In
such a case the gap associated with a 100% cash-based strategy decreases from 124
USD per MT (i.e. 454 USD per MT – 330 USD per MT) to 107 USD per MT (i.e. 454
USD per MT – 347 USD per MT). As mentioned above, it is reasonable to expect that
within the ranges identified for the areas of relative advantage of each strategy there
may be remarkable differences in unit costs, determined by various factors which are
ultimately reflected in market prices, with the areas characterized by lower market
prices closer to the isoquant, reflecting the lower estimate of unit costs.
At this stage, after defining and adjusting the isoquant and estimating the unit costs
associated with different strategies, it is possible to include in the analysis the side-
Relevance of contextual factors
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
265
effects that the decision maker considers worth taking into account in selecting a
strategy. In a case such as that of Turkana, characterized by a rudimentary economy and
a certain degree of isolation from the rest of the country, it is relevant to consider any
stimulus to the local economic growth a high priority. Therefore the selection among
feasible intervention strategies should prefer any option that offers the opportunity to
generate this stimulus either directly or, ceteris paribus, indirectly.
It is difficult to see food aid as a strategy to promote the local economy; on the contrary,
it is expected to have a discouraging effect on local supply and, in general, on local
initiative, and Turkana is no exception. However, the local market capacity seems to
give contradictory signs: despite the profitability of trade, a large share of both actual
and potential demand remains uncovered. This condition would fall into the I quadrant
of Figure 3.1 in which a strategy based on a combination of commodity and cash may
prove most effective. In other words, while a strategy totally reliant on commodities is
not seen as favourable to stimulate the local economy, a certain cash component is seen
as an appropriate way to contribute to achieving the main objective of improving
household food security whilst helping to counterbalance the unfavourable effect of a
commodity-based strategy on the local economy. While the framework proposed is
unable to give a value to the side-effect of supporting the local economy through the
cash injection, it is possible to estimate the changes in the costs of the intervention
under preparation. Table 8.3 summarizes the unit costs for a few critical combinations
of input shares. The estimation of unit costs and their differentials here is based on the
assumption of their linear distribution; this allows for an easy interpolation to estimate
an expanded matrix based on both input shares and price increases, which are not
considered in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3     Unit cost of various combinations of cash- and commodity-based
strategies
food cash avg avg
0 454 0 454 0
75 25 465 11 471 17
50 50 475 21 488 34
25 75 486 32 504 50
0 496 42 521 67
0 454 0 454 0
75 25 423 427
50 50 392 401
25 75 361 374
0 330 347
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Table 8.3 provides a summary view of the changes in unit costs associated with
different input combination strategies. The approach is quite versatile, since it allows
the optimization of strategy choice at geographical level. In fact, by replicating the
project structure applied to Turkana in other areas and adjusting it to local market
prices, it is possible to estimate additional local isoquant functions that help to estimate
the relevant unit costs as done above. In the case of Turkana, as previously mentioned, a
balanced approach appears preferable as it combines external support to local supply
through food aid with a cash component to increase purchasing power and consequently
stimulate local business. A combination based on equal shares of cash and commodity
raises the unit cost by 21 USD per MT (i.e. 475 USD per MT – 454 USD per MT),
corresponding to around a 4.6% increase. This amount rises to 34 USD per MT
(corresponding to a 7.4% increase) in the case of a 5% price rise on the local market.
These can be seen as the shadow values, or shadow unit costs, that can be attributed to
Relevance of contextual factors
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
267
the secondary objective of developing the local economy through an intervention whose
primary aim is to increase household food security and nutrition.
While a balanced approach is preferable for Turkana, the results of the analysis show
that for the rest of the country currently covered by the food aid intervention a
commodity-based approach is neither the most appropriate nor the most efficient
approach. Apart from a few cases characterized by limited market functioning, the
average degree of market integration is acceptable. This supports a cash-based strategy.
In addition, local market prices are much lower and more stable than in Turkana, which
helps to improve the cost-efficiency of the intervention and to maintain the economic
value of the cash transfer. In line with this position, Table 8.3 shows also that a
commodity-based strategy is inefficient. On average the unit cost associated with a
100% cash-based strategy is 27.3% lower than that associated with a 100% commodity-
based strategy. This means that converting most of the programme from a commodity-
based to a cash-based approach would not only be beneficial to the local economy, but
would be able as well to generate some remarkable savings. In this case, the unit cost
would be reduced from 454 USD per MT to 330 USD per MT. Even when taking into
account a 5% market price rise eventually induced by the cash injection, the savings
would remain remarkable: 107 USD per MT.
8.5 Conclusions
The present chapter has considered the appropriateness and cost-efficiency of
intervention strategies responding to instances of food insecurity. The relevance of
contextual factors, particularly local market prices, in affecting the choice between
cash-based and commodity-based strategies has been examined.140 It has been
considered that even if the aim of the programme is a simple nutrition transfer, the
140 On more general grounds, other contextual factors, such as physical security, market stability, and
others, are critical issues to be taken into account when comparing response options. They have not been
included in the present analysis, which mainly focuses on the relevance of local prices for the cost-
efficiency of interventions.
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context in which the initiative is to be implemented can make a difference. The use of
the isocost and isoquant functions has been presented as a way to strengthen the
comparative analysis of feasible options. It has been shown that this analytical setup
allows for definition of the conditions of comparative advantage for each strategy and
shows how these conditions vary according to some contextual variables. The
estimation of comparative advantage associated with different strategies and the
simulation of possible scenarios can provide major support for both planning and
monitoring. While the analytical approach proposed mainly reflects a cost-efficiency
perspective, how it can be adapted to incorporate an effectiveness perspective has also
been examined. Since estimation of the value added in terms of total effectiveness
associated with a marginal increase in unit cost of the intervention is not feasible, the
proposed approach allows estimation, ceteris paribus, of the differential cost associated
with the strategy which is considered, a priori, more effective than the other considered.
In this case, the choice of the strategy is based on a wider perspective in which the aim
of the intervention remains the same but the analysis manages to take into account
relevant by-products in either a positive or a negative way.
An application of the proposed comparative approach has been presented, focusing on
the choice between a commodity-based and a cash-based intervention strategy in
Turkana, a Kenyan district chronically prone to food insecurity and totally dependent on
food trade. The way the gap between food requirements and supply in the district is
reflected in high prices has been considered. The role played by local market prices in
affecting the cost-efficiency of cash-based interventions and therefore their critical role
in the selection of intervention strategy has been discussed. While a cash-based
approach appears much more efficient than a commodity-based one on the basis of
average national prices, this is no longer the case in Turkana, where the high prices
drastically reduce the transfer value of cash interventions.
Furthermore, the presence of high prices needs to be taken into account when
considering the appropriateness of a cash-based strategy, in view of its likely
inflationary consequences. At the same time, the option of reliance on food aid may
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have disincentive effects which may discourage economic growth in the district in the
long run.141
A simulation of the cost-efficiency of both types of intervention has revealed the
preference for a commodity-based strategy. However, in view of the small margin
detected in favour of food aid, and in view of its mid- and long-term drawbacks, the
feasibility of a cash-based approach has been considered. A balanced approach appears
to be preferable, as it combines external support for local food supply with an increase
in local purchasing capacity. However, the shift from a fully commodity-based strategy
to a mixed one based on equal shares of food and cash is expected to raise the unit cost
by between 4.5% and 7.5% depending on the associated price increase on the local
market. The results of the analysis for the rest of the country are straightforward,
showing that a commodity-based strategy is neither the most appropriate nor the most
efficient approach. The unit cost of a cash-based intervention is expected to be around
107-124 USD per MT lower than that of food aid. Therefore converting intervention
strategy for most of the programme is expected to contribute to producing major project
savings and to benefit the local economic system.
141 Harvey et al. (2005) make the case that relief should not be unnecessarily criticized for failing to
enable recovery or development. This is even after taking into account the potential negative effects of aid
and the possible disincentive effects of relief. The matter is that humanitarian aid may be a wholly
inappropriate instrument for that purpose. As Harvey et al. put it, the problem lies not with relief and its
failings but with the lack of other forms of international engagement with crises.
9
Concluding remarks
9.1 Relevance and challenges of market analysis
Markets are a key element of people’s livelihoods in all contexts, both in normal
conditions and in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, as far as conditions allow
market forces to work. Such a recognition is valid both in the short-term as well in the
long-term. In recent years a series of events has contributed to raising the relevance of
market analysis as part of food security analysis and planning. Concerns about
achieving the relevant MDGs have increased with the growing complexity of food
security issue both at global and local level, as dramatically reflected in the global food
and financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. At the same time, the likely consequences of the
ongoing process of global warming do not help to brighten the prospects for agricultural
production in some of the most depressed parts of the world. Following on the above, a
combination of factors has contributed to strengthening efforts already ongoing towards
the design and delivery of more effective and efficient assistance. In particular, the
progressive acceptance of cash-based instruments and, more in general, a strategic shift
from food aid to food assistance has increased the importance of the use of market
analysis both strategically and at all phases of the project cycle.
From an economic perspective, the success and overall preference for a cash- or
commodity-based intervention strategy is strictly linked to the possible economic
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reaction that can be expected from local markets, which varies according to context.
Thus, focused analysis is necessary. In line with theoretical approaches such as those
proposed by Coate and Sen, decision making need to be based on the proper analysis of
availability (i.e. supply), access (i.e. demand), and the interaction between the two as
reflected in the degree of market functioning. Any attempt to sideline any of these three
points will end up reflecting a more or less limited perspective.
Having said the above, the long-awaited strategic shift has highlighted new needs,
mainly expressed in terms of analytical skills and discerning capacity required to
optimize response option analysis and strategic decision making. As in other fields,
market-based measures depend on the availability and accessibility of quality
information for effective results. For this reason databases and information systems are
regularly updated, adjusted and enlarged to provide a more detailed knowledge base for
analysis. But that is not enough: data and information systems are not valuable unless
actually utilized, and utilized in a proper manner. This leads to another problem: the
scarcity of available skills to make proper use of available information or to generate
useful information. This is a general problem: in many situations there are more data
than capacity to make proper use of them.
Such a shortage can become a critical constraint in the initial stages of an emergency
response when there is an urgent need to mobilize resources and tackle the difficult
question of selecting alternative response options. There are few approaches to market
analysis that can effectively provide support in this effort; they have been considered in
the initial part of this study. They differ in the tools and techniques adopted, some being
more data hungry than others. In general this is also reflected in a trade-off between
analytical rigour and availability of resources, mainly in terms of the time and skills
required to carry out the analysis. In some cases the complexity of the analysis can be
justified by the major political and economic implications of alternative available
options or simply by budgetary constraints. However, in other contexts, such as when
decisions must be made about life-saving interventions, the urgency of the response
may justify a less rigorous approach. For this, tools and techniques have been developed
that trade off part of the rigour and significance of the analysis in exchange for rapidity
of the findings and recommendations. Such Rapid Assessment Techniques (RATs) as
the Household Economy Approach (HEA) and the more recently developed Emergency
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Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) can provide invaluable information and
support for rapid response interventions. In some cases, such as in conflict situations,
these may be the only feasible approaches.142 However, while the implementation of
RATs is rapid and flexible they have limitations where assessing the possible risks
associated to a cash-based strategy is concerned.
9.2 Main findings of this study
The general consideration proposed throughout this study is that preference for a cash-
based rather than a commodity-based strategy is essentially based on a double
condition:
 a certain degree of market functioning;
 a certain level of price increase to be expected from the cash-based intervention.
These two conditions are strictly linked by an inverse relationship: the lower the
functionality of a market, the higher the inflationary risk to be expected from a cash-
based strategy. A certain level of inflation is acceptable and may be even favourable for
the development of the local economy. However, inflation can easily get into a vicious
cycle and then out of control. Regular adjustment of the amount of the transfer is
normally suggested as a preventive measure to keep pace with the rate of inflation.
Such a system is not always advisable, however. First of all, it penalizes the non-
recipients and therefore the risk of adverse side-effects is higher the smaller the
coverage of the programme compared to the total affected population. Second, even
ignoring the previous remark, such a measure is acceptable only in the short run and in
response to low rates of inflation, because otherwise it would end up fuelling the
spiralling process of price increases. Ideally such a risk should be assessed at an initial
stage with a certain degree of confidence, but normally this task is beyond the capacity
of RATs and furthermore, would contradict the reasons in support of a quick decision
142 It is worth mentioning that in such humanitarian interventions as Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
HEA has for years played an excellent role in support of not only the massive food aid intervention but
also of other sectoral strategies.
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making process mentioned above. Very likely the best option lies in a combined
approach: a RAT assessment conducted in the immediate aftermath of a crisis followed
within a couple of months – the time required to mobilize adequate capacity – by a more
in-depth analysis. Such a combined approach should be able to support both main
perspectives: the RAT assessment would support decisions required for an initial
response, while a more in-depth analysis would provide the wider picture from which to
mobilize a longer and more substantial and articulated response strategy. Hopefully this
type of combined but sequenced assessment and analytical approach could assist all
stakeholders in optimizing their role in the strategy. In particular, it should be able to
contribute to optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions.
One of the central issues that come out of the present study is the critical relevance of
context in determining the appropriateness of different feasible strategies. In other
words the feasibility of a strategy does not necessarily mean that it is appropriate, or if it
is, that it is the most appropriate strategy for the specific case. It has been considered
how even within the same country, or local area, some determinant factors may favour a
diversified strategy. This does not mean that the optimum strategy can be totally
adapted to the characteristics of the context; this would be either impossible or an
inefficient option from the point of view not only of the donors but also of the
implementing and associated stakeholders. It means rather that such differences are
influent in determining the wider impact of the strategy and therefore cannot be
generalized. Through a major simplification it is possible to say that the characteristics
of potential recipient communities and relevant traders, as well as of the wider context
in which both groups live and operate, are essentially the main determinants of the
success or failure of any local-level strategy. When considering the analysis from a
market point of view, whatever the proposed intervention strategy, these determinants
translate into market demand, supply and prices; therefore such determinants, including
the contextual variables, are precisely the aspects upon which the analysis needs to
focus.
This study has proposed and applied a few tools for assessing the feasibility of cash
transfers. This has been done by testing the functionality of the market and simulating
demand and supply, that is, the likely response of possible recipients and traders to an
eventual cash-based intervention. Particular attention has been paid to the simulation of
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supply response, motivated by the consideration that when demand is artificially
increased through cash transfers, much of the final outcome is determined by the
capacity to scale up local supply. This is particularly relevant both in deficit areas,
which normally rely on imports, and in areas where the majority of households are self-
sufficient and consequently there is very little engagement with the market. The
profiling exercise of traders conducted through the case studies has provided interesting
behavioural information. In particular, the relevance of price increases as a trigger of
traders’ decision to scale up their business size, named in this study as willingness to
trade (WTT) has been investigated. The fact that different price rises generate a range
of different responses from different typologies of traders in different contexts has
highlighted the need to define response capacity at the local level. From this
contextualized perspective, the comparison between increased demand and supply has
been used to estimate the price increase that can be expected from a certain injection of
cash through transfers to a set number of beneficiaries. The three case studies have
illustrated the application of the methodology proposed in different contexts. In more
general terms, the combination of different case studies has allowed the generation of a
simulation model which, on the basis of key contextual factors, can help to provide an
estimate of the rate of inflation that can be reasonably expected. The use of such a
model should contribute to improving the picture provided by RATs and is therefore
expected to offer more solid grounds for decision making. Moreover, such a model
should be of general use and therefore reasonably easy and fast in its application, even
at the early stages of response planning. Having said that, it is recognized that the three
case studies have provided only a limited basis for the generalization of the model, and
its replication through a larger set of case studies could strengthen its power and
increase its usability.
The final chapter focuses on the use of market prices as discriminatory factors in the
comparative efficiency of different strategies and combinations of strategies. Simplified
versions of isocosts and isoquants have been used as simple tools to define the
conditions of relative advantage of different strategies and to capture the effect of some
contextual variables on such conditions. This type of approach can be useful when
trying to optimize response strategy through its geographical diversification. While this
analytical approach mainly reflects a static cost-efficiency perspective, it can be
sharpened through the partial inclusion of an effectiveness perspective. This does not
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entail the inclusion of a full cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis, but rather the
estimation and comparison of differential costs associated with improvements in the
overall effectiveness of the strategy.
9.3 Final considerations
The discussion about the opportunities and constraints of cash transfers is a recurrent
subject in the field of assistance in general and food assistance in particular. The current
wave of interest in cash transfers in the humanitarian sector, reflecting the increasing
recognition of social protection policies, seems to have achieved enough support to
generate some initial changes in the design and administration of food assistance. Time
will tell whether such changes will become more structural and contribute to making
assistance more effective and efficient. It is very likely that, as in other sectors, part of
the future success of this increasingly popular form of assistance will depend on efforts
done to improve its design and implementation.
Providing cash transfers means much more than just transferring cash. It is worth
remembering that together with the many good aspects of cash-based strategy, such as
greater dignity for the recipient and support for local economy, such a strategy also
involves a few more risks. This is particularly evident in light of the ongoing process of
globalization and consequent exposure of middle- and low-income countries to the
increasing fluctuations of the global market. Such fluctuations can pose a serious risk of
economic instability, particularly in countries with a fragile economic structure, as
experienced during the recent global problems of soaring food prices and financial
crises. In such conditions operating through cash-based strategies requires particular
care in order to avoid assistance having a distorted and eventually even a
counterproductive impact. It is right that “in a context of high food prices … the
provision of vouchers and cash transfers may be a way … to mobilize assistance more
cost-efficiently when international food prices … are higher than national and local
prices” (WFP, 2008a), but it must be recognized that such an approach does not
necessarily reflect the interests of the recipients. The use of cash-based strategies should
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be discouraged in conditions of high level or risk of inflation, either at local or global
level, because they can be reasonably expected to add to local inflation what can be
called “imported inflation”. On more general grounds, the care required when
transferring cash also applies in conditions of global and local economic and financial
stability. Profit-making is one of the main objectives of business, as confirmed through
the case studies by the relevance of eventual price rises as determinants of traders’
decisions. Assuming that, in conditions of food shortage and weak market structure, the
increased demand stimulated by cash transfers can induce a gratuitous increase of local
food supply is rather naïve, particularly when considering large-scale operations. Hence
the need for careful market analysis.
All in all, the message here is that cash transfers are good, and that there is wide scope
for their increased use as a major channel for food assistance, provided that this is done
with due care and caution. It is sincerely hoped that the tools and analysis developed
through this study will contribute to making food assistance work better.
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Annex 2
Price analysis
Table A1        Range values of 13-month moving coefficient of correlation (average, min, max)*
1 kabulokor
2 kalapata 0.095
-0.595
0.980
3 kalimapus 0.323 -0.037
-0.377 -0.560
0.906 0.847
4 kerio -0.022 0.156 -0.072
-0.824 -0.643 -0.672
0.904 0.937 0.818
5 lokwi 0.072 0.398 0.215 0.158
-0.789 -0.338 -0.701 -0.591
0.999 0.981 0.896 0.941
6 lopur 0.096 0.413 0.224 0.115 0.331
-0.622 -0.201 -0.429 -0.438 -0.731
0.999 0.981 0.950 0.846 1.000
7 napeililim 0.233 0.268 -0.043 0.088 0.261 0.388
-0.438 -0.707 -0.897 -0.385 -0.795 -0.080
0.999 0.981 0.876 0.917 1.000 1.000
8 napus imoru 0.181 0.299 0.319 -0.005 0.567 0.460 0.326
-0.590 -0.611 -0.286 -0.574 -0.368 -0.470 -0.718
0.999 0.981 0.920 0.846 1.000 1.000 1.000
9 nairobi 0.156 0.151 0.242 -0.020 0.261 0.075 0.059 0.226
-0.758 -0.869 -0.462 -0.608 -0.614 -0.613 -0.719 -0.675
0.871 0.859 0.971 0.678 0.917 0.926 0.607 0.795
10 mombasa 0.084 -0.129 0.128 -0.140 0.057 -0.099 -0.180 0.033 0.626
-0.956 -0.959 -0.911 -0.747 -0.904 -0.916 -0.904 -0.906 -0.074
0.906 0.677 0.876 0.725 0.926 0.893 0.668 0.869 0.965
11 eldoret 0.185 0.132 0.222 0.002 0.153 0.104 0.006 0.045 0.644 0.623
-0.733 -0.878 -0.673 -0.800 -0.728 -0.760 -0.728 -0.738 0.139 -0.170
0.884 0.765 0.940 0.802 0.900 0.928 0.586 0.718 0.924 0.912
12 kitale 0.281 -0.017 0.225 -0.119 0.132 -0.046 0.037 0.084 0.542 0.465 0.724
-0.720 -0.822 -0.713 -0.630 -0.830 -0.827 -0.830 -0.830 -0.195 -0.505 -0.108
0.739 0.945 0.976 0.778 0.971 0.924 0.826 1.000 1.000 0.867 0.997
13 kisumu 0.273 0.016 0.139 -0.009 0.123 0.060 0.204 -0.043 0.645 0.622 0.776 0.714
-0.808 -0.947 -0.737 -0.515 -0.825 -0.817 -0.838 -0.829 -0.339 -0.442 0.397 -0.326
0.874 0.729 0.965 0.770 0.879 0.905 0.819 0.687 0.967 0.969 0.920 0.959
14 bugoma 0.332 -0.185 0.167 -0.223 -0.057 -0.228 0.002 -0.130 0.284 0.431 0.448 0.482 0.675
-0.708 -0.828 -0.732 -0.633 -0.948 -0.749 -0.751 -0.859 -0.964 -0.994 -0.996 -0.905 -0.340
0.899 0.918 0.947 0.317 0.855 0.871 0.560 0.638 0.947 0.889 0.928 0.911 0.982
15 mbale - K 0.585 0.109 0.293 -0.104 0.215 -0.031 0.177 0.118 0.543 0.461 0.727 0.823 0.746 0.619
-0.520 -0.673 -0.874 -0.924 -0.592 -0.754 -0.568 -0.751 -0.145 -0.275 -0.669 -0.056 0.039 -1.000
0.931 0.833 0.961 0.854 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.960 0.867 0.982 0.982 0.992 0.990
16 mbale - U 0.314 0.009 0.055 0.306 0.003 -0.013 0.144 0.007 0.474 0.360 0.559 0.401 0.594 0.472 0.471
-0.679 -0.936 -0.961 -0.452 -0.890 -0.800 -0.798 -0.824 -0.702 -0.620 0.159 -0.710 -0.371 -0.810 -1.000
0.857 0.651 0.757 0.965 0.768 0.655 0.890 0.710 0.945 0.945 0.867 0.880 0.952 0.998 0.817
17 bus ia - U -0.949 0.660 0.011 0.416 0.431 0.612 0.577 -0.140 0.201 0.876 0.238 -0.477 0.981
-0.994 0.401 -0.994 0.305 0.431 0.577 0.459 -1.000 -0.633 0.665 -0.996 -0.997 0.977
-0.934 0.823 0.331 0.774 0.431 0.810 0.932 0.097 0.434 0.919 0.496 -0.311 1.000
…
…
……
…
…
…
5 6
…
…
1 2 3 4 177 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
* average in bold
Table A2 ADF unit root test of logged price series - Kenya
Price series
Kabulokor -0.610 -2.613 -8.452 -2.613
Kalapata -0.270 -2.613 -8.910 -2.613
Kalimapus -0.086 -2.613 -12.396 -2.613
Kerio -0.143 -2.613 -17.517 -2.613
Lokwii -0.371 -2.613 -10.495 -2.613
Lopur -0.332 -2.613 -9.387 -2.613
Napeililim 0.135 -2.613 -12.158 -2.613
Napusimoru -0.159 -2.613 -8.852 -2.613
Nairobi -0.472 -2.614 -6.413 -2.614
Mombasa -0.210 -2.614 -7.454 -2.614
Eldoret -0.597 -2.614 -5.312 -2.614
Kitale -0.536 -2.630 -4.801 -2.631
Kisumu -0.494 -2.614 -6.807 -2.614
Bugoma -0.146 -2.619 -6.288 -2.620
Mbale K 0.506 -2.630 -6.073 -2.631
Mbale U -0.433 -2.617 -9.727 -2.614
Busia U 1.565 -2.660 -7.586 -2.659
ADF
statistic
Critical
value
1%
Levels
ADF
statistic
First differences
Critical
value
1%
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Table A3 Price transmission in Kenya
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Kabulokor Kalimapus -0.713 *** 0.240 * -0.206 ** 1 ↔ 0.904
Kabulokor Lopur -0.834 *** -0.165 * 1 0.960
Kabulokor Busia U 2.271 ** 3
Kabulokor Napeililim -0.628 ** -0.171 * 1 1.015
Kabulokor Napusimoru -0.744 ** -0.152 * 1 → 0.903
Kalapata Kabulokor -0.158 * 0.201 * -0.388 *** 1 → 0.922
Kalapata Kalimapus -0.403 *** 3 1.001
Kalapata Kerio -0.485 * -0.418 *** 2 1.013
Kalapata Lokwii -0.563 *** -0.514 *** 1 0.993
Kalapata Lopur -0.502 *** -0.507 *** 1 ← 0.994
Kalapata Nairobi -0.388 *** 1 0.985
Kalapata Napeililim -0.260 * -0.419 *** 1 1.105
Kalapata Napusimoru -0.513 *** -0.525 *** 1 ← 0.996
Kalapata Bugoma -0.444 *** 1 0.975
Kalapata Busia U 1
Kalapata Eldoret -0.398 *** 3 ← 1.033
Kalapata Kisumu -0.396 *** 1 0.963
Kalapata Kitale -0.445 ** 2 0.969
Kalapata Mbale K -0.515 *** 1 →
Kalapata Mbale U -0.412 *** 1 1.023
Kalapata Mombasa -0.394 *** 1 0.992
Kalimapus Kabulokor -0.375 *** 0.294 * -0.520 *** 1 ↔ 0.904
Kalimapus Kalapata -0.388 *** 3 1.001
Kalimapus Kerio -0.386 *** 3 0.980
Kalimapus Lokwii 0.425 * -0.389 *** 4 ← 0.979
Kalimapus Lopur -0.539 ** -0.438 *** 1 → 0.983
Kalimapus Bugoma -0.334 * -0.397 *** 3 ← 0.944
Kalimapus Eldoret -0.207 * -0.415 *** 3 1.029
Kalimapus Kisumu -0.414 *** 1 0.931
Kalimapus Kitale -0.322 * 2 → 0.942
Kalimapus Mbale U -0.265 ** -0.455 *** 1 1.017
Kalimapus Mombasa -0.408 *** 1 → 0.945
Kalimapus Nairobi -0.410 *** 1 0.966
Kalimapus Napeililim -0.409 ** -0.441 *** 1 1.017
Kalimapus Napusimoru -0.637 *** -0.465 *** 1 → 1.012
Kerio Kabulokor -0.594 *** 2 → 0.962
Kerio Kalapata -0.171 * -0.631 *** 2 1.013
Kerio Kalimapus -0.577 *** 3 0.980
Kerio Lokwii -0.285 *** -0.736 *** 2 ← 1.017
Kerio Lopur 0.397 *** -0.453 *** 3 → 1.028
Kerio Bugoma -0.422 *** 1 ↔ 1.037
Kerio Eldoret -0.100 * -0.637 *** 2 1.094
continued
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Table A3  continued
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Kerio Kisumu -0.139 * -0.631 *** 2 → 0.964
Kerio Kitale -0.355 * 2 → 0.964
Kerio Mbale K -0.655 *** 2
Kerio Mbale U -0.127 ** -0.648 *** 2 1.069
Kerio Mombasa -0.170 ** -0.641 *** 2 0.989
Kerio Nairobi -0.179 * -0.642 *** 2 1.009
Kerio Napeililim -0.171 ** 0.187 ** -0.588 *** 2 1.068
Kerio Napusimoru -0.277 *** -0.730 *** 2 ← 1.006
Lokwii Kabulokor -0.313 *** 1 → 0.968
Lokwii Kalapata -0.401 *** -0.394 *** 1 0.993
Lokwii Kalimapus -0.293 ** 4 → 0.979
Lokwii Kerio -0.576 *** -0.361 *** 2 → 1.017
Lokwii Lopur -0.249 * -0.321 *** 1 1.000
Lokwii Bugoma -0.394 ** 1 1.006
Lokwii Eldoret -0.183 ** -0.356 *** 2 ← 1.034
Lokwii Kisumu -0.230 ** -0.363 *** 1 ← 0.990
Lokwii Kitale -0.410 ** 2 0.984
Lokwii Mbale K -0.235 * -0.318 ** 2 ↔
Lokwii Mbale U -0.130 * -0.294 ** 1 ← 1.016
Lokwii Mombasa -0.266 ** -0.338 *** 1 1.056
Lokwii Nairobi -0.375 *** -0.362 *** 1 1.001
Lokwii Napeililim -0.293 ** 1 ← 1.136
Lokwii Napusimoru -0.611 *** 0.407 *** -0.502 *** 1 → 0.957
Lopur Eldoret -0.171 ** -0.307 ** 2 1.036
Lopur Kabulokor -0.188 *** -0.329 *** 1 0.960
Lopur Kalapata -0.414 *** -0.332 ** 1 → 0.994
Lopur Kalimapus -0.232 ** -0.346 *** 1 ← 0.983
Lopur Kerio 0.519 *** -0.206 ** 3 ← 1.028
Lopur Kisumu -0.236 ** -0.308 ** 1 0.982
Lopur Kitale -0.154 * 2 1.094
Lopur Lokwii -0.288 * -0.283 ** 1 1.000
Lopur Mbale K -0.220 * -0.325 ** 1
Lopur Mbale U -0.149 * -0.312 ** 1 1.022
Lopur Mombasa -0.233 * -0.296 ** 1 1.032
Lopur Nairobi -0.307 ** -0.307 ** 1 ← 0.998
Lopur Napeililim -0.259 ** 0.164 * -0.281 ** 1 1.127
Lopur Napusimoru -0.371 ** 0.396 *** -0.273 ** 1 0.964
Napeililim Napusimoru -0.508 *** 0.340 * -0.490 *** 4 ← 1.162
Napeililim Bugoma -0.442 *** 1 → 1.035
Napeililim Eldoret -0.481 *** 2 → 1.167
Napeililim Kabulokor -0.212 ** -0.501 *** 1 1.015
Napeililim Kalapata -0.321 * -0.462 *** 1 1.105
continued
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Table A3  continued
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Napeililim Kalimapus -0.263 ** -0.479 *** 1 1.017
Napeililim Kerio -0.599 ** 0.487 ** -0.421 *** 2 1.068
Napeililim Kisumu 0.618 ** -0.440 *** 2 → 1.006
Napeililim Kitale -0.418 ** 4 → 0.911
Napeililim Lokwii -0.416 *** 1 → 1.136
Napeililim Lopur -0.388 ** 0.359 * -0.436 *** 1 1.127
Napeililim Mbale K -0.844 *** 1
Napeililim Mbale U -0.190 ** -0.646 *** 1 1.146
Napeililim Mombasa -0.477 *** 1 → 0.991
Napeililim Nairobi -0.473 *** 1 1.071
Napusimoru Bugoma -0.381 ** 1 ← 0.969
Napusimoru Eldoret -0.160 * -0.259 ** 2 0.999
Napusimoru Kabulokor -0.180 ** -0.302 *** 1 ← 0.903
Napusimoru Kalapata -0.453 *** -0.285 ** 1 → 0.996
Napusimoru Kalimapus -0.292 *** -0.319 *** 1 ← 1.012
Napusimoru Kerio -0.694 *** -0.277 ** 2 → 1.006
Napusimoru Kisumu -0.188 * -0.268 ** 1 ← 0.899
Napusimoru Kitale -0.335 ** 2 0.907
Napusimoru Lokwii -0.757 *** 0.458 *** -0.391 *** 1 ← 0.957
Napusimoru Lopur -0.396 ** 0.362 *** -0.239 ** 1 0.964
Napusimoru Mbale K -0.290 ** -0.363 ** 1 ←
Napusimoru Mbale U -0.168 * -0.341 *** 1 0.996
Napusimoru Mombasa -0.254 * -0.259 ** 1 0.967
Napusimoru Nairobi -0.300 ** -0.251 ** 1 ← 0.930
Napusimoru Napeililim -0.363 *** 0.154 * -0.273 ** 4 → 1.162
Nairobi Eldoret -0.504 *** 0.229 *** -0.306 *** 3 ← 1.105
Nairobi Kisumu -0.702 *** 0.312 *** -0.511 *** 4 ↔ 0.977
Nairobi Mbale K -0.606 *** 0.281 *** -0.311 *** 1 ←
Nairobi Mbale U -0.419 *** 0.114 * -0.242 *** 1 ← 1.043
Nairobi Mombasa -0.811 *** 0.401 *** -0.351 ** 2 → 1.106
Mombasa Bugoma -0.545 *** 0.150 * -0.178 * 1 → 1.000
Mombasa Eldoret 0.248 *** -0.262 ** 2 ← 1.371
Mombasa Kisumu 0.379 *** -0.392 *** 1 ↔ 1.027
Mombasa Mbale K 0.196 * -0.313 ** 1 ←
Mombasa Mbale U -0.221 *** 1 ← 1.106
Mombasa Nairobi 0.450 *** -0.390 *** 2 ← 1.106
Eldoret Bugoma -0.897 *** 2 ↔ 1.056
Eldoret Kisumu -1.236 *** 0.517 *** -0.487 *** 2 ↔ 1.102
Eldoret Mbale K -1.258 *** 0.779 *** -0.459 ** 1
Eldoret Mbale U -0.790 *** -0.283 *** 2 ↔ 1.000
Eldoret Mombasa -1.369 *** 0.731 *** 2 → 1.371
continued
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Table A3  continued
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Eldoret Nairobi -1.577 *** 0.839 *** -0.205 * 3 → 1.105
Kitale Bugoma -0.617 *** -0.266 * 2 ← 1.003
Kitale Eldoret -0.681 *** 0.856 *** -0.316 ** 2 ← 1.011
Kitale Kisumu -0.935 *** 0.936 *** -0.321 ** 2 ← 1.028
Kitale Mbale U -0.598 *** -0.432 *** 2 ← 1.052
Kisumu Bugoma -0.722 *** 0.267 *** 2 ↔ 0.995
Kisumu Eldoret -0.699 *** 0.364 *** -0.416 *** 2 ↔ 1.102
Kisumu Mbale K -0.906 *** 0.538 *** -0.656 *** 2 ↔
Kisumu Mbale U -0.612 *** 0.127 * -0.341 *** 2 ↔ 1.049
Kisumu Mombasa -1.080 *** 0.680 *** -0.303 ** 1 ↔ 1.027
Kisumu Nairobi -1.242 *** 0.750 *** -0.386 ** 4 ↔ 0.977
Bugoma Eldoret -0.536 -0.167 * 2 ↔ 1.056
Bugoma Kisumu -0.918 *** 0.902 *** -0.388 ** 2 ↔ 0.995
Bugoma Kitale -0.562 *** -0.287 * 2 → 1.003
Bugoma Mbale U -0.554 *** -0.351 *** 1 ← 1.001
Bugoma Mbale K -1.160 *** 1.359 *** -0.883 *** 2 ↔
Bugoma Mombasa -1.038 *** 0.802 ** -0.343 ** 1 ← 1.000
Bugoma Nairobi -1.028 *** -0.285 ** 1 → 0.999
Mbale K Kalimapus -0.689 *** -0.186 * 1 →
Mbale K Lokwii -0.575 * 2 ↔
Mbale K Bugoma -0.801 *** 0.437 *** -0.794 *** 2 ↔
Mbale K Eldoret -0.717 *** 0.567 *** -0.617 *** 1
Mbale K Kisumu -0.981 *** 0.555 *** -0.815 *** 2 ↔
Mbale K Mbale U -0.719 *** -0.362 *** 1
Mbale K Mombasa -1.007 *** 0.562 * -0.359 ** 1 →
Mbale K Nairobi -1.262 *** 1.148 *** -0.342 ** 1 →
Mbale K Napeililim -0.153 * 1
Mbale K Napusimoru -0.599 ** 1 →
Mbale U Busia U -0.860 *** 0.792 * 1
Mbale U Eldoret -0.811 *** 0.447 * -0.275 * 2 ↔ 1.000
Mbale U Kalimapus -0.641 ** 1 1.017
Mbale U Kisumu -1.124 *** 0.756 ** -0.328 * 2 ↔ 1.049
Mbale U Kitale -0.761 *** 2 → 1.052
Mbale U Mombasa -1.117 *** 1 → 1.106
Mbale U Nairobi -1.429 *** 1.018 ** -0.256 * 1 → 1.043
Busia U Kabulokor 0.389 ** 3
Busia U Kerio 1
Busia U Eldoret -1.543 * 0
Busia U Napeililim 0
significance:  *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
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Table A4 ADF unit root test of logged price series - Swaziland
Price series
Mbabane -1.052 -2.652 -4.761 -2.654
Hlathikhulu -1.210 -2.596 -11.019 -2.596
Manzini -1.145 -2.595 -10.875 -2.595
Siteki -1.126 -2.595 -8.274 -2.595
Big bend -0.806 -2.595 -10.354 -2.595
Symunie -0.934 -2.595 -11.232 -2.595
Piggs peak -1.186 -2.595 -10.601 -2.595
Nhlangano -1.062 -2.595 -11.033 -2.595
Mankayane -1.275 -2.595 -10.515 -2.595
SAFEX -0.424 -2.598 -7.214 -2.598
ADF
statistic
Critical
value
1%
Levels
ADF
statistic
Critical
value
1%
First differences
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Table A5 Price transmission in Swaziland
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Mbabane Hlathikhulu -1.327 *** 0.971 ** -0.901 ** 2 ↔ 0.966
Mbabane Siteki -0.956 *** -0.434 * 1 ← 1.491
Mbabane Bigbend -1.354 *** 1 → 0.761
Mbabane Symunie -0.897 *** 1 ↔ 1.228
Mbabane SAFEX -0.566 *** -0.468 ** 1 ← 1.003
Hlathikhulu Mbabane -0.615 *** 0.326 ** -0.948 *** 2 ↔ 0.966
Hlathikhulu Manzini -0.875 *** -0.071 * 2 ↔ 1.000
Hlathikhulu Siteki -1.558 *** 0.880 *** 2 → 1.673
Hlathikhulu Big bend -1.679 *** 0.900 *** 2 → 5.358
Hlathikhulu Piggs peak -1.063 *** 0.431 *** -0.127 * 3 ↔ 0.993
Hlathikhulu Nhlangano -1.372 *** 0.292 *** 1 1.530
Hlathikhulu Mankayane -1.196 *** 0.496 *** -0.272 *** 1 ↔ 1.048
Manzini Hlathikhulu -0.854 *** -0.124 ** 2 ↔ 1.000
Manzini Piggs peak -1.010 *** 0.274 * -0.184 *** 1 ← 1.246
Siteki Hlathikhulu -0.516 *** 0.498 *** -0.096 * 2 ← 1.673
Siteki Big bend -1.098 *** 0.741 *** -0.212 ** 1 ↔ 1.954
Siteki Symunie -0.839 *** 0.415 *** -0.136 ** 1 → 1.005
Siteki Nhlangano -0.896 *** 0.260 *** -0.151 *** 1 ← 1.016
Siteki Mankayane -0.632 *** 0.413 *** -0.136 ** 1 ← 1.114
Bigbend Siteki -0.819 *** 0.475 *** -0.279 *** 1 ↔ 1.954
Bigbend Symunie -0.724 *** 0.308 *** -0.179 *** 2 ↔ 1.228
Bigbend Piggs peak -0.470 *** 0.306 *** -0.099 * 3 → 2.938
Bigbend Nhlangano -0.768 *** 0.263 *** -0.141 *** 1 ← 1.093
Bigbend Mankayane -0.542 *** 0.325 *** -0.142 ** 1 ← 1.071
Symunie Mbabane -0.684 *** -0.634 * 1 ↔ 1.228
Symunie Hlathikhulu -0.477 *** 0.884 *** -0.088 * 1 ← 1.627
Symunie Manzini -0.278 *** -0.250 ** -0.092 * 1 ← 1.465
Symunie Siteki -0.948 *** 0.920 *** -0.267 *** 1 ← 1.005
Symunie Big bend -1.097 *** 1.052 *** -0.279 *** 2 ↔ 1.228
Symunie Piggs peak -0.474 *** 0.504 *** -0.139 ** 4 ↔ 1.091
Symunie Nhlangano -0.981 *** 0.286 ** -0.374 *** 1 ← 0.999
Symunie Mankayane -0.585 *** 0.483 *** -0.172 *** 1 ← 1.089
Piggs peak Hlathikhulu -0.865 *** 0.343 *** -0.332 *** 3 ↔ 0.993
Piggs peak Manzini -0.798 *** 0.165 * 1 → 1.246
Piggs peak Siteki -1.356 *** 0.674 *** -0.081 * 3 ↔ 1.136
Piggs peak Big bend -1.526 *** 0.584 *** -0.068 * 3 ← 2.938
Piggs peak Nhlangano -1.158 *** 0.247 ** 4 ← 1.200
Piggs peak Mankayane -1.056 *** 0.394 *** -0.211 *** 1 ← 1.023
Nhlangano Hlathikhulu -0.380 *** 0.336 *** -0.146 ** 1 1.530
Nhlangano Siteki -0.778 *** 0.443 *** -0.195 *** 1 → 1.016
Nhlangano Big bend -0.894 *** 0.625 *** -0.171 ** 1 → 1.093
Nhlangano Symunie -0.753 *** 0.246 ** -0.221 ** 1 → 0.999
Nhlangano Piggs peak -0.415 *** 0.292 ** -0.118 ** 4 → 1.200
Nhlangano Mankayane -0.520 *** 0.438 *** -0.162 ** 3 ← 1.004
Mankayane Hlathikhulu -0.779 *** 0.301 *** -0.211 *** 1 ↔ 1.048
Mankayane Big bend -1.346 *** 0.345 *** 1 → 1.071
Mankayane Symunie -1.003 *** 0.178 *** 1 → 1.089
Mankayane Piggs Peak -0.838 *** 0.255 *** 1 1.023
Mankayane Nhlangano -1.162 *** 0.210 *** 3 → 1.004
SAFEX Piggs peak -0.291 *** 3 → 1.031
significance:  *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
Annexes
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
307
Table A6 ADF unit root test of logged price series – Southern Sudan
Price series
Aweil -1.097 -2.660 -4.819 -2.660
Juba -0.759 -2.642 -4.553 -2.644
Malakal -1.116 -2.644 -2.739 -2.646
Wau -0.677 -2.647 -3.120 -2.649
US -0.908 -2.642 -5.633 -2.644
First differencesLevels
ADF
statistic
Critical
value
1%
ADF
statistic
Critical
value
1%
Table A7 Price transmission in Southern Sudan
i ← I 2 2 3 direction ofcausality Half life
Aweil Malakal -0.5663 *** -0.441 * 2 1.061
Aweil US -0.578 ** 4 ↔ 0.776
US Aweil -0.6142 *** 4 ↔ 0.776
US Juba -0.9918 * 2 2.341
US Malakal -0.6364 *** 2 → 0.956
significance:  *** = 0.001, ** = 0.005, * = 0.01
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Annex 3
Prototypes of questionnaires used
for case-studies
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